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Abstract 
The thesis argues that language research in education 
is implicitly positivistic, and that in:'focussing on 
communioative functions, most ,investigations ignore 
the processes of expression. This imbalance has in-
fluenced theory and method in English Studies, which 
should acknowledge both aspects. After a review of 
linguistic influences, a phenomenological epistemology 
is developed. This provides the basis for an account 
of language which restores the element of expression. 
The centre of the work comprises two parallel strands 
of enquiry which have an elaborated distinction of de 
Saussure's langue and parole as their common structure. 
After sketching a simple model of some of the features 
of langue, one part draws on phenomenological writing. 
It shows .how the formal structure of language has its 
roots in experience; langue, therefore, - as a science 
of elements - is ,extended to comprehend the relation-
ship of those necessary abstractions to the structures 
of experience underlying them. Whe .other part shows 
how such a philosophical account has an empirical and 
useful validity; literary method is used to describe 
the expressive aC,ts of students as they discuss poetry. 
Consonant with the first part, parol'e is viewed as so 
many instances of experience disposed to sharing mean-
ing. This illumination of parole suggests some);"truths 
which research methodology must respect if it is to 
recognise the character and event of meaning. In con-
clusiori, several principles of art which the expressive 
nature of language shares are elaborated with examples 
from 'literature, and pedagogic implications illustrated 
from the author's experience. Finally, phenomenolog-
ical enquiry is characterised as a method which can in-
vestigate the experience of language in education; such 
work respects the personal, experience of meaning, and 
so the moral dimension of research lies in the problem 
of communicating that effort for meaning to others. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
An overview of the study 
Intelligent thought about the nature of thought and 
the criteria of good thinking is impossible apart 
from intelligence about the nature of language, and 
the necessary intelligence about language involves 
an intimate acquaintance with a subtle language in 
its fullest use. English is a subtle language; its 
literature is very rich, and its continuity stretches 
over centuries, starting long before the great seven-
teenth century change; sa there'ispoint in saying that 
for the English speaking philosopher the fullest use 
of language ought to be its use by the creative writ-
ers of his own time, and he needs to take full cog-
nizance of this truth. 
(Leavis, 1975, p.13) 
How should an English teacher start thinking about lang-
uage? This thesis started out in dissatisfaction with 
accepted approaches in language research. The English 
teacher who carries out research in his area of teaching 
is n~rmally faced with a limited number of choices •. These 
range between literary study for its own sake and enquiry 
into language as some sort of object. The first would 
probably not anyway be carried out in a Department of Ed-
ucation, except possibly as the subject of a more global 
analysis of language interaction, say. The second usual-
ly entails some enquiry into the functions of language 
from the perspectives (and using the techniques) of soc-
iology, of psychology and linguistics. Inherent in this 
. 
approach is the idea of language as essentially disembod-
ied and functional. 
Some explanation for this state of affairs can be found 
historically in the sophistication of the theory of ed-
ucation which accompanied the burgeoning of soci~l sci-
ence in the 1960s and 70s; prior to this, th~ory had, 
for the most part, been in the hands of 'great thinkers' 
like Dewey (1964) and Whitehead (1962)~ In this later 
p~riod, the philosophy of education established its tenor 
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with the occupation of academic philosophy in conceptual 
and linguistic analysis, and similarly jettisoned inter-
est in ethics and aesthetics. And while these moves to-
wards a particular sort of coherence were attaching a 
more or less benign positivism to the study of language 
in education, the literary influence went unself-con-
sciously and unfashionably along, and, with a few except-
ions, remained virtually unexplicated. 
One notable exception was F.R.Leavis' The Living Prin-
ciple (1975), whose title anticipates his project for 
English Studies as the basic structure for intelligent 
and humane thought in the universities. Language, the 
argume.nt goes, is nothing if it is not deeply expressive 
and creative of human value. By extension, linguistics 
is the systematic account of that 'nothing' writ large: 
it is what is left in the wake of removing from the pur-
view of language the indispensable element of human con-
sciousness which is the foundation of all utterance. 
The incongruity of this view with the prevalent under-
standing of language needs no comment; the opposition of 
the linguistic and the literary approach to language is 
endemic. So this thesis opens by considering some of 
the influences which have shaped the current understand-
ing of language in education, and then proposes a struc-
ture for departing from this model (Chapter 2). 
Leavis and a few others were at pains to preserve a way 
of using and of thinking about language which had little 
status in British philosophy. In Continental movements, 
.. 
however, the view was central to phenomenology, and to 
such phenomenological schools as existentialism and her-
meneutics. Phenomenology deals equally with human exper-
ienceand human behaviour in a manner which-is systematic 
without being grossly reductive. Ques~ions of the will, 
of morality and of beauty are all of a piece with observ-
ations on the structure of language, of perception and of 
the body. The method, most simply, is that of radical 
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self-reflection; the standard questions of philosophy -
What is it to be a man? What is it to know such and such 
a thing ? and so on - must be confronted not according to 
hallowed techniques and models of enquiry but, as far as 
this is possible, by reflecting in the only way I can come 
to know things: by their passage through my own experience. 
The thesis is thus developed in Chapter ,3 with a general 
statement about the aims of the phenomenological project, 
and also a personal attempt to grapple with the knotty 
subject-object problem. Such an establishment of the prin-
ciples of enquiry, the status of the object and the orient-
ation of the enquirer is surely essential preparation for 
any piece of research, but it is particularly important in 
a study like the present one. The intention is not to 
raid popular understanding anarchically, but to show how 
the alternative has a proper structure and that it is one 
shared with, yet taken for granted by traditional methods. 
The hub of the work is based on de Saussure's distinction 
of Langue and Parole, described like" this: Langue is 
a hoard deposited by the practice of speech in 
speakers who belong to the same community, a 
grammatical system which, to all intents and 
purposes, exists in the mind of each speaker. 
Parole is 
and 
the executive side of language ••• (involving) 
••• the combinations by which the speaker uses 
the code of the linguistic system in order to 
express his own thoughts ••• 
the psycho-physical mechanisms which permit him 
to externalise these combinations. 
(Saussure, 1974, p.13,14) 
The terms have been freely used in various disciplines, 
chiefly for their capacity to explain the occur~ence of 
the actual in terms of, and against the possibility of 
the virtual. What I have done is to posit Langue as the 
general ground of exp~rience and to describe, in Chapter 
4, how other concepts in addition to the purely linguistic 
are required if wenwant to show how this personal experience 
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finds expression. Building up a model of language through 
some of the levels suggested by linguistics - the phoneme, 
word, sentence, and so on - I have elaborated in each case 
a phe mmenological understanding of the process. 
In the limite~ 'empirical' enquiry which comprises Chapter 
5, these augmented levels of language are used to describe 
how language reveals something of the experience of mean-
ing making. I have set the instances of 6th formers dis-
cussing a poem against some methodological'propositions 
generated by the analysis of Chapter 4. My suggestion is 
tha t if we pre sum e to i nte rp re t Par ole - the 0 ts e rva bl e 
portion of meaning - then we must do so with respect for 
the experience which gives rise to it, and not merely in 
terms of its phenomenal shape. 
It is important that these two chapters of the middle 
section be understood as parallel; their common structure 
reflects the way in which they report on different aspects 
of the same phenomena. But, even more importantly, to-
gether they reflect the unity of the apparently separate 
processes of my enquiry which were going on at the same 
time. That is, I was involved in teaching, in reflect-
ing on that teaching, and in reading in language studies, 
in philosophy, literature and education. The thesis now 
has a shape which is a rationalisation of the processes 
of discovery which went on. Perhaps it is inevitably 
true of all theses that their final form is the result 
more 'of a l.,rlcal cunning than of historical accuracy. 
But in giving a particular order of presentation to the 
work, I r~alise that I am now choosing to emphasise .cer-
tain connections which were not always explicit in the 
development. The connection I should now want to em-
phasise in this overview is the inseparability of thought-
ful practice and heuristic thinking. 
The last two Chapters, 6 and 7, have a similarly necessary 
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connection. One of the chief effects of describing the 
experiential character of language is to discover an 
account of the general symbolising processes common to 
all forms of experience, and maximised by art. This is 
the idea which informs the- conclusions,_ where the study 
is firstly re-implicated in the classroom. (Chapter 6). 
Here I have elaborated three principles of art-making 
which show the contiguity of the processes of art and of 
speaking, principles which must have very clear implic-
ations for teaching. But this expressive character of 
language -and the linguistic structure of experience 
which it reflexively implies - make particular demands 
of research as well. The thesis ends by turning back 
on the original problem : How shall we carry out research 
into language? The thesis has restored the literary 
and practical dimension of experience to the abstraction 
of language created by linguistics; it follows that res-
earch into language iIl: .... education: must be based in this 
literary understanding of language, because such an app-
roach demands the engagement of the researcher with the 
human values which constitute his object. Such research 
must then be 'practical' in the sense of its engagement 
with the real things which language points to, rather 
than with the false objects which standardised, linguist-
ic research techniques interpose. 
But how would such 'personal', such 'literary' work be 
evaluated? The insight that values in language occur not 
in syntax but in the experience of the reader does not 
mean that there is no shared text, just as the parallel 
view that "research must involve the consciousness of the 
enquirer does not mean that his work remains removed by 
his 'subjectivity' from common concern. The presence of 
the reader or researcher is in a very literal sense a 
condition of there being a text or a research event at all 
The object, and the values which sustain that object, are· 
what critical or technical devices point to; the linguist, 
philosopher or educational researcher who reveals no 
experience of that object remains locked in the insub-
stantiality of such devices. The point in both cases 
is brought home by the analysis in Chapters 4 and 5: 
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there are structures to language and to experience which 
scientific enquiry can explicate, but those explanations 
depend for their very conviction on a quality of attend-
ing in the listener which is beyond the brief and capacity 
of our usual sciences to describe. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
C~n language be an object for enquiry ? 
2.1 Research in education is practised within certain generally 
well-prescribed limits. Some of these limits are determin-
ed directly by local policies, p~eferences and expertise: 
a broader set is defined by the influences on educational 
theory of 'pure' social science. Many such research 
exercises are ·based. on the model provided by natural science, 
where observable phenomena are explained in terms of explicit 
and general interpretative schemes. This is obviously not 
the case in research in educational philosophy, where the 
absence of an empirical component provides for a more re-
flective or theoretical work. But, even in this area, 
research has not escaped the infection of a scientific 
drive to explication, and educational philosophy has foll-
owed the analytic trend of academic philosophy. Of course, 
the point is not that there is anything wrong with the 
application'of science to education, and all enquiry is to 
some extent scientific; but these influences do raise the 
question whether educational research, as traditionally 
practised, is properly oriented to deal with certain areas 
of experi ence. 
Language research is one such area. The spirit of research 
into lapguage has been concerned to find 'real', useful, 
certain, precise, organic things to say. Of course, it 
is a chronic problem for research that looking at language 
must be done in language: language must be, that is, both 
subject and medium of the focus. As the subject of philo-
sophical enquiry language remains at the level of generality, 
unbounded by empirical requirements and the mediu~ is in 
fact an exultation in language - language interacting self-
consciously with language. Outside of such work, the 
subject"of research is. more often a 'co'rpus' of actual 
utterances, defined according to the requirements of the 
discipline; the medium, accordingly, is an equally well-
8 
defined mechanism for sorting this language out; in the 
common research tradition data and a scheme fulfil each 
other. A subtle alloy of Cartesian duality and empiricist 
methodology generally prevents any proper philosophical 
bUrgeoning of the enquiry; it proceeds in,the positivist 
shadow, and 'rigour' denotes measurability rather than 
commitment. 
The problem of language research should be a particularly 
acute one for the English teacher preparing for educational 
,research; he is faced with an implicit model of language 
quite foreign to the one which he took for granted in the 
literature faculty. It is almost as though the education-
ist and the professor of literature were talking of 
different subjects when they spoke of language. Language 
in literary studies is a matter of engagement with the 
subtleties of value in human concerns; in education the 
dO~inant trend is to seek to neutralise language through 
making explicit its various functions.' These functionalist 
descriptions- though aimed 'at disclosing their objects -
have tended to be more eloquent of their own method than 
illuminative of the character of language. 
In this chapter I shall firstly discuss in a general way 
some of the 'current influences on language in education, 
and then outline the epistemologies which lie behind them. 
I' ehall finally characterise phenomenology as the alternat-
ive epistemological ground for educational research which 
will reveal a radically different understanding of language. 
This under~tanding should be recognisable to to education-
ist and literature student alike. 
2.2 The chief philosophical influences on education in this 
., . 
century undoubtedly echo, if not directly derive from the 
two systems of thought developed byWittgenstein (1961; 
1963). ,The positiYism of the earlier system still survives 
9 
but it is the later, 'therapeutic' and prolegomenary lin-
gUistic philosophy which has spawned an analytic tenor for 
the virtual monopoly of educational philosophy by R.S. Peters 
and like-minded colleagues (Peters, 1967 ; Peters and Hirst, 
1971. ) • 
Interpreting Wittgenstein literally on the subject of the 
philosopher's attention to language ('Never mind the meaning, 
look to the use !'), Peters and White (1971), for example, 
identify themselves with the philosophers who 
have abandoned the, view that they are spectators of all 
time and all existence whose job it is to make oracular 
pronouncements about the purpose of life and of education. 
(p.llO) 
What remains to them is the task of neutralising language; 
the a priori concerns of the possibility, nature, aims and 
methods of education are considered to be isolable by clari-
fying the everyday uses of language. "What is it to be 
educated? What is indoctrination? What do we mean by 
a worthwhile activity?" : this is the stuff of educational 
phiJorophy, and it is the claim of such philosophers as Peters 
that' the answers they have offered to these questions are 
neutral, apolitical and simply descriptive. 
However, as the field of philosophy 'proper' has recently 
begun to open up to other, social concerns, so the hold of 
this way of doing educational philosophy has been broken; a 
philosophy which "leaves everything as it is" - even if it 
were possible - suddenly seems as glaringly inappropriate 
now as its method, seemed eminently practicable ten or so 
years ago ... The passive 'underlabourer' role is beginning 
to be abandoned in favour of more obviously prescriptive 
systems. Aspin (1982) identifies phenomenological, plural-
ist, utilitarian and Marxist in addition to purely analytic 
approaches to specific curricular, social and-personal, 
questions. 
But these developments are not unequiv6cal improvements, 
and two points shouTd be made here. The first is that, 
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although there is this new exploration of personal and more 
immediate issues, approaches to the transcendent problems 
of meaning and to the epistemologies which they represent 
are still in the main socially rather than personally 
oriented. What appears to be a chronic and ineradicable 
legacy of positivism is the tendency to view 'meaning' as 
more or less explicable since it is 'on the outside' of 
experience~ In parallel with the scientific drive to more 
concise and communicable characterisations of experience, 
philosophical approaches to meaning still assume that words 
have more or less firm values, and that they are susceptible 
to dialectical, or determinist, or pluralist or plain posit-
ivist devices. There is no genuine exploration of tru~y 
personal experience. (And this holds true for the literary 
approach to meaning of Ogden and Richards (1949)). 
The second point partly explains this. Philosophy has 
traditionally been practised as a strictly non-enp:irical 
activity, seldom by teachers themselves, and almost always 
with 'detachment' as a condition of validity~ The meaning 
of his involvement has usuall~ been 'explained by the philo-
sopher in terms of the system within which he works; the 
event of that involvement he excludes from' his brief. But 
if philosophy is to take on. real problems, as these recent 
modulations of empiricism sugg~st, how can it do so without 
explicitly attaching to its reflections the evidence of real 
engagement with its objects? 
By contrast, although its foundations are in the tradition 
of reflection (Dilthey 1976, 1977), psychology proceeds as 
an empi,,·i.cal acti vi ty' in the main. The. question "How can : 
language be an object for study?" is meaningless for most 
Psychologies, since it is manifestly susceptible ~o enquiry. 
But itis only the observable portion, as it ~ere, which is 
visible to Most research. . Even in the Romantic tradition of 
~. .. 
Freud, where it is seen as substantially more than a function 
of the.individual's behaviour, language has no obvious moral 
dimension. 
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The influences on education are, therefore, rather predict-
able and two schools dominate these. The first, Behaviour-
ism, has been described (by Koch, 1969) as 'the enduring 
predicament of psychology', and it is no less .;a persistent 
bogey of education. The empiricist and positivistic project 
of conceiving psychic life under the category of the con-
ditioned reflex· means that language is no more thana 
function of behaviour, and 'meaning' something revealed by 
instruments brought to bear on this behaviour. Although 
Behaviourism has passed out of fashion in a pure form, there 
are enduring influences in, for example, the modification 
technology of special education, less explicitly in inter-
action studies, .and more subtly in the uncritical, positivist 
lore of teachers understandings of learning processes. 
The second major influence on educational theory, if not so 
much on practice has been the rationalist response to such 
full- blown em.piricism, chiefly in the work of Piaget. By 
contrast wi th the .. Behaviourists, cogni ti ve psychologists 
allow privacy and meaning to the psychic life, and the 
relationship between language and thought has become a 
major question for them. For Piag~t (1999), language 
attends cognition as part of a greater symbolic function, 
developing only in measure with prior operational structures. 
Where for associationist psychology language is effectively 
a structure learned from the e~vironm.ent, for mentalist 
psychology it is. an innate structure imposed on,though to 
Some extent modified by that environment. Similarly 
rationalist in character is Chomsky's project (1957,1.965) 
to explain the structural interdependence of language and 
the psyche in term'S of a Language Acquisition Device, .though 
the highly theoretical nature of this and other psycho-
linguistic enquiry has brought about renewed empirical 
interest in the social rather than purely psychological 
aspects of language. 
Reviewing various approaches to language in psychology, 
Donaldson (1978) has· noted that 
The living child does not seem to enter into the 
business very actively (not to say fully) ••• 
What does the warm blood in the veins matter? 
(p.38-39) 
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Whilst this is' not strictly true of Piaget's work, the fact 
remains that the experience of .meaning is no more a part of 
his brief than it is a possibil~ty for the behaviourist -
this despite the fact that feeling is a recognised mode of 
experience for the cognitive psychologist. In either case 
language is an index, whether it be of signification 'with 
concealed musculature', or of cognitive achievement. The 
possibility of a 'language of the affect' has been explored 
only in abnormal psychology. 
The approaches to language of sociology seem easiest to 
characterise. Where the nature and mediation of 'the ~eal' 
is problematic.for phfusophy and psychology ( a problem to 
some extent:given with their constitution) the datum for 
sociology has traditionally been precisely that reality in 
its concr'ete,form. The question. of what language is is 
subordinated to. the functional on~ of what it does, and the 
sociologist is rather concerned with how the signified is 
realised for a social group than with its metaphysical 
relation to the signifiers which acc1Jnplish i.t. Similarly 
the life of these, signifiers in the experience of the , 
individual has not been an admissable concern. This has 
been qualified to some extent by the 'new' sociology which 
speaks of a "'sociology of knowledge', based in the relativ-
istic work of' such as Schutz (1967), Goffman (1961), Whorf 
(1956). Qualitative methods have been developed which 
enact the principle that reality is socially-constructed 
and linguistically mediated. But this invitation to . 
participate in the construction of a fragmented reality 
barely di£fers from the traditional empiricist on~ in its 
conception of language as an. instrument: individuals 
receive meanings through a language which houses the values 
of 'their culture. Perhaps the best-known and most enduring 
working out of this general sociological understanding of 
language is to be found in Bernstein (1975). His theory 
has undergone modifications since it first appeared but 
still points - in his elaborated and restricted codes, 
his framing of knowledge, etc. - to the social control 
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which language accomplishes by this account. The structure, 
processes and effects of this relation bet~een society and 
language is the .concern of the specialist field of socio-
linguistics. Labov's (1969) work with coloured sub-cultures 
is standard here, and the so-called London School founded by 
J.R.Firth (1957, etc.) has promoted such a~ Halliday (1969) 
and Mitchell (1957). In reaction to what was considered 
an' excess of theoretical speculation after the manner of 
Chomsky, this present approach is characterised by field-
work supp~rting empiricist theories. 
The direct effects of sociology and sociolingtistics on 
educational. theory, practice and research can be seen in 
the functional and empi~icist models of language which.lie 
behind the Bullock Report (HMSO, 1975), like-.m~ndedlanguage 
enrichment schemes 'like ~angu~ge in ~s~. (Doughty et a1, 
1971), and the various schemes of interaction and discourse 
analysis. Finally we can observe that there is nowhere in 
the sociologist's understanding of language - not even in 
the schemes of the 'sociological phenomenologists' - an. 
adequate account of the purely personal genesis and history 
of meaning. 
Reference has been made to the methods of linguistics 
applied in psychological and sociological. fields without 
really identifying the ground of the science itself, which 
will now be looked at in more detail. Although there is 
little form~l" presence of linguistics in educational theory, 
the grow~h of the'science of language has undoubtedl~had 
direct as well as subtle effects on the tradition~l ~ducat­
ional disciplines, and hence a direct and determining 
influenc~ on the dominating understandi~g of language in 
education. 'Pure' linguistics is concerned with language 
as a datum in itself, and not as an index of some other 
value. To-this end, - of establishing finite values - it 
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is called a science. Actually of course, practice has 
determined the character of the enquiry, and the persuasion 
firstly of psycholinguistics and then of sociolinguistics 
insists that language cannot ·be studied t·oo· far' away 
from the fact that it is people who use it,. and that the 
contextual ·"detail of these specific useages cannot be missed 
out of any realistic account. 
Linguistics' has thus followed the fashions of social science, 
Its high point as a science was arguably its 'identification 
by Bloomfield, (1933) with the principles of behaviourism. 
The American tradition actually arose out of a practical 
concern at the turn of the century to record the rapidly-
dying Amerindian languages. One development of this was 
Sapir's '(1949) work which was culturally-based but emphas-
ised the "purely human' and 'non-instinctive', rational 
and cognitive aspects of langua~e. The other was the 
behaviouri'st·tr.adi tion against which Chomsky was to react. 
It is perhaps finally the interpretation which linguists 
put on meaning and .on its location which ,distinguishes them 
from each other.. The more rationalist (and generally 
Psycholinguistic) approaches - such as transformational-
generative linguistics - stress mental process, whilst the 
current hue of linguistics is decidedly empiricist. 
This said there yet remains an identifiable core to 
theoretical linguistics. It is Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1915;1974) who provides the basis for modern linguistics, 
and all the various schools we now know proceed from the 
tone and pr~nciples of his enquiry. Modern study is to be 
distinguished from Saussure's predecessors' on several. 
points. Firstly, it stresses the priority of the spoken 
language, where earlier accounts assumed the superiority of 
the writt~n. Notions of correctness attach ~o a literary 
grammar and it is on this feature that the second innovation 
dep,ends; modern linguistics claims to depart the prescriptive, 
oracular function of previous enquiries and to offer a 
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descriptive account of all languages, recognised as leg-
itimately such whether they be apparently 'primitive' or 
acknowledged as 'sophisticated'. An important conceptual 
and methodological distinction which accomplishes this 
descriptive work is Saussure's~ opposition of synchronic 
and diachronic study. The latter is concerned with the 
historical development of a particular language and hence 
has some normative character, where synchronic study con-
siders language as it is arrested in ~ts special state at 
a particular time. The spirit of modern science is evident 
in this concern with the 'raw', observable data rather than 
with the qualifying speculation of a historical method. 
But the signal character of Saussure's work is his struct-
uralist understanding of this synchronic language, that is 
to say his "demonstration of the system of relations which 
makes a language coherent and which validates the separate 
components only in their contrasti ve relation to each "other. 
Saussure'sprovision of a distinction between a language 
which comprehends all possible utterances by acknowledged 
speakers of that language (Langue), and a language which is 
the actual instances realised by an individual (Parole) 
anticipates the application of linguistics to other fields. 
Aspects of structure, of phonology and ofa wider grammar, 
and some methodological procedures provide the core of a 
theoretic"al linguistics. But, as the enqui.ry of Fodor and 
Katz (1964) showed that the semantic area was not suscept-
ible to the same treatment as the syntactic, it is finally 
at" the poin t where 'si gni fier' . meets 'si gni fi ed' tha t 
linguistics must be seen to relinquish an authoritative 
hold on the "character of language. Linguistics can 
provide structural models of the observable phenomena 6f 
language, and in this respect can do so with a sc~entific 
respectability. But where the venture shades into the 
moral concerns of Ii terary stylistics (see e. §t S~beok 1966) 
and henc~' has to spawn ~n endless catalo'gue of scholarly 
antinomies such as sense and reference, emotive v. cognitive 
meaning, etc, it becomes both speculative and reductive, 
adding little increment to our understanding of the ex-
perience of meaning. 
Linguists might say that experience is not in any event 
their concern, and this invites questions not so much 
about the uses as about the moral foundations of such 
study. 
An area of study where there is some. acknowledgement of 
the importance of the participating indi vidual in the 
creation of meaning is discourse analysis. The problem 
of meaning at which a 'pure' linguistics must hesitate 
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has been put again by linguistic apPToaches which draw on 
anthropology, sociology, ~sychologY'and, not curiously, 
linguistic philosophy. The application of the work of 
Austin (1962) and Searle (l965, etc.) to linguistics 
actually returns the present survey to its beginning with 
Philosophy, although it is a very different conception of 
phllosophy from that of the Greeks. It is a scientistic 
empiricism which provides 'speech aets' and 'events' and, 
generally, a view of meaning as.an empirically accessible 
ground. Austin (1962) observed that philosophy had assumed 
that 
the business of a: stat~ment can only be to describe 
some state of affairs or to "state some fact", which 
it must do either truly or falsely. 
(Austin in Coulthard, 1977, p.ll) 
AUstin's work, and the later work of Searle show that this 
is not the case, and provide the· rationale for the measured 
hermeneutic which linguists have turned on discourse. The 
method of discourse analysis,. combining as it does these 
strands froni' various other enquiries, typifies the current 
attitude to language in linguistic enquiry, and indicates 
its status as a subject for that enquiry. The f~eld is 
of course wide and diverse across commitments to particular 
theories. 
Bef~re moving on to alternative approaches to the study of 
language,.I should like to illustrate the effects of the 
influences just described (from philosophy, sociology, 
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psychOlogy, linguistics) on a specific area of educational 
research. In classroom interaction studies, classroom 
language itself (or extracts from it) is taken as data, 
and meanings are fashioned from it. Research workers in 
the field clearly view language as functional, since 
'meaning' is deduced on the basis of inferred 'uses'. In 
addition, reduction of the data, which may be extreme or 
more benign, inevitably results in the demotion, if not 
the total.exclusion of the expressive nature of language. 
Inevitably, because it is so much easier, the focus is on 
communi ca tion. 
Classroom interaction studies arose from a belief in the 
causal relationship. between language useage and educational 
achie';emen t.. R~search wo.rkers claim variously to show tha t 
certain kinds of language are essential for particular 
Cognitive'processes, or that 'superficial' aspects of style 
and register contribute to ~ducational success. For y~ars 
classroom resBarch had looked only at 'presage' 'and 'pr6duct' 
variables, and had overlooked the 'black .box' which classroom 
process represents. Educators became interested .in the 
fUnction of ~n utterance in a sequence, a~ a specific con-
tribution to· a developing discourse, and that within a 
particular social setting. 
One of the mai.n reasons for the small amount of hard evidence 
to emerge from the large volume of work on language in educ~· 
ation is certainly that language has been used with abandon 
as a research.tool, and its organisation and complexities 
largely ignored. As some,of these complexities were re-
Cognised, it. became' necessary to postulate another level 
of organisation of language - the level of use or discourse 
representing the structure of patterns of speech,. and at 
this level all kinds of new, additional facto~s impinge on 
the analysis: 'paralinguistic features, ~uch as intonation, 
register, etc; non-verbal communication, subtle transmission 
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of the 'hidden curriculu~' by linguistic and non-lingui~tic 
means, etc. 
The main types of approach. to classroom research might be 
grouped in three .ways, the first being interaction analysis 
studies. These are based on the coding of public talk, the 
focus being on the frequency of occurrence of various stan-
dardised categories of (linguistic) behaviour (e.g., Flanders 
1978; Eggleston, Galton'and Jones, 1976). The second group 
largely avoids placing context-free snippets of language 
into pre-specified categories, and attempts analysis of 
transcriptions based on large sequential :~nits of speech 
sUch as the episode (Smith, Meux et a1 in Nutha11 and Lawrence 
19 6 5) or the incident (Nuthall and Lawrence, op.cit.) They 
often use a mixture of psychological, pedagogic and linguistic 
criteria in the same analytic operation, and result in very 
Complicated analytic schemes whose practical value to other 
research workers, and certainly to the teacher,= is dubitable. 
The last group.of studies, using a more subjective approach 
in an attempt to delve 'more deeply into meanings is that of 
anthropological study •. : This approach has been adopted in the 
USA most particularly to investigate the classr~om language 
of black and Amerindian children (Cazden, John and Hymes, 
1972). One variety of this app~oach is participant observ-
ation (e.g., Stubbs and Delamont, 1976; Delamont, 1976). 
The method claims to take account of the totality of the 
classroom scene, and to be ~lluminative and descriptive 
rather than normative. It-is based on case-studies and 
investigators often deliberately choose to look at atypical 
examples. ..Such an approach answers some of the criticisms 
of the more 'objective' language studies. The observer 
does not make inferences from sections of classroom talk, 
but asks the teacher, and especially the pupils, about their 
feelings, their interpretations of the situation, the meanings 
they attach to events, etc. Objections which critics of the 
method voice usually start with the observation that such 
data does not amount to 'evidence' at all, or at least 
not as it is usrially thought of. 
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Finally, of particular relevance to English Studies -
though the work deals' deli bera. tely· wi th classroom language 
in a variety of. subject contexts - are the enquiries of 
Barnes (1976) and Barnes and Todd (1977). These do not 
easily fit into any' of ·the three broad types of research 
mentioned above. Barnes clearly takes pains to avoid 
rigid classification'of speech, whilst equally clearly 
feeling some obligation to be 'scientific' about data; 
so his commentarY'on recorded instances of children talking 
is Poised somewhere between a linguistic and a literary 
account, on the one hand adducing language functions, on 
the other offering interpretative paraphrases. This reaches 
an extreme form in Barnes and Todd (1977), where talk is 
analysed according to two separate categories of obs~rvation, 
a 'Content Frame' and an 'Interaction Frame'. ~ Undoubtedly 
Barnes has had a ~ost valuable influence on teachers' at-
titudes to classroom talk, and this should not be under-
estimated. However, the prevailing sense is finally one 
of'a communicative and linguistic, rather than expressive 
and literary tone to the work. 
2.3 Although the foregoing can claim to be no more than a very 
general look at some of the boldest influences on education 
and l~nguage, there are several conclusions which can be 
drawn . from the survey. These inferences hold for t~e 
character of educational enquiry at large, and for its more 
specific ways of investigating language. Firstly, enquiry 
is guided in the main by scientific principles of clari ty, 
eXactness, communicability, etc. Secondly, the object of 
enquirY·is almost always a function of observable behaviour. 
Thirdly, although 'meaning' has become a general occupation 
of educational research, it is to be understood there as a 
fUnction of these concerns with the explicitation of a 
world conceived as data. 
But the general account necessarily misses out some of 
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the less obvious persuasions, "and in the case of each of 
the contributory disciplines there have always been in-
fluences so subtly effective that they are barely counter-
movements. By contrast, they are guided by principles 
of value, of experience, particularity, etc.; their 
concern is with the illumination of personal experience, 
and hence 'meaning' indicates an expressive rather than 
merely communicative event. 
In philosophy such influences are minimal; although 
Phenomenology and existentialist philosophy enjoy some 
status in philosophy departments, their effect on the 
Philosophy of education is nugatcry, and publications like 
Curtis and Mays (1978) almost unique in this country 
(though the less direct contributions of Collingwo.od (1938) 
and MacMurray (1935) should not be overlooked). Certain-
ly Freire (1977) has had some influence here, ·though his 
focus on repressive societies rather than on the creative 
person has meant that language is still seen" largely in 
terms of its social medium. 
For the mainstream of psychology, and for educational 
pSYchology, the drive is obviously scientific, although 
a small and only relatively local influence continues to 
Urge phenomenological approaches (Bolton, 1978, 1979 etc) 
It is in psychiatry that there is a methodological interest 
in combinin~ observation and reflection; poised uneasily 
between medicine and belief, modern psychiatry encourages 
refl~ction on language i~ the face of its experie~tial 
nature. The importance which the existentialist-
Phenomen?logical psychiatric attaches to the centrality 
of.language (Szasz, 1962; Laing and Cooper, 1964, etc.) 
is one it shares with Freudian principles. Psychoanalysis 
provides for a combination of the hermeneutic intention 
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with the principles of science, defining as. it's ground the 
discontinuity between the experience and the expression of 
the subject. Language is thus held to be the medium of 
all ~sychiatric processes; combining linguistic analysis 
with a theory of psychological causality, the methods var-
iously explore the f~t between symbols and experience. 
A similar concern characterises the therapeutic projects 
of such as Lomas (1973) and Winnicott (1971) which - like 
those of Freudian and existential psychiatry - have at most 
an indirect effect on educational studies. 
Since Schutz (1967) and others, sociology has developed 
'qualitative' methods in case-study, and in the illumin~ 
ation of meanings for participants in an event. But its 
concern is still with the social construction of meaning, 
and hence with language as an instrument. Such methods 
are only obliquely related to the principles of phenomen-
ology which are sometimes adduced in their justification. 
,The remainder of 'positive' influences has come from 
outside the traditional disciplines of education, from 
such highly individual - and therefore not systematically 
disseminated - work as Hourd (1977), Leavis (1975) etc. 
It is barely an exaggeration to say that such work, con-
ceived in the tradition of the arts, has no direct effect 
on educational theory nor on educational research. On 
the other hand, the influence of social scientists like 
Bernstein (1975), Halliday (1969) and Bruner (1964) has 
persuaded arbiters of English Method like Britton (1969) 
and, to some extent, Barnes (1969) to develop pseudo-
,scientific positions in an area traditionally, though 
inexplicitly allied to the arts (see Abbs,1982 ; Harrison, 
1983). The Bullock Report (HMSO,1975) is a testimony 
to this influence. 
All· this means that the' explicit as well as the subtle 
influence exerted on the would-be researcher recommend 
to him an understanding of language almost wholly couched' 
in terms of its social functions and psychological 
processes. "Look for the use !" is still the methodol-
ogical injunction, and 'meaning' is still by and large 
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the explication o~ this use. It is no exaggeration to say 
that ·the event of origination of meaning, and the nature of 
the objects so originated are virtually nowhere in education 
theory deemed important or even respectable concerns. This 
is not because they have in any way been 'solved', but 
because their solution is somehow taken for granted in the 
rationalist or empiricist epistemologies which lie behind 
the various educational theories. Ei ther the fact of 
consciousness is uncritically given, or else the given is 
the order of an empirical world. 
To the literary mind this is curious, because there seems 
to me always to have been the seeds of an alternative 
epistemology in literary studies - this despite the ~is­
services done by work like Ogden and Richards (1949), with 
its notion of the 'pseudo-statement' of art, 'or the later 
structuralist accounts which exclude consciousness from the 
events of meaning. This tacit epistemology is based on 
the practical understanding of those who work with literature 
firstly, that language has an expressive function at least 
as important as its communicative one, and secondly that 
meaning is not 'out there' any more than it is 'in here'. 
The idea of negotiation of meaning provides. a structure 
for admitting the insights of both rationalist and empir-
icist accounts of language.' But it is not a question of 
merely synthesising the two in order to furnish a convenient 
theory to explain this alternative epistemology of the arts; 
it is a matter of fundamentally revising our account of 
understanding. 
2·4 In what has gone before positions have often been identified 
as variously empiricist or rationalist as if, indeed, all 
scientific stands must be based on these philosophical 
understandings. To some extent it is a useful measure to 
be able to point say to a scientific characterisation 
which sees the mind as originating what it knows, in 
contrast to one which insists that our knowledge is the 
direct creation of external. shaping. In contemporary 
practice the distinction is not abays so sharply to be 
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drawn, and most accounts of human experience now acknow-
ledge the interpenetration of native and rec.eived intell-
igence, though a' discernible bias may remain. The 
question of origins has a practical purchase beyond its 
traditional debate .by philosophers, and this currency has 
already been identified in, for example, the implicitly 
rationalist approac~ of Chomsky (1957), or in B~rnstein'~ 
(1975) elaborations of empiricism. The terms remain 
broadly useful as ways of identifying such scientific 
characterisations with historical traditions. They attach 
a particular understanding of knowledge to the characteris-
ation they describe. To identify such and such. an approach 
to language, then, as empiricist or rationalist is to say 
that this approach proceeds from a prior and particular 
view of how we come to know. Since the final part of this 
chapter, in preparing the way for a phenomenology of lang-
uage,will indicate how such an understanding departs the 
traditional 'methods, it is necessary at this point to offer 
a brief summary of these .traditions. The epistemological 
questions - Can we know? What can we know? How do we know 
it ? etc. - ari'se only from the negative, sceptical view that 
everything is·to be doubted; they later revolve around 
basically linguistic enquiry into what knowing means. When 
the question: is first considered with.a modern rigour by 
Descart~s (1887), there is little in the tone of the enquiry 
to suggest ~hat knowledge will not be demonstrated· event-
ually; the question is rather one of how its certainty is 
to be established. Several hundreds of years later the 
prime question 'Can we know?' has undergone the modulations 
of ai enquiry into meaning, and its ~arious answers are_held 
to lie .in empirical instances rather than at the end of an 
exercise in reasgn. 
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Arising, then, from the sceptical objection that knowledge 
is impossible, the account of knowledge is usually an attempt 
to point to that which is certain in experience. What is 
necessary, what is true, what is indubitable - these are the 
stuff of knowledge proper, and the known will always derive 
from it. The most enduring account of knowledge remains 
that of Descartes (1887), who systematised scepticism in 
order to subject everything to a method of doubt. Arriving 
at his ineffable truth of the Cogito ergo sum, he identified 
the separate substances of mind and body and thus established 
what Whitehead (1948) has called the 'bifurcation of nature'~ 
It is an egocentric theory in effect, though ultimately a 
theocentric one which shows how it is primarily 'through the 
light of reason that we arrive at something impossible to 
doubt; reason equally guarantees belief in the objects of 
the senses. D~scartes'conception of reason accords with 
the contemporary spir~t of mathematics where, if anywhere, 
truths can be said to reside quite independently of per-' 
ceptions. The Cartesian view of knowledge - dubbed by Ryle 
(1963) as the 'Official Doctrine' in view of its continufng 
pervasiveness - subtly as well as overtly informs the theory 
and 'the practice of both our science and our everyday life, 
and its chief characteristic is the either/or of Descartes' 
separation of mind and body. The divisions of nature and 
of experience that we how take for granted can be traced to 
the same philosophical moment; subject and object, reason 
and emotion, thought and language - these are the functions 
of the rationalist insistence on the primacy of a mind 
distinct from,its embodiment, a 'Ghost in the machine'. 
Descarte's can thus approve the mechani cs of Galileo whi ch 
as a scientist he could only admire; but his theism urges him 
to the morali ty impli ci t in a .mind freed of th~ causali ty 
which governs 'extended substance', and it is his mathematical 
acuity which accomplishes the insight. 
The view which broadly characterises the epistemology of 
the Continental rationalists Descartes, Liebniz and Spinoza 
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is thus that the mind can originate its contents; by 
contrast, the British empiricist argument - identified 
mainly with Locke (1964), Berkeley (1901) and Hume (1955) -
is that knowledge derives l~rgely from sense perceptions. 
Hamlyn (1970) points to the fact, howeve~, that the seven-
teenth-century empiricists shared with the rationalists 
a desire to provide what is clearly a rational justific-
ation for knowledge. Theirs too is a quest for certainty 
and their mission to establish proof by pointing to 
necessity. But the approach is rather .through the 
Machine than via the hallowed Ghost. In his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1964) Locke's argument 
rests on the truth of things; we have simple ideas of 
things caused by those things. It is the mind which 
creates complex ideas ( and hence error) by compounding 
simple notions; what is given, the data, cannot be wrong, . 
although human judgment may so construe it. All our 
ideas come from experience, derived from. sensation' itself 
or else from reflection on sensation or from the secondary 
process of (rationally) compounding complex ideas. 
Descartes' belief in the mind's ultimate reference to a 
truthful God, and Locke's faith in the iriteg~ity of 
things' appear to have as little in common as do Chomsky's 
Language Acquisition Device and Bernstein's Codes. But 
actually one thing at least which all ·four schemes share 
is a need to establish an explicit project on behalf of 
the mind or of experience. To be sure in no case can 
this project be realised wholly and exclusively by reason 
or by a material world; all accounts acknowledge some play 
of mutual confirmation between origination and instance. 
But one cannot overlook the implications of these projects 
in- extremis: the empiricist mind is the creation of its 
stimuli, and the thinking or willing subject is a fictive 
Superfluity; the world of the rationalist, on the other hand, 
'is not realised by action in the physically-extended plane 
which~is a conti~%ent echo of its project. Thus one 
character of both designs is their insistence on a useful 
inner' and outer" di vision. There is an equally firm 
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commitment to fulfilling the p~ogramme with an apodictic 
certainty.· The movements in scholarship which stand out 
in this century indicate a distinct empiricist bias and 
an acquiescence in that spi~it of dualistic explicitation. 
Against this spirit. of thoroughgoing scientism there has 
beerr little resistance in British scholarship. Polanyi 
(1969) has ins.pired a small number of philo.sophers and 
scientists to recast their understanding of knowledge as 
an area of experience resisting fine definition. Polanyi 
and his chief apologist, Grerie, deny the physical tract 
which traditiDnally separates the knower from the object 
of his knowledge, sketching coming to know as a movement 
from the proximal to the distal, a process of organisation 
of tacitly-known structures. The stuff of knowledge itself 
has rather a verbal than ,a nominal character, which is to, 
say that knowledge is a highly-organised ,moment in exper-
ience and. not, an independent. body of facts iridifferently 
appr~hended. Polanyi avoids the accusation 'of subjec~iv­
ism by charging the 'indi vidual wi th a 'commi tment to the 
truth of shared. experience. Polanyi's is a lonely voice, 
though 'his insistence on the. participation of the subject 
is by no means unique; it is implicit in positions as 
various as tho~e of Bruner (1964) and Kelly (1955), in 
Popper's 'three worlds' (1972) and in the 'phenomenological' 
sociology which Schutz (1967) generated. Polanyi's 
parti.cular gift, to the insight, however, is the rather 
unfashionable one of treating the 'logical geography' (Ryle, 
1963) of knowledge with a logic of poetry; this design can 
only be described as moral. If it seems inappropriate to 
talk of work in ,this area as moral, it is precisely because 
enquiry generally has been ,moved out of the hands of 
enquirers themselves into the necessities and ~tructures 
of their disciplines. No special sense of 'm?rall'need 
be adduced either; it is precisely in the everyday sense 
of, a concern with right and wrong that it is used here. 
Now if science i~~elf is agreed to lie by definition outside 
the purchase of morality, and scientists are surrendered to 
their' art, then"one could ask ingenuously where are to be 
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found the values which authenticate the practice. It 
'was in the face of such a situation that Husserl inaugur-
ated a system of philosophy with that moral concern. 
Scientific points of view, says Merleau~Ponty 
according to which my' existence is a moment of the " 
world's are always both naive and at the same time 
dishonest, because they take for granted, without 
explicitly mentioning it, the other point of view, 
namely that of consciousness, through which from 
the outset a world forms itself round me and begins 
to exist for me 
( 1 9 62 , P • i x. ) 
If knowledge is held to lie in principle in structures 
outside of the individual, then logically the world is 
sundered from its inhabitants. Further, if the whole 
life of experience is minimised or subordinated to those 
scientific structures, then consciousness is no longer: .... ~' 
required to proceed with responsibility. Returning 
knowledge to the authority of the knower - 'ari authority 
shared with the inexorable fact of the world - is thus a 
. moral project and one which Husserl (1970) saw as rescuing 
enquiry from the 'crisis' of European philosophy. 
Briefly, the phenomenological project is concerned with 
the original.questions of philosophy, such as occupied the 
pre-Soc'ratic philosophers; the answers to these questions 
are no less than essential to provide the foundation for. 
all other enquiry. In establishing these foundations, 
it obviously cannot call upon the second-order character-
isations provided by science, and so it requires to do 
without presuppositions and to get to the nature of things 
as they are. These things start for us in consciousness, 
which must hence be the ground of our enquiry. However, 
phenomenology will not separate the world from'our willing 
insertion in it, so consciousness must not be ~onceived as 
a subject operating on an indifferently-held object, and a 
phenomenological method does away with rigid distinction~ 
between originat~,r arid originated. 
Such'~ broad ou~line does feeble credit to the density and 
variety of phenomenological enquiries and, since in any 
event 
It is less·a question of counting up quotations than 
of determining and expressing in concrete form this 
phenomenology fo~ ourselves ••• 
(Merleau-Ponty 1962, p.viii.) 
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a fuller and more engaged account will be given in the course 
of describing a phenomenology of' language in the following 
chapters. However, these features hold for any phenomenol-
ogical venture; these and what is the backbone of any such 
epistemology, the notion of in~entionality. This is a 
technical term to be distinguished from the use of intention 
to i~dicate the subject's deliberate and particular attitude 
with regard to something. Intentionality for the phenomen-
ologist is rather 'operative intentionality', the subject's 
involuntary openness to the world. His mind is not, pace 
HUme, .f a bundle of different perceptions which succeed each 
other with inconceivable rapidity' (1955) nor yet, after the 
critical-realist account, the originator of forms and struct-
ures imposed on the world and subsequently confirmed by a 
content which that world provides through the senses. 
Intentionality rather guarantees the negotiation of a nec-
essary reality by insisting on a tripartite structure of 
thought. Descartes arrived at the certainty of the ego by 
identifying its thinking function, the cogito which - if it 
were possible - would remain an autistic and wordless project 
for itself. . Since thought cannot exist for itself as mere 
process, and needs for its very activity to be thought of, 
Husserl'stask is to demonstrate how the ego, the cogito and 
the cogitatum are each distinct from whilst seamlessly sup-
portive ~t the other. In perception there is always the 
act of perception, which Husserl calls the noesis, and the 
percept as it is given to the subject, the noema (Husserl, 
1960). This is further distinct from the object itself; 
as I hear my neighbour playing his guitar, my ~ct of percept-
~on a~~omplishes a p~rticular and weli-determined perception. 
Of course his playing is revealed in a multiplicity of 
perceptions - acco.rding to the identity of the listener, his 
physical position, etc. - and is therefore not to be identi-
~~ ~. 
fied with any number of my noemata. But the object in my 
perception is to be distinguished from my act because it 
does not, as does my act, exist in consciousness. My 
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act of perception, the noesis, is not continuous, whereas 
the noemata have identity such that they outlive any number 
and instance of acts of perception. Because of this' con-
sistency of noemata my acts of perception are said to' aim 
at fulfilment by the intentional object. Since they trans-
cend my (subjective) acts of perception, noemata guarantee 
the correspondence. of perception to truth; Merleau-Ponty 
speaks of the 'intentional arc' .which maintains coherence 
for the subject, and when this 'goes limp', for example 
in illness, this relation of subject to truth of things is 
impaired (1962, p.136). Finally, then, intentionality can 
be said to refer to the objectivating duty of consciousness, 
where objectivity' is understood not as a finite virtue 
exterior to the subject, as it were, but as the possibility 
~ 
of an identity which persists beyond the life of iIItmediate 
perception. 
The actual object at which our perception aims has been said 
to exist independently of the noesis and to transcend all 
noemata. Actually to approach the thing itself we need to 
pass through its outer horizon - which describes its perceived 
spatial relation to other objects as well as its occasional 
essence as a member of a class of objects - and to arrive at 
the 'essential essence' (Heidegger, 1965) which should reveal 
to us more what is given with the object for itself, as well 
as what is realised noetically. We can do this for an object 
whether it be concrete - like this paperweight before me -
or abstract, like a particular quality of beauty, the nature 
of time, or, indeed, the character of thought itself. It is, 
in a sense, in each case to put the Kantian questions anew 
What is it which determines this paperweight? Or which re-
veals to me the truth about my friend's behaviour? We must 
at the·· same time try to set aside what we know, or take for 
granted,' is usually the case • 
.. 
This is the process of eidetic intuition, and it is by this 
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method of bracketing out and thus of transcending the natural 
attitude that we arrive at the things themselves. These 
things, as intentional objects, celebrate phenomenology's 
avoidance of both a psychologism which would see an object 
of cognition as a mental act, and of the empiricist object 
which can transend consciousness. It is intentionality's 
project to introduce consciousness to the ground which 
properly belongs to the object, whilst the object itself is 
only fulfilled in consciousness. In this way, the whole 
phenomenological approach can be said to comprehend the 
directions of both an idealist and a realist characterisation 
of understanding simultaneously, because phenomenology sees 
the one as necessary to the other, and neither as enjoying 
any logical priority. Husserl has called this mutual nec-
essity a Fundierung, and Merleau-Ponty elaborates this: 
•••. every factual truth is a rational truth, and vice-
versa. The relation.of reason to fact, of eternity to 
time, like that of reflection to the unreflective, of 
thought to language, or of thought to perception, is 
this two-way relationship ••• the founding term, or 
originator - time, the unreflective, the fact, language, 
perception - is primary in the sense that the originated 
is presented as a determinate or explicit form of the 
originator, which prevents the latter from reabsorbing 
the former, and yet the originator is not primary in the 
empiricist sense and the originated is not simply derived, 
since it is through the originated that the originator is 
made manifest. 
(1962, p.394.) 
The 'either/or' opposition is endemic in systems of thought, 
and in an obvious way is necessary. The Fundierung does 
not dilute the purity of conceptual poles with ,the compromise 
of synthesis; its innovative strength is in positing their 
relation as horizonal rather than opp~itional, so that a 
term has a distinct meaning only against the general licence 
of sense provided by its apparent opposite. Put like this,' 
less obvious instances of Fundierungen spring to mind -
Chomsky's 'Competence and Performance', for example, or the 
~estalt 'Figure and Ground'; but chiefly, one thinks of 
Sauisure's Langue and Parole (1974). These terms have 
sUffered some neutralisation in the hands of recent Struct-
uralist accounts, where there is little or no elaboration 
~. ~. 
of human participation in their operation. But it should 
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be noted that Saussure1s understanding of the terms was a 
more generous and humane one than normally attaches to their 
Use in linguistics, and he himself referred to Durkheim's 
Psychological and sociological theories to describe their 
relationship (Durkheim, 1972). 
0, ; 
',r 
This Chapter opened with the question "How can language be 
an object for enquiry?" The Chapter has indicated some 
of the ways in which language has been made an object for 
study within certain disciplines; the question remains un-
answered because we have yet to determine quite what language 
is, if it is not the thing described by linguistics. It is 
proposed in the next Chapter to return to Saussure's position 
of Langue and Parole. By contrast with their use as the 
basis 'of a science of language, the terms will be re-examined 
from a phenomenological viewpoint. as an introduction to a 
more detailed enquiry into subject-object relations. What 
will eventually be shown in later Chapters is how the express-
ive character of language is illuminated by the relation of 
Langue and Parole understood as structures of experience. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The phenomenological project 
The terms Langue and Parole are used by Ferdinand de 
Saussure in his Course in. General Linguistics (1974). 
Langue can be readily defined as a system of possible 
phonological, grammatical and semantic relations which 
exhausts the possibilities of a given language. As such, 
it is not itself realised, but is like a theory describing 
and guaranteeing the coherence of actual speaking and 
listening, of reading and writing. What people actually 
say is to be understood by Parole. It is important to 
realise that if we added up everything you say and every-
thing I say, and everything said by all other speakers of 
our language we should not be any nearer to artwulating 
Langue, not even if we abstracted from this data all. 
apparently consistent and necessary features. The 
relation of Parole and Langue, then, is a more subtle one 
than that~ a set of co-ordinates to a complete map; if 
we worked through all such references we could produ.ce 
the map, but it is most particularly the third dimension 
given with the lack of concretion of the semantic element 
which frustrates this analogy. Parole does not refer to 
Langue in the way that our co-ordinates indicate a point 
on the map. If this analogy is useful it is only in the 
sense that the co-ordinates have meaning \n terms of the 
whole map; they are relatively significant only. If we 
accept these terms as basic and useful to an enquiry into 
language, ·the prompt question is : How is this relation 
between what I say and the theoretical guarantee of 
meaning accomplished? Langue is not spoken by persons 
and is a wholly intellectual creation; parole is manifest 
and eventual. Since we explain Parole in terms of L~ngue 
it soori' emerges that they must be term~ of a different order, 
and the basic distinction is this: Langue is a term which 
must describe lang~age at the level of its ontology, since 
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it is clearly a theory of the existence of language, of 
the e1emen ts and their relations necessary to language. 
Parole, on the other hand, describes language at an 
empirical level, and is hence a term for methodology 
rather than metaphysics. What is missing from the 
account of Langue is the ontology of the speaker, whilst 
the instance of Parole must calIon the systematic nature 
of Langue to guarantee methodological coherence. 
interpenetration is a clear case of fundierung. 
Their 
Parole, like its speakers, exists but Langue is endorsed 
only by a system of abstractions. Broadly speaking, 
linguistics has seen the relation of the terms in a 
structuralist and abstract point of view, and has not seen 
the ontology of the speaker - and the ground of these ab-
stractions - as lying within its brief. A phenomenology 
is required to show not only how a critique of existence 
is necessary to the account' of Parole, but equally how 
abstraction itself is adumbrated by this critique. The 
first task is to establish the necess~ry conditions for 
speaking, to ask what is essenti~lly true of langu.age and 
what merely contingent. 
There are few purely physical conditions necessary to 
language beyond existence; Work with the deaf (Furth, 
1966), the emoti6nally d~sturbed (Goldstein, 1948), the 
mentally-ill (Binswanger 1945) and so on minimises the 
. role of the wholly-physical in language. This is not 
to deny that language does indeed require certain well-
defined physical 'performances, whether these are at the 
level of neurone or phoneme or morpheme. But impairment 
can be various and se-rere and yet we should still, have. to 
concede that such a subject 'has' language. After a more 
loosely-defined point we should have t? say no, this 
SUbject does not 'have' language. The criteria we 
bring to this decision may refer to the absence of 
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particular physically-realised skills or attributes, and 
this by trying our subject against normative scales of 
ability; but quite in the manner that death is difficult 
to distinguish criterially from life for medicine, so the 
fUnction of language for a subject cannot be empirically 
established. This is no more than a reflection of the 
partial contributiops which medicine it~elf, psychology, 
li~guistics etc. make to the study of' language. The 
question remains : What both unifies and transcends the 
processes illuminated by these studies? Existence by 
itself is clearly no guarantee of language, since animals 
'exist' without language as we understand these terms. 
At the same time, in an obvious way it cannot be missed 
out of an account of language. We require, then, some-
thing between existence as commonly understood and language 
as physically realised for science; that is to say a con-
cept or area of understanding which comprehends both 'the 
silent privacy of personal existence and the shared phys-
ical reality which language both describes and participates 
in. Such a concept is necessary to guarantee meaning for 
the individual and for the context which generates this 
meaning. 
Such an area is provided by being-in-the-world, understood 
by the Lebenswelt of Husserl, and given with Heidegger's 
Dasein. Broadly this concept provides for the practical 
contribution which the individual makes in constituting 
the world (Parole), but it is a world which is already 
there (Langue). The relationship is not to be understood 
in spatial terms, but rather in temporal and hence exist-
ential ones. The meaning of the world arises directly 
from its manifest, three-dimensional nature, an4 not 
primarily from abstractions. The world must be dealt with 
as it ~resents itself, which is to Say practically. Man 
~s surrounded immediately by materials and tools which 
represent opportunities; they are not the res extensae of 
Descartes, merely there, vorhanden, indifferently located. 
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The world is stuff for use, zuhanden; in their various 
other fields Bergson (1946) similarly points to man as 
pre-eminently homo faber, Dewey (1964) exalts praxis over 
the given world of Newtonian .. and Cartesian science, and 
Kelly (1955) identifies 'man the scientist'. For Heidegger 
Human being is not a thing which has additionally 
the gift of being able to do something, but it is 
primarily possibility. 
(Grene, 1957, p.143) 
However, being-in-the-world is actually more radical than 
the projects of such as Dewey, Bergson. and Kelly, and is 
not to be understood as a sort of linguistic compendium 
which allows us to alternate focus and ground between 
separate notions of 'being' and 'world' according to accent. 
Being-in-the-world insists that the terms have meaning only 
in the full presence of each, w~ich involves the entangle-
ment of all history both personal and mundane. The concept 
is most important to this study because only in terms of it 
can such phenomena as the experience of the literary text 
be understood. In a discussion of T.S.Eliot's poetry, 
Harding (1963) speaks of the poet's exploration of the 
"Possibilities of meaning that lurk in the interstices of 
familiar ideas" (1963, p.lOS). It is such an exploration 
that we need to rid 'being' and 'world' of any mutually 
exclusive properties; the history of Being in philosophy 
is characterised by a concern with its status as either 
the property of an object, or as an object possessing 
properties. To enquire about Being is generally to at-
tempt to isolate the criteria for use of the word 'is', 
to discover what unifies all such uses, and to view Being 
finally as a name for something else which is in the world. 
Answers to·the question 'What is Being ?' tend to describe 
it a~ an abstract synonym for a nominal function ·in an 
extended and separate world. There seem to be thus two 
competi~z strains at work in the enquiry, which are to 
ab~tract from the real. world an essence, which must yet 
'be' in a distinct, independent and transcendent fashion. 
Dewey (1929) has similarly pointed to two sources of error 
in the concern with Being. One of these is the survival 
of an (often implicit) preference for a Divine Being, 
or some state which, reflecting 'Him', represents immut-
ability and permanence, distinct from the world of sense 
perception.. Such a view cannot separate a search fer 
universal truth frem a divine authership which hence 
unifies .our experience. Even .outside .of clearly thee-
logical greund, medern mythelegical theught still has 
an impulse tewards such a structure .of Being. A secend 
confusien .of the questien, accerding .te Dewey's acceunt, 
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is the reificatien .of abstract truths away frem the centext 
in which, and .only in which, they derive their meaning: 
thus we expect te arrive at essential Being by a lecal 
empirical pregramme. Dewey thus criticisei beth the 
/ idealist and the neminalist tendency. 
The reflectien .of Being which science discevers bears an 
obscure relatien beth te Being as an area fer metaphysical 
speculatien, and te the Being which daily'experience 
assumes linguistically .or, mere rarely,· in mements . .of 
reflectien. Heidegger (1962b) identifies the regrettable 
diffusien .of the search fer Being with the feundatiens 
for metaphysics and science laid by the prejects .of Plate 
and Aristetle. These mevements .of idealisatien and 
analysis take existence fer granted where the earlier 
'thinkers' such as Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides 
- whem he distinguishes frem 'philesephers' - had seen 
Being, language and werld as ce-present moments .of the logos. 
It is the search fer Being in a temperal dimensien which 
authenticates Heidegger's claim to be returning te the 
spirit .of ihis .original, pre-Secratic theught; it is man's 
finitude in this werld which prevides the basis fer Being, 
not an enduring ether-werld .of Ferms, .or ether me.taphy~ical 
a bs t~a ctiens. 
What is ·the werld which phenemenelegy discovers fer 
conscieusness ? It is net the same werld as that 
37 
'elaborated by physics or by geography; these worlds prove 
to be contingent on Being's first locating itself in the 
field of its intentionality. Such schemes permit Being 
to move the extended world coherently from its perception 
to its cognition and to reflect 'on it. But the world 
which is constituted with Being has none of the properties 
of science which define these secondary worlds. The 
world in which Being finds itselfDu~ be meaningful, but 
it is an immediate meaning which arises because Being is 
practically engaged with a world of internional objects. 
Phenomenology can hence understand Being by substituting 
for the term itself 'a world of objects'. In the ,growth 
of consciousness, this world is not'primarily given as 
object itself, in the usual sense of the word, but as the 
limitless possibility of subjective consciousness. Again 
it is thus not the totality which exists for physical 
sCience, but rather a contextual mass which shifts meaning-
fUlly with, the instances of pre-reflective experience in 
which the individual acts. The only possibility of 
coherence for this wo~ld is the incrementation of intent-
ional acts which seek their unity in the horizons of the 
world. That is, it is only as consciousness begins to 
distinguish meaning against a horizon that this horizon 
itself takes on definition; as consciousness perceives 
the limit and value of its own intentionality, it grants 
objectiv.ity to the boundless surplus of the world which 
(as we have said) physical science is later to character-
ise. Objectivity is then define~ as the infinite totality 
of perceptions which do not - in the manner of the Ideal 
object - transcend our subjective acts, but to which mass 
these acts inexhau~ilily address themselves. Objectivity 
does not find itself in an antinoMY with subjectivity 
through mutual exclusion; objectivity should be seen rather 
as the conclusion at which subjectivity aims as the very 
condition of its having a will. It acts to b~ ~nders~ood 
and how else should it achieve recognition unless it acts 
in a shared world. This world participates in the life 
of the subject but extends variously far beyond the 
instances of existence which determine that subject. 
Does not this world begin to sound rather like Langue ? 
Of course, the world is not a 'theory' in the way that 
Langue is, but the guarantee ,of coherence it provides 
for the possibilities which the ~ubject realises echoes 
the relation which holds Parole and Langue together. 
Gadamer (1976) speaks of the three peculiarities of 
language. Firstly, it is 'essentially forgetful', 
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since we launch into speech innocent of the grammatical 
rules which subtend our utterances: ' ••• the more lang-
uage is a living operation, the less we are aware of it.' 
(p.65.) Secondly, there is the 'I-lessnesss of language 
which is its necessary directedness towards another 
person and, indeed, its realisation only in the (albeit 
sometimes imaginary) presence of an Other. Thirdly, 
Gadamer speaks of the 'all-encompassing' nature of 
language, not as 'a delimited realm of the speakable', 
(ib.) but as the possibility of all b~ing itself. 
This characterisation of language actually provides us with 
with the conditions for the subject's assumption of 
the worl~. He is always in a world of whose boundar-
ies:he is not primarily aware; but his existence becomes 
an expressio~ in the light of, because of the existence 
of, this bounded world. Finally the world is unified 
by his consciousness and is 'all that is the case'. 
So just as a reflexive linguistics can elaborate a 
Langue which clearly precedes only in logic the instances 
of Parole, so the world grows as a sort of tacit theory 
which the subject needs to ground ,the possibilities of 
experience. The world itself remains bound by his 
experience - as Parole has no actual need of Langue -
but liberates itself as a theory when the subject requires 
, . . 
some guarantee of existence. It is a moment of the same 
order which identifies Langue as that which endures 
beyond particular utterances. 
In summary, the first step in performing this phenom-
enology of language has been to identify being-in-the-
world as the ground in which Langue and Par'ole meet. 
It is suggested that this term is transcendental in 
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the operation of language because it allows for both 
Subjective expression and a more or less ideal context. 
The term has not been fully described because, although 
it is basic to the life of language it depends on the 
introduction of another, further regressed term. If 
being-in-the-world guarantees language, what dynamic 
conceptual area do we need to calIon to describe how 
being-in-the-world itself is originated and accomplished? 
It is still an abstract principle of metaphysics. 
Being-in-the-world allows us, as yet in outline, to 
distinguish the speaking subject from his comprehending 
context, but phenomenology requires we establi:sh per-
ception as the gate through which chaos issues as 
cOherence. For Merleau-Ponty particularly, perception 
is the end of the final reduction, or, to put it the 
other way round, is the first conceptual area which also 
makes sense. In his thesis of the primacy of perception, 
Merleau-~onty (1962, 1964a) thus brings ontogeny to 
ontology. I propose to echo his scheme and begin the 
enquiry proper with an examination of how the world 
starts in perception and thence how it is that 'the 
competing ,strains of ideal abstraction and direct 
experience find the subject in a speaking world. 
* 
I s, percepti~n really such a gate, or does that metaphor 
reflect rather a logical structur~ necessary to relate 
chaos and coherence? Certainly perception does not 
operate with the effect of an electric switch, suddenly 
c~mpleting and galvanising and illuminating, though all 
these features are salient to it. It is required to 
cast perception not as the pivot necessary to a dualist 
epistemology, relating only by holding apart inner and 
outer, but to see it as the only means of a validation 
which each seeks in the other. It is therefore the 
mode of reality allowed to the subject in the presence 
of the object and as such has only contingently an 
empirical real~ty. This latter reality is the quant-
ifiable function established by mechanistic psychology, 
which sees perception as something actively done by or 
at least through the sense-organs; it becomes the way 
in which the whole subject holds an object intentionally 
b~side of' himself. The notion of 'successful divis-
ion' is actually given with the use of the term percept-
ion in these instances. Phenomenology, on the other 
hand, in refusing either to hypostatise the sense-organs 
or to use them as machines - in .which cases organs and 
objects have no need of each other - phenomenology sees 
perception rather as the act of the subject placing the 
object as it were 'outside'. So the perennial question 
of the relation of subject and object turns primarily on 
the nature of perception. Merleau-Ponty puts the task 
of understanding the question this way : 
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We must discover the origin of the object at the very 
centre of our experience; we must describe the emerg-
ence of being and we must understand how, paradoxically 
there is for us an in-itself. 
(1962, p.7l) 
If we return to the question of the reality of perception 
for mechanistic psychology wee see that the term can act-
ually be used as the indifferent generic substitute for 
'successful' seeing, hearing, tasting, etc. In so far 
as there is a unity of meaning which covers all these 
functions, it goes something like this : perception 
generalises the particular sensory manner in which I 
acknowledge a discrete object •. In this account the 
emphasis on the sensually-given object diminishes the 
constituting power of the perceiver, and· the question 
remains as to how sensation and intellect together 
perform this realisation of the object. The empirical 
fact of this is obvious, since some operation is nec-
essary to guarantee that my well-defined perception of 
this coin from an angle which suggests an elliptical 
shape can yet allow me the knowledge of the circular 
coin itself. Attempts to describe perception in terms 
of the functions which realise it take for granted the 
objects of the senses; only that part of the act of 
perception committed to objects as we uncritically know 
them can be said to have an empirical reality, and that 
part is only as real as those objects. The remainder, 
the larger part one could say, belongs to the condition 
of the subject being able to entertain those objects. 
In this sense perception goes beyond correlation to 
understand, in a way which only philosophy can provide, 
the very possibility of existence. By this token we 
can understand man - quite in th~ manner of Cassirer 
(1944), etc. - as the animal who can 'have' objects 
symbolically, or simply 'have' symbols in the absence 
of· those objects. Perception is the means by which 
those objects can be constituted, that is to say can 
be meaningful. The objection that other animals do 
this is no objection.at all, and we can point to the 
sick and to children for instances of impaired, dis-
torted or limited emergence into the perceptual field. 
The intellectualist argument separat~s the normal per-
cipient from these marginal cases by introducing judg-
ment as the element necessary to make perception 
possible and distinct from mere sensation, and so the 
concept of 'attention' is invoked as a general power to 
enable 'judgment' to cons~rue an otherwise indifferent 
mass of 'sensations'. But how attention faatens ~ 
-judgment to sensation, and more ~mportantly why it should 
bother remain unanswered questions. Approaching these 
questions from a certainty of the object, the empiricist 
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explains the presence to the subject of a meaningful 
object in terms of memory and association which promote 
an accretion of identity. But in the first instance 
what is it which 'knows' to calIon particular memories 
other than a construction which is not furnished by these 
memories· but rather itself gives character to that store-
house? And how, unless this construction is fairly 
well-determined, is the subject not flooded by myriad 
association.? What filter should we have to introduce ? 
These are forms of the questions of the Meno, and 
Merleau-Ponty comments that ' 
A thought really transcended by its objects would 
find them proliferating in its path without ever 
being able to grasp their relationships to each 
other, or finding its way through to their truth. 
( 1 9 62 , P • 371. ) 
The phenomenal field must be guaranteed by something less 
volatile tha~ a world of objects and less axiomatic, less 
resolute than a rational project. To do this it is not 
merely a matter of synthesising the extremes which the 
traditional accounts go to, not a matter of saying tru-
istically that judgment and sensation negotiate reality· 
between them, for the truth of this is in any event con-
tained in seminal form in these-original accounts. What 
is really defective in these accounts is their emphasis 
on [unctions, so that sensory apparatus is characterised 
as a conductor, or judgment given the 'job of offsetting 
the possible dispersal of sensations' (ib., p.32). 
This functional emphasis is variously unsatisfactory. 
Firstly, it cannot provide a purpose for the occurrence 
ofa function other than by referring it.to other func-
tions, so that the whole operation has only the coherence 
of a machine. So, secondly, if judgment operates to 
qualify sensation, the identity of the objects .tcausing' 
that sensation is arbitrary; conversely, if those objects 
'are firm in experience, then judgment's task is merely 
to confirm. Chiefly, however, these accounts separate 
in time subject and data, the one serving to r,ealise the 
other. Perception appears as either a single act of 
,~ 
acknowledgement, or as the process serially realised 
by separate functions (seeing, feeling, wondering, 
judging, etc.) over a period of time. This process 
has overall functional' coherence but apparently no 
direction; the focus of the operation lights now on 
the object, now on the subject. If we relate world 
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and subject in this way perception is at best accidental, 
more often mechanical. The guarantee we ,seek is to be 
had by shifting the argument from the plane of functions 
to the world of direction and of the will which achieves 
it. So far perception, has been identified with the 
acts which realise it. In characterising perception as 
only contingently functional and as primarily the 
condition of all functions, it can be separated from the 
cupidity of empirical ,demonstration and recast as a 
priori necessity. 
And yet it remains an act. Although it has no remark-
able beginning 'nor end, and will not be measured by its 
various skills, perception is an act because it is in-
tentional. Again, it is not just the gate or the pivot, 
but the very possibility of these functions and that which 
necessitates (rather than merely facilitates) relation. 
In replacing causality with the lebenswelt, phenomenology 
abolishes the need to identify the margins of perception 
- the subject is always'already in a world and 'the begin-
ning,is not a matter of fact, but an action' (Husserl, 
1931). ,The boundlessness of this action arises from 
what Husserl'distinguishes as 'operative' intentionality 
(from our normal understanding of intentions). Kant's 
Refutation of Idealism is probably the earliest indicat-
ion of a sort of intentionality which could link 'inner 
perception' with 'outer perception'. He later,posits 
the unity of imagination and understanding 90nfronting 
·the unity of objects (Critique.of Judgment, 1952). 
But there remains to Kant's subject a categorial activity,' 
even though he is no longer the sole author of his world 
and Kant's intentionality is a virtual cognate of 
jUdgment. But the notion of a pre-reflective or 
antepredicative consciousness finds the individual in 
a world which is realised by operative intentionality; 
perception is the actual, fleshly way in which these 
theoretical glances over the shoulder are unified. 
Is this to contradict what has gone before ? Having 
said that perception must be freed from mechanistic 
~ccounts and understood as the guarantee of all 
functions (and accounts), I have now returned to it 
a solid and three-dimensional task. But this task 
is commensurate with the size I want to claim - in a 
philosophical way - for perception. This task is not 
exhausted by any or all of its performances, for the 
task is always to anticipate coherence rather than at 
any instant to dwell on it. Reason and imagination 
and memory will do that, whilst perception runs ahead 
into a world of action. This is why perception is 
never just a realised act, but is also always the 
condition of all acts. Husserl thus talks of the 
'teleology of consciousness', so that 
When we consider what we may call. the history of 
the subject the beginning is not a matter of fact 
but an action ••• To be a subject is not only to 
act, but also necessarily to proceed from action to 
action, from the product of one action through a 
new action to new products. 
(Husserl in F~llesdal, 1979, p.372) 
The a~count of perceptiDn traditionally elaborated by 
science and philosophy is deceptively and superficially 
similar, but it sees the object a~ it were unifying 
perception, the act serving the object. 'The scientif-
ic concept becomes the means and equivalent of an 
object held to be the invariant of all sensory and per-
cep tual fi el ds ; 
The tacit thesis of perception is that at -every 
instant experience can be co-ordinated with that of 
the previou~ ins~ant and that of the following, and 
my perspect~ve w~th that of other consciousnesses _ 
that all contradictions can be removed that monad" 
d "t b" t· " ' 1 C an ~n ersu Jec ~ve experlence is one unbroken text _ 
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that what. is now indeterminate for me could 
become determinate for a more complete know-
ledge, which is as it were realised in advance 
in the thing, or rather which is the thing 
itself. ' 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.54.) 
However, the process described by Husserl is not prim-
arily intellectual but derives from the subject's in-
sertion in a world which pre-dates conceptual abstraction, 
a world primarily aesthetic. We do not 'know' objects 
in the way that 'the tacit thesis' would require, standing 
behind our acts of perception adding increments like 
building-blocks until we have the pre-determinate thing. 
We know them by dwelling in them and this precisely 
because we find ourselves in a world. The case of 
aesthetic appreciation of the work of art crystallises 
this. For scientific enquiry the object is invariant 
and the focus which all percepti6ns must aim to exhaust, 
to possess entirely. The object, any object, is by 
definition discrete. Indeed, this is what is meant by 
intentional objects, things as they appear to conscious-
ness, well-defined,' 'dispersed and distributed each to 
its due place' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.371). Objects 
in this sense can be exhausted by explicit knowledge. 
In the equally ordinary sense of subject, we attribute 
as it were an 'inside' to the entity, an internal nec-
essity which can never be yielded up entirely to con-
ceptual thinking; art-objects appear to have this char-
acter. The aesthetic object does not 'live a life of 
its own', but it does 'live' in its presentations, which 
extend beyond the lives of ali who perceive it. It is 
for this very simple reason that the literary text, the 
symphony, the painting (or whatever art work) actually 
persist, or fail to persist; the extent tG which they 
frustrate their 'objectivity' determines their life. 
'The aes theti c 0 bj ect is then defined as tha t whi ch, . 
having a truth, can be dwel t in. I D\velling in I means 
sharing a perspective and a particular horizon with 
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something, so that it is not only materially distinct 
from all other objects qua intended entities, but in 
virtual relief against the class of objects ,to which 
it nO,rmally and usefully belongs. Bruzina (1978) 
talks of aesthetic imagination as making 'what other-
wise would be merely an appearance of something the 
appearance of it' (p.157). What such activity does 
is in fact to return the object from the generality 
given it by the concept to its particular nature. 
But this particular nature is ever-present to the sub-
ject, is properly his first experience of what will be 
object, and its aesthetic presence is occluded. by the 
growth of abstraction. What is true for sophisticated 
aesthetic imagination is more simply the case of our 
receipt of the world. We are primarily in a'world 
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of objects. The categorial object is that secondary 
place which, having been dwelt in, can become discrete 
for Being. This is why we can say without contradiction 
that Being is a world of objects. This is also the 
simple truth of Merleau-Ponty's observation that 'We are 
in the world and the world is in us. ' 
We need finally to outline, within the thesis of the 
intentionality of consciousness, the various ways in 
which 'the thing itself' appears as an object for an 
intending subject. It is clear that since we objected 
to Descartes' methodological separation of subject and 
object, some redefinition of the terms would be called 
for. In a sense this is overdue, because it is the 
relation of subject and object that this whole study 
would seem to stand on, for the question takes us back 
to basic epistemological considerations, and to the 
very character of the thesis of intentionality •. The 
discussion occurs here because we need to de~cribe 
the ways in which a-subject can ~irstly 'have' objects, 
so that we can describe how he later has words in their 
stead. The natural attitude polarises subject and 
Object and accounts for their relation partly by a 
theory of abstraction which is less than satisfactory. 
What is chiefly absent from this account is the way 
that subject and object' participate in each other in 
a subtle way which their material distinctness occludes. 
Because there is no absolute subject nor absolute 
Object, we cannot describe one in the absence of the 
other. Object is always object 'for' a consciousness, 
whilst the subject we take for granted as that con-
sciousness in the condition of entertaining objects. 
But the marginal case - such as aesthetic perception 
of the work of art - of horizons falling away so that 
the subject dwells more fully in the object ( and 
'there is for us an in-itself', Merleau-Ponty says) 
reminds us that in antepredicative knowle~ge ,there is 
no other than this indi visible perceptual unity; but 
the idea, creating a space which did not previously 
exist, interposes between my experience and what is 
suddenly an object for my experience. It is such 
ideas which maintain the object and~its boundaries 
distinct from those ~f the subject. Finally the 'idea 
of me' must replace the uncritical 'experience of me'. 
I can become for myself an object, I can posit myself 
in a narrative and only rarely, if ever, experience 
the reality of myself in the re-discovery of 'the' 
thing i tsel f' • 
But this transcendental ego has a shorter history 
than that of the world of perception. If we remember 
that perception is not an act or set of acts performed 
by me on a world about me, but is rather the condition 
of there being a world at all, then we can 'avoid the 
idea of the primacy of the subj ect. The truth of Merleau-
Ponty's dictum, that 'We are in'the world and the world 
is in us', asserts itself repeatedly. ' The real meaning 
of the pre-r~flective and ante-predicative life is just 
that subject and object are not originally to be 
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distinguished in experience. Only when objects are 
detached from this pre-reflective life do we enjoy 
an attitude towards them, and so know ourselves as 
SUbject. How is it that they are detached, or are 
expelled ? 
The traditional account of the emergence of the 
thinking individual favours abstraction as the means 
of concept-formation, thus taking for granted a dis-
crete subject and object. The thesis equally takes 
as axiomatic what it is asked to explain, which is the 
relation of the particular to the general. For this 
account, abstraction is the drawing away from a number 
of particular impressions of a generalisation, which 
is hence seen as that which unifies the resemblances 
which the particulars are held innocently to exhibit. 
But how could the individual do this without he already 
has that generalised scheme to marshal the myriad im-
pression? And what, anyway, could a particular 
impression be other than a theory of its generalised 
possibility? If it is particular, it is by virtue 
of its significance against a positing horizon; 
significance is always relative and oppositional and 
depends for its life on its reference to other instances 
of itself. Again like Parole, the particular can only 
signify because it is anticipated and guaranteed by the 
general,. a sort of Langue against which the intending 
sUbject makes a coherent template of undifferentiated 
impressions. This template 'works' ,to the extent that 
it enables the subject to act in a shared world, and 
so to proceed from action to action, and thus to new 
products. Perception is charged with creating and 
maintaining objects, which are generalised instances 
of themselves; Merleau-Ponty describes this: . 
The whole life of consciousness is characterised by 
the tendency to posit objects, since it is conscious-
ness, that is to say self-knowledge, only in so far 
as it takes hold of itself and draws itself together 
48 
in an identifiable object. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.71) 
This is the Kierkegaardian objective thought, which 
has forgotten if not severed its roots in perceptual 
experience and operates with the stru~tures of science 
and common-sense. This ~issipation of experience in 
the fact of an object is also an arrest of the subject 
and Merleau-Ponty conti~ues, 
And yet the absolute positing of a single object 
is the death of consciousness, since it congeals 
the whole of existence, as a crystal placed in 
a solution suddenly crystallises it. 
(lb". ") 
The truly particular, on the other hand, cannot be 
had in a generalised fashion. Its precise status as 
/ an Object for us depends on how it is constituted in 
consciousness. 
SUbject and object must be described "in terms of the 
continuously-related ways we have of being in the world, 
and as correlated with different forms of consciousness. 
The project to demonstrate the unity of subject and 
object would be vitiated if, at the same time, we did 
not jettison another traditional separation, that of 
thinking from feeling. MacMurray says that 'Reason is 
primarily an affair of the emotions' (1935); this 
manifestly does not mean that thinking cannot prosper 
beyond the concrete, but that the affect always partic-
ipate~"in thinking; again, it does so because thinking 
has forms which correspond to different intentional 
Objects. Bolton (1982) suggests that the world of 
experience is organised by three ubiquitous ways of 
haVing objects. The first, the 'world' of imagination, 
is characterised by the aesthetic presence ?f th~ngs to 
us; we dwell in this world in a way which pre.cedes and 
yet also transcends reflective thought. The 'world' 
of abstraction, by contrast, is established by standing 
back from things, and Bolton elaborates the conceptual 
structures which organise this. So concepts of things 
49 
emerge from the perception of resemblances between 
particular objects; concepts of acts reveal the 
structural properties of those acts; finally, we 
form concepts of persons 'through a sympathetic 
reflection which reveals them as modes of fulfil-
ment of intentionality'. Through this abstraction 
we are returned to .the world of imagination and of 
immediate experience. The third 'world' of Bol ton's 
account is that of faith, understood as ultimate 
concern for the coherence of the many realities 
which make up lived experience. Faith refers 
to the whole structure of experience in a way 
that combines the actual and the ideal •• (and) 
in so far as it necessarily incorporates the 
ideas of commitment, transcendence and sharing; 
it is faith that inspires the commitment of our 
imagination, the "plunging forward" of intent-
ionality that makes the world real for us, but 
it is faith too that allows us to acknowledge 
the necessity to surrender our subjectivity, to 
recognise that experience can only be fulfilled 
in that which can stand as its measure, and thus 
be sacred for us; and the meeting-point of commit-
ment and the sacred object is where persons can 
meet to know one another and themselves. 
(Bolton, 1982, p.75) 
This is why objects must be understood as correlates 
of consciousness, and described by the mode of the 
subject's being-in-the-world, which itself precedes 
any subject-object distinction. Objects can only be 
known by the intentional acts which realise them, 
and these acts are themselves known by different forms 
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of thought, and therefore different forms of participation 
of subject in object, of object in subject. 
This analysis calls into question Roquentin!s separation 
of the subject, the word and the thing in Nausea (Sartre 
1.965). For Sartre, it appears that words are a sort of 
deluding medium between consciousness and the thing. 
In his account of Roquentin's vision of the root, Sartre 
. ;' 
describes the discrepancy which separates the thing 
from the wo rd: 
In another world circles, musical themes, keep 
their pure and rigid ,lines •• a circle is not absurd, 
it is clearly explained by the rotation of a seg-
ment of a straight line around one of its extrem-
ities. But neither does a circle exist. This root, 
by contrast, existed in such a way that I could not 
explain it. You could not pass from its, function 
as a root, as a suction pump. to that, to that hard 
and thick skin'of a sea lion, to this oily, callous 
stubborn bark. The function explained nothing: it 
allowed you to understand in general what a root 
was, but not at all that one there. 
(Sartre, 1965 p.194) 
This experience brings on the 'nausea' of the title. 
Now in terms of Bol ton's scheme, Roquentin' s experience 
could be seen as a collapse of faith which maintains 
the categorial attitude, so that the object becomes 
detached from the conditions which normally describe 
and delimit its existence. One could conclude from 
this that for Sartre, the epoche - which this is a 
form of - ~s always disastrous. But surely, Roquentin's 
experience, on the contrary, is the very celebration of 
faith, as the root maintains its coherence as the thing 
that it is, and Roquentin remains unified with the object 
of his consciousness; and this because words are intent-
ional. Sartre's mistake is to over-intellectualise the 
word, seeing it, indeed, as the bearer of functions, and 
overlooking the imaginative power which gives it any 
effect it may have, and which is continuous with our 
ability to dwell in the object so intended. It is 
the enhancement of the imagination which makes particular 
this root for Roquentin, and which he is at pains to 
communicate. Of course, he must do so in language, 
and beca~se 'the word' is not 'the thing', he feels he 
must fail. But the word intends the thing. 
Again, the general mistake is to See the life of words 
'as something extra to the life of things and of 
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consciousness, and not as a mode of their participation 
in each other. In the same book Sartre observes that 
it is by making a narrative of our lives as we live 
them that we diminish their existential meaning for us 
in the ~ttempt to make them meaningful: 
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••• a man is alw~ys a teller of stories, he lives 
surrounded by his stories and the stories of 
others, he sees everything that happens to him R,\-",· 
through these stories; and he tries to live his 
own life as if it were a story he was telling. 
(P.56) 
So - according to Sartre - we must fail ·to realise 
properly what we are if we organise narratives around 
OUr experience so that we dislocate our more immediate, 
imaginative insertion in the world. Of course there 
is some truth in this; but narrative, 'far from being 
an ornament, is a supremely intentional' function, and 
what any given narrative intends is the coherence of 
a situation correlated with a consciousness. Narrative 
is not a later and enervating function of language, but 
is itself a character of consciousness. 
Forms of language reflect the structures and processes 
of consciousness exactly, and of course they do because 
they are as much constitutive of consciousness as we 
can know. it, as consciousness determines what we can 
say. It requires a phenomenology of language finally 
to resolve and describe this relation of word and 
thoUght, of subject and object. These relations are 
endlessly debated, but only in the phenomenological 
account does the truly philosophical ground of hUman 
consciousness feature. In the traditional accounts 
a description of expression - the radical accomplish-
ment of consciousness - is methodologically .impo~sible. 
We are left with structures of 'mental' life posited 
on the one hand, and instances of , empirical linguistic 
performance on the other. The view that language 'does' 
something is, of course, quite acceptable: it points 
to real or imaginary objects or experiences; it evokes 
memories and creates possibilities; it bears literary 
as well as colloquial sense and meaning; it ~s a 
medium and it is functional •. But what is difficult to 
im~gine - because difficult to observe - is how language 
has all these - and more - functions simultaneously. 
It does so because langvoge is not itself realised by 
any or all of these functions, but because it is, by 
virtue of its correlation with consciousness, the 
Condition whereby any functions have sense or meaning. 
Linguistic data is what is left in the wake of identi-
fying local expressions of this condition. But the 
whole eludes us like consciousness itself. 
"How can language be an object for science ?" is still 
the question. For Heidegger, for example, the 
co-occurrence of language and consciousness prevented 
any such enquiry; language is the 'House of Being', and 
for such a position is methodologically inaccessible. 
Can we learn nothing from linguistic enquiry? 
A scheme suggests itself. We could see Langue as all 
the virtual possibilities of consciousness, and hence 
of language. Parole, therefore, represents the actual 
instances of consciousness made manifest. Then, still 
within this linguistic register, we could construct a 
picture of language built up through some of the 
elements whichlinguistics has found methodologically 
necessary, but indicating in each case the correlative 
structures of consciousness which achieve this 
observed coherence. Chapters 4 and 5 are based on 
thi s metaphor. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A phenomenology of language: a reflective account 
This chapter deals with language on several levels 
suggested by linguistics. In the creation of these 
levels for the purposes of this chapter, various terms 
are used which for linguistics are technical, though 
often contentious. It is important that the status of 
both terms and levels be indicated at the outset, so 
that the scheme and the character of the chapter can be 
understood as a whole; a more detailed account will 
obviously occur in the course of the argument. 
What is phenomenally true of speech, and by virtue of 
this generality beyond contention, is that it appears 
to organise human sounds into clusters of noise which, 
in a string of such clusters, is said to have meaning. 
Do those sounds have a simple character which can be 
revealed by analysis? What is the nature of a single 
cluster of sound? And' these 'strings', what is it 
determines their combination ? In the case of each 
of these questions analysis has elaborated hypotheses 
which go some way towards explaining the operation of 
language in a scientific manner. In so doing, anal-
ysis has created units, levels and categories which 
are moot across the different schools; in fact the 
determination of such levels and the description of 
their interaction is in large measure what disting'-
uishes the schools. There is no 'typical' system, 
nor universal measure, and two examples should illus-
trate the variety of categorisation. 
The 'Tagmemics' of K.L.Pike (1976) are based -on a hier-
archical arrangement of units on·the related strata of 
morpheme, word, phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph and 
! 
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discourse. By contrast, the 'Systemics' which 
M.A.K.Halliday (1969) developed after the work of 
Firth (1957) is a far more complicated affair, pre-
dicating three primary levels of form, sUbstance and 
context; four fundamental categories of unit, structure 
class and system; and three scales of rank, exponence 
and delicacy. It follows that the use of categories -
like 'the word' - must be special to the systems in 
which these units occur. Nevertheless, some basic 
schematisation of language aS,sounds, as'w'ords and as 
the combination of words into sentences is discernible 
in QII lingui sti c sys terns. 
The first three levels described in this chapter reflect 
this common division. In each case I have assumed a 
basic aspect of what I shall call the linguistic atti-
tUde, and described the additional concept, or concept-
area, necessary to see how this science of categories 
reflects a living experience. To the linguistic account, 
we could say, has been added the intentional structures 
of which.such accounts are abstractions. The last two 
levels of. this chapter extend these structures into the 
general context of speaking persons, and the intentional 
worlds of their discourse. The scheme can be summarised 
in this way 
Chapter Representative Intentional 
section linguistic concept area 
concept 
4.1 phoneme experience 
. 4.2 word communication 
4.3 sentence style 
4.4 dis course will 
4.5 world Being 
A' fuller scheme, showing the relation of this chapter 
with Chapter 5, is given in Appendix A. p.232 
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Such a linguistic scheme is unmistakably hierarchically 
progressive, but it should also be clear that in exper-
ience there is ro such di vision. Being is not a resul t 
or accumulation of these processes, but the very reason 
that they and al-r other phenomena can be coherent. This 
must also be true for the linguistic concept of world, 
therefore. The artificiality of such hierarchies, and 
their tendency so to misrepresent the character of ex-
perience is commented on in the course of the chapter. 
4.1 Experience and the phoneme 
What then does language express if it does not express 
thoughts? It presents or rather it is the subject's 
taking up of a position in the world of his meanings. 
The term 'world' here is not a manner of speaking: it 
means that the 'mental' or cultural life borrows its 
structures from natural life and that the thinking 
subject must have its basis in the subject incarnate. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.193.) 
Organised signs have their immanent meaning, which 
. does not arise from the "I think" but from the "I am 
able to". 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964b, p.88.) 
Structuralism identifies language firstly as a finite and 
closed system of phonetic elements pre-existing signific-
ation. These elements are thus not signs, since they 
have no referent outside of the system, and are coherent 
only as they appear within this relative and opposit-
ional scheme. (This is why language must be learned 
'globally', since the elements of a language have no 
sense outside of the rules of relation which bind them 
each to the others.) Such an understanding explains to 
us how words without referents - "to", in 'I intend to 
work', for example - are yet meaningful; their value 
derives from their 'syncategorematic' function within 
a. larger phonological structure. . Merleau-Ponty confirms 
the structuralist canon that 'For a word to keep its. 
sense it has to be held in place by all the others •• : 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1973b, p.92). He adds, however, an 
investment of structuralism with existence by showing 
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how the apparently impersonal rules of langue are form-
alisations of the experience of the speaker of Parole; 
that is, he claims that there is an immanent meaning 
to words beyond the rules of relation which structur-
alism Uses to connect them, and that this meaning is 
in the first instance the expression of an intending 
voice which has yet to learn the abbreviations of 
communicative form. To the level of immanent meaning 
described by Saussure (1974), we can now add the insight 
that this phonology arises in infant gesticulation and 
that this same expressive element remains to adult 
speech as an affective, sound-sensuous dimension of 
aesthetic communication. 
Now, almost without exception, philosophers from Plato 
onwards have dealt with language as a system whose co-
herence issues at the level of the word, or the sentence. 
Language itself means according to the fairly stable 
values of the particular words of a specific utterance: 
it is for this reason that philosophers in general, and 
Post-Wittgensteinians in particular have felt confident 
that they could address philosophical questions by ex-
amining corpi of language. Questions of what is meant 
by, as much as of who means what collapse into the 
methodological injunction laid down by Wittgenstein: 
'Don't ask for the meaning; look for the use!' 
Though the work of the Philosophical Investigations is 
a refutation of the positivistic Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (Wittgenstein, 1963; 1961), the equation 
of words with translatable conceptual thought still 
requires that we minimise their phonological or aes-
thetic value, a thesis which implies at least the 
possibility of an a priori, eidetic universal grammar. 
Now it is arguable whether Merleau-Ponty's lipguistic 
becomes the foundation of his phe~omenology rather than 
a concomitant development; but surely his re-introduction 
of meaning - after the pre-Socratic manner - at the level 
of the aesthetic is an epistemological as much as 
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linguistic project which requires us to recast language 
as ontological. The view that language is a late 
sophistication of homo sapiens, added on out of evol-
utionary necessity is pirtially true:-Merleau-Ponty 
himself defines speech as 'the surplus of existence 
OVer natural being' (1962, p.173). But Merleau-
Ponty would rot want to distinguish too shrilly 
between the noises of man and those of the other 
animals, and his thesis of language insists that it 
communicates primarily at a pre-reflective level. 
This holds for language across all instances of 
animal communication, and is the core of the argument 
that language is essentially expressive, arising 
gesturally from a bodily orientation and intention. 
Put in this way, the argument seems obvious. But 
like so many which the phenomenologist- undertakes to 
make explicit, it is one taken for granted in the 
'natural' and the 'linguistic' attitude. The general 
occupation with the observable and communicative fea-
tUres of language which characterises the various 
accounts of social science, and which is rationalised 
in linguistics, minimises if not entirely ignores 
the expressive element. The natural attitude sees 
language as a vehicle given to us 'indifferent as a 
means of public transport', as Steiner (1978) says. 
BUilding on this the scientific attitude measures the 
instruments and effects of the system as though they 
Were not embodied. Of course, in a sense which is 
not merely metaphorical, language is properly the 
individual's first science; it is the means by which 
man becomes reflexive, by which he can turn round on 
his experience and know it - but more importantly' 
communicate it - by a system of symbols. The move-
ment into language is an emergence into the world, 
Which by definition is a shared place. Cassirer (194~) 
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updates the response to Kant's question 'What is man ?' 
with the observation that he is uniquely the animal 
which can have objects symbolically. It is easy to 
see how this view of language as a sort of supra-
affective scientific coating might allow us to forget 
that while language delivers us from a world of mute 
perception, it is from such a world that it arises and 
to which it essentially refers. Language no less than 
other forms and fashions of knowledge is gained 'from 
some experience of the world w.ithout which the symbols 
of science would be meaningless' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 
P.viii). Merleau-Ponty then extrapolates as an 
ontologi~al princi~le of language what he discovers 
as an ontogenetic feature: the way children come to 
language demonstrates for us its roots in perceptual 
experience, in what phenomenologists usually call the 
antepredicative.or pre-reflective life. Now where for 
SUch as Piaget (1969) the child transc~r.dsor quits the 
schemes of infant experience, this base of experiential 
coherence remains for Merleau-Ponty'slinguistic as the 
guarantee of meaning. To be sure the adult world is 
intellectualised, is symbolic, but its origins in the 
structures of experience must remain to mediate the 
second-order scheme of science. l 
The foregoing rests on our acceptance of the phono-
logical level of language as in itself expressive and 
signifying. Merleau-Ponty deduces this from infant 
speech, and it is against the canon of language ac-
qUisition from which it derives that this thesis should 
be presented. 
The traditional account of language acquisition pictures 
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I It is axiomatic to this view that insanity results from 
the detachment of symbolic experience from prime, ~xist­
ential experience; less marginally, it will be seen later (p.79-~lth~t inaut~entic ~anguage is that which has a high 
~oromun1cat1ve but 1mpover1shed expressive value. 
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the child as gradually habituated to the language which 
surrounds him by behaviouristic processes of copying, 
of stimulus and response, of reinforcement and reward; 
in this way his language is shaped by the models of 
adult language. Chomsky's (1957) is the 'first prop-
erlydeveloped reaction to this account, and two arg-
uments are particularly challenging. If imitation is 
the chief principle of acquisition then, firstly, we 
should expect children to adopt, for example, the 
patterns of intonation with whi.ch adults commonly 
address them; secondly, and more profoundly, the 
thesis of imitation cannot account for the fact that 
children produce errors for which they have had no 
model - "He goed", "mouses", etc. The evidence to 
the contrary is that children are somehow deaf to 
certain social influences, and develop rather in some 
ineffable fashion which has its own logic and pace, 
and which is effectively impervious to many forms of 
encouragement or inhibition. Chomsky's solution is 
rationalism writ large in the form of the Language 
Acquisition Device, a hypothesis about the serial 
development of language structures which the child 
brings to bear on .the language behaviours to which he 
is exposed. The founding thesis is that the child has 
an innate capacity for language, that human being itself 
·is pre-pared to operate linguistically upon sense data. 
At a broad level of theory the model is plausible, par-
ticularly in its explanation of such facts as the child's 
basic linguistic competence at around 3~ years, and the 
generally uniform pattern of acquisition of various 
structures across different children. The lack of 
empirical evidence, however, and in particular Chomsky's 
deduction of his thesis from idealised utterances have 
caused linguists to return to more empiricist accbunts. 
Still undoubtedly rationalist in persuasion yet based 
on empirical evidence, Piaget places language within 
the context of g~neral cognitive development; linguistic 
structures hence attend corresponding and prior 
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intellectual operations. Both these accounts imply 
some essential separateness of language and thought 
processes from each other and from the more global 
functioning of the body. More commodiously, Bruner 
(1975) attaches some forms of language to general 
patterns of activity of which the utterances form a 
part, and he thus goes some way to embodying speech. 
But this is a pragmatic account which should be dis-
tinguished from the phenomenological. In their 
extreme avoidance of behaviourism, these accounts 
minimise the possibility of meaning at a simple 
Phonological level. Again the necessity to attach 
'meaning' only to such explicitly'conscious be-
haviour as can be rendered by words is a function 
of the categorial either/or which separates such 
intelligence from its embodiment. But 'The spoken 
word is a gesture,' says Merleau-Ponty, ' and its 
meaning a world.' (1962, p184) His thesis typically 
admits and balances the authority of intelligence 
which the rationalist account emphasises and the 
com~unicative nature of language stressed by the 
empiricist. The true novelty, however, is his 
situation of meaning primarily in the body, and, his 
identification of infant phonology as expressive of 
this body's relation to the world. Language there-
after, however mediated by intellectual structures, 
and shaped by convention, must be understood as in-
tentional of a world perceived by an embodied con-
sciousness. 
Merleau-Ponty thus departs from the philosopher's 
(including Husserl's) usual concern with syntax and 
celebrates precisely those features of language which 
philosophy sees as marginal or contingent, and which 
linguistics itself characterises as pre- or non-
linguistic; these are the emotional, biological and 
expressive elements. Crystal, commenting on 
the first stage of phonological acquisition says 
/ 
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---- .. --~ --. 
The important point to note here is that this 
is not a linguistic stage, as far as the pro-
duction of the sounds is concerned •. 
(1976 ) 
He here identifies the linguistic with that which 
distinguishes a given community, and it is only at the 
second stage that he would describe the child's speech 
as linguistically significant. Whilst allowing, then, 
that matur~ . speech is emotional and expressive, it 
seems that Crystal's conception of the linguistic is 
a largely sociological one, requiring that utterances 
should primarily realise a form of the given communic-
ative context. Ergo language is essentially a 
communicative contract. For Merleau-Ponty, on the 
other hand, the communicative signifies the context 
within which the prime, existential will to expression 
may become conventional and may indeed reach its mark 
of being understood. Our first step, then, must be to 
extend the category of 'the linguistic' to include the 
expressive, if raw phonetic impulses which announce a 
presence in the world.' ..... rve· must begin -'. as we did for 
perception - with the resolution not to identify lang-
uage with the processes. which realise. it. Perception, 
we said, is not to be understood by acts of seeing OJ:' 
hearing, nor even by compl&x relationships of sense-
data to electrical brain activity. These are in the 
end contingent; perception is rather the basic condition 
necessary to the. meanings which are elaborated by these 
acts. Meaning extends beyond perception, but it is 
perception which originates it, and this because con-
sciousness is intentional. Language is coherent not 
when it occurs at the explicit level of the sign 
properly constituted, but only if it extends and 
intellectualises.a more fundamental articulation of the 
World by an intending being. The intention -of a world 
starts before reflexive consciousness, and the movement 
into a personal science - which wo~ds represent - is 
the formalisation of a single gestural process begun 
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with. the infant's motile and affective presence. 
Merleau-Ponty relates the motor responses of the child 
to an alphabet of gestures thrown up by evolutionary 
requirement, and suggests how language similarly arises 
in spontaneous gesturing at a phonetic level : 
the knitting of the brows intended, according to 
Darwin, to protect the eye from the sun, or the 
narrowing of the .eyes to enable one to see sharply, 
become component parts of the act of meditation, and 
convey this to an observer. Language, in its tUrn, 
presents no different a problem : a contraction of 
the throat, a sibillant emission of air between the 
tongue and teeth, a certain way of bringing the body 
into play suddenly allows itself to be invested with 
a figurative sense which is coweyed outside us. 
This is neither more nor less miraculous than the 
emergence of love from desire, or that of gesture 
from the un-coordinated movements of infancy. 
(1962, p .193. ) 
Since language clearly has an 'inner' content which is 
not by·this account 'self-subsistent and self-conscious 
thought' , 
What then does language express, if it does not 
.express thoughts? It presents, or rather it is 
the subject's taking up of a position inthe'world-
of his meanings. The term 'world' here is not a man-
. ·ner of speaking; it means that the 'mental' or cultur-
'. '.: allife borrows .its· structures from natural life and 
that the thinking subject must have its basis in the 
subject incarnate. 
(Ibid.) 
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This view is crucial to Merleau-Ponty's whole philosophy, 
and.is one of the best statements of the general phenomen-
ological project to recover the ground of science in 
experience. Its achievement is that it gives 'the sign' 
a value in pre-£ntellectual operations, showing how at 
a mute, perceptual level our behaviour itself polarises, 
selects and announces. This gives the lie to the wholly 
empiricist position; similarly for mentalism, a disposit-
ion to language does not then mean merely the presence 
of intellectual powers awaiting activation, but a more 
general givenness to meaning-making which the body init-
iates, and which modal faculty indeed becomes the intellect 
. itself. Thus a 'mental life' is not a delimitable 
faculty which sits on top of.an inferior body (like 
Ryle's Ghost), but it is the most·~refined way the body 
has of declaring its in~entional structure. 
The Saussurean understanding of 'the sign' is of an 
image - the si~~ifiant - and a meaning - the signifi~ -
inseparably linked, and Merleau-Ponty's demonstration 
of the gestural basis of language not only confirms this 
definition but locates the sign in experience" for 
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••• we can no longer consider the learning of language 
as an intellectual operation of reconstituting meaning. 
We are no longer in the Eresence of two entities (the 
expression and its sense) the second of which would 
be hidden behind the first. Language as the phenom-
enon. of expression is constitutive of consciousness. 
(1973, p. 50.) 
So just as a .smile or a raised fist do not convey pure, 
conceptual thoughts between minds, so the word is uttered 
and grasped globally as an indissoluble act of expression. 
The expression (of a meaning) does not interpose between 
an intention and (an intuited) meaning, but is indeed the 
instance of meaning itself, and this primarily on a phon-
ological.level. Long before. words achieve sedimentation 
in lexicons, they arise as elements of expression whose 
meaning is not intellectual : 
Here the meaning of words must finally be induced by 
the words themselves, or more exactly, their conceptual 
meaning must be formed by a kind of subtraction from a 
gestural meaning which is immanent in speech. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.l79.) 
This means, of cour~e that the relationship between words 
and sounds cannot, pace the account of linguistics, be 
merely conventional : 
If we consider only the conceptual and delimiting 
meaning of words, it is true that the verbal form ••• 
appears arbitrary. But it would no longer appear so 
if we took into account the emotional content of the 
word, which we have called above its 'gestural~ sense 
which is all-important for poetry, for example. It ' 
would then be found that the words, vowels and phonemes 
are so many ways of 'singing' the world, and that their 
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function £s, to represent things not, as the naive 
onomatopoeic ,theory had it, by reason of an objective 
resemblan~e, but because they extract, and literally 
express, their, emotional essence. If it were possible 
in any vocabulary, to disregard what is attributable 
to the mechanical laws of phonetics, to the influence 
of other languages, the rationalisation of grammarians, 
the assimilatory processes, we should probably discover 
in the original form of each language a somewhat res-
tricted system of expression, but such as would not 
make it entirely arbitrary to call night by the word 
nuit if we use lumiere for light. The predominance 
of vowels in one language, or of consonants in another, 
and constructional and, syntactical systems, .do not 
represent so many~arbitrary conventions for the ex-
pression of one and the same idea, but ,several ways 
for the human body to sing the world's praises and in 
the last resort to live it. We may speak several 
languages, but one of them always remains the one in 
which we live. In order completely to assimilate a 
language, it would be necessary to make the world 
which it expresses one's own, and one never does 
belong to two worlds at once ••• Strictly speaking, 
therefore, there are no conventional signs. 
(lb., p.187-8.) 
This 'summary passage both establishes the primacy of the 
expressive origin and character of words and'refutes the 
relativist philosophy of language. Its particular neat-
ness is in fact this relationship it suggests between man, 
his world" and the other men who inhabit it. It allows 
us a single world which is wholly shared, and yet it is 
the manner of this sharing which makes for local and con-
ventional accent. But this specialty, the passage 
insists, is not initially at the level of word, or syntax, 
but at the le~el of phoneti~ expression through which the 
child invents for himself the linguistic values of his 
community. We recall that 'every scientific schematis-
ation is an abstract and derivative sign-language' (Ibid, 
P.ix) which. is meaningless unless experience has validated 
it. Speech, then, always reaches back into ,a semantic 
and therefore conventional store-house which was created 
by the selective impoverishment of a gestural response to 
the world. 
This account is not particularly novel, but Merleau-Ponty 
brings a novel accent to it. He emphasises how babbling 
~----
ranges across all phonetic possibility in the world of 
speech, and how this unrestricted play of sounds gives 
way to the cultural influence of prosodic features and 
thus to a.will to communicate. But language obviously 
means at apre-conceptu~l and pre-verbal level and even 
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in adult language this expressive element remains. Our 
Common understanding of words drains them of this affect-
ive character so that we take them to be coherent ab~tract­
ions which have left behind the urge to mean, and which 
rather mean by virtue of an intellect operating on them. 
The structuralist insistence that phonemic fsignsf have 
no meaning in themselves beyond our ability to distinguish 
each from the other ov'erlooks' the world of experience 
which this world of noise moves directly out of. It is 
because experience cannot be an object for science that 
linguistics excludes it from its. field of enquiry, and 
hopes thereby to avoid a me.thodological schism which the 
problem of meaning at a purely phonological level would 
open. For Merleau-Ponty, however, complex adult lang-
uage has its roots in babbling and is 'subtended by a 
world of phonetic gesturing which resists explicitation. 
One of the aims of this section has been to remind the 
linguistic account that 
The word owes its effi.cacy to thefac~ ~hat it is 
not an obj ecti ve notation, but an.,'·in·dexof' va·lue . 
(Gusdorf, 1965, p.9) 
So a word does not isolate a referent from its context 
but raiher determines it rasa function of its environ-
ment' (lb.) That environment rendered in speech is the 
intentional product of the speaker exercising a particular 
orientation. I shall summarise and conclude this section 
by drawing on some related points which Ricoeur has made, 
Chiefly in his discussions of structuralism (1978; 1981). 
The question which motivates Ricoeurrs enquiry and remains 
a~ a motif to this section is whether and how language 
can be an object for empirical science. Ri co eur poin ts 
! 
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out that Husserl's early work (from the Logical Investig-. 
ations to the Cartesian Meditations) defined consciousness 
not by perception, by its presence to things, but by its 
ability to distance itself from them by signification. 
In the last ten years of his work Husserl admits perception 
and so shifts to a more existential phenomenology which 
therefore opposes any. final separation of subject and 
Object. Structuralist linguistics, however, operates 
on the understanding of the sign as a distancing device. 
Broadly, the phenomenological reduction to the level of 
Phonology in language has the same effect as its regress-
ion. of consciousness to perception, which is to posit the 
sUbject as acting and as having always acted in a lived 
world. 
The definition which Hjelmslev (1970) has provided for 
structure as 'an autonomous entity of internal depend-
encies' permits 'the subordination of inductive operat-
ions to deduction and the calculus' (Ricoeur, 1978, p. 
109). by which structuralist linguistics f~nctions. In· 
this way language has no 'outside', since this would 
work against the closure of signs. It is equally sev-
ered from individual performance and the evidence of 
personal creation of meaning by combination. Now 
Ricoeur's objection to structuralism is based on its 
identification of language with the structures and pro-
cedures with which it is customarily analysed. This 
is to say that language is-no more :nor le~S: than these 
rUles 'and those principles and such and such a system; 
what Ricoeur seeks to do, whilst applauding the useful-
ness 'of structuralist analysis, is to relocate Parole 
as a character of existence without impairing the in-
crement to science which the elaboration of Langue has 
given. Ricoeur approves the levels (of phonology, of 
morphology and syntax, etc) which structuralism sets us, 
but points out that a change from 'one hierarchically-
posi ted uni t to another is a change 'from struct,ure to' 
function' • So as phonemes combine to form words, say, 
they do so in the service of the intentional use of 
those words; words similarly form sentences because 
a particular meaning demands an equally special combin-
ation. What unifies these operations is the act of 
the speaker, not the me~e presence of a structure. 
Discourse.extends beyond any virtual system because it 
is an· actual event. The structuralist systems point 
to the internally referring character of signs, but 
Ricoeur adduces Frege's Sinn (ideal sense) to account 
for this while the complemen~ary Bedeutung describes how 
language simul taneously refers to a' real world. (Frege, 
1952). Elaborating a system of antinomies, Ricoeur 
opposes the terms 'eventual', 'choice', 'innovation', 
'reference' and 'allocution' to the structuralist values 
of 'virtual', 'constraint', 'institution', 'closure' and 
'anonymity'. This latter set describes the elements of 
Langue while the former irnroduces a 'regulated. dynamism' 
which is a science of operations upon.those elements. 
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We thus move from the. view of language as a system of 
nominal relations indifferently combiriing to a dynamic 
recasting of those same relations as intentional pro-
cesses. l In so transforming these elements we 'return 
the sign to the universe' (Guillaume) to oppose Levi~ 
Strauss' demonstration of its absence from reality (1963). 
One can hold to this point of view as long as he 
considers 'the closed system of discrete units which 
compose a language; it no longer suffices when one 
approaches discourse in act. It would appear then 
that the sign is not only that which is lacking to 
things, it is not simply absent from things and 
other than them; it is what wishes to be applied, 
in order to express,. grasp, appreh;end, and finally 
show, to make see. 
(Ricoeur, 1978, p.118.) 
This hypostatisation of the sign thus also returns' it to 
the experience of the speaker. In Chapter 7 I shall 
1 - Ricoeur counters possible objections: 'And let no 
orte raise the accusation of mentalism. This accusation 
which inhibits too many investigators, is valid against' 
a Psych?logism of ~he image and of the concept, against 
the clalm of psychlc contents accessible to introspect' 
alone. It is 'foolish when directed against operatio l~n (1978, p.117.) ns. 
again explore the gap which exists between experience 
and science, which I believe the question of phonolog-
ical or 'immanent' meaning illustrates,' and which is a 
chronic problem for methodology; meanwhile I mention 
an obvious case of experience which finally resists 
any scientific explanation. Poetry stands as the 
supreme example not only of untranslatability but also 
of the effects of words which, to be sure, can be all-
uded to by a critical terminology but which, as Eliot 
has reminded us, may communicate before being under-
stood. l Our talk about poetry is usually ~ rational-
isation of eventual experience in terms of ' the signs 
which words are; we need to remember that these signs 
are not merely 'internally dependent' on each other for 
meaning, but that they serve - and later we shall say 
they are - our intention to create meaning. 
4.2 Communication and the word 
••• to name a thing ,is to tear oneself away from 
its individual and unique characteristics to see 
it as representative of an ,essence 'or a category. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.176.) 
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It is proposed in Ch.4.iii to describe in greater detail 
the expressive character of language established in 4.i, 
and to show how this will to expression has communication 
as its mode of realisation. Since 4.i concentrated on 
the experience of the individual, we shall here describe 
the ideal character of Langue which trains this speaking 
voice and which is deformed by it. 
Speaking being an essentially expressive act arising from 
the speaker's private experience of the world; the quest-
ion remains as to how it is that this speech'is understood 
by other people. We said in the last section that where 
1 - So we can explain onomatopeia in terms of its high ic-
onicity, say; likewise the effects of alliteration or ass-
onance. Of course, even such phonaesthetic significance 
beco~es ritualised, so that it is unlikely that the effect 
of the palatal-alveolar fricative - as the linguistic ac- ' 
count might have it - in "Splash l" or "Soft the sea sighs" 
~or structuralist linguistics the meaning of 'the sign' 
is precisely its absence from experience, its capaci ty 
for detaching meaning from an immediate situation, for· 
phenomenology such.a sign is initially the gesture of 
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an intending individual, a mark. of his presence to the 
world. Saussure (1974) defines the sign as an indis-
soluble unity of the signifiant (a physical image) with 
the signifit (a conceptual entity), and in the first 
section we concentrated on the physical presence of the 
sign. Now since language clearly refers to things which 
need not even exist, it follows that this ~Qncept, in 
distinction from the physical image, must refer to an· 
ideal entity. So, as consciousness is always 'of some-
thing', speech likewise has a referent which is only. con-
. . 
tingently real; the act of speech is intentional and 
posits objects noetically in just the way that thought 
entertains them. When we speak of an object, or think 
of it, we interpose an ideal form between.consciousness 
and the thing itself. What a word expresses, then, is 
not merely a personal or 'mental' experience, but a 
meaning which appears to transcend this present use and 
which may appear in any language and context. Its 
pointing to something in the experience of the listener, 
its communication.of sense, that is, completes the act 
of expression by turning it into a shared event. In this 
moment. the sign itself is transcended as the ideal sense 
meets up with the reality of the thing and the truth of 
experience. This operation is described similarly, and 
m~re for~ally by Frege (1952). 
Briefly, Frege contrasted the logical term 'concept' 
with the actual object·by saying that objects can be 
derives entirely from an emotional response. That diff~ 
erent··languages realise different onomatopoeic forms for 
.what we would agree ·to be the same phenomenon reminds us· 
that even in the highly iconic word there remains an el-
ement of the arbitrary and conventional. For the vast 
majority of wordifwe must admit that there is minimal and 
more often no iconicity, though this does not mean that 
thos~words do riot communicate at a sub-verbal level, and 
we have demonstrated how 'the sign' is an expressive and 
intentional process. 
,."~. 
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talked about while concepts are what we use in order 
to do this talking. So in "Brutus is an honourable 
man", the predicate 'is ••• man' is a concept, an 
ideal enti ty, since Brutus is the real obj ect. -·This 
movement from simply saying somethi.ng to saying about 
something is a .movement from object to concept. Of 
Course in the ·real world of. natural languages, even 
to say just "Brutus" must have a context such.that the 
utterance is an intentional statement, carrying with 
it somehow its. predicating concept. Language can' do 
this because for Frege it has the double aim of an 
ideal sense and of reference, of Sinn und Bedeutung. 
The ideal sense is inexistent since it is an object 
of thought, but it undoubtedly refers to' reality. 
So the movement we spoke of is a double one, for al-
though'at the level of the sentence the concept 'qual-
ifies' a pre-existing .object, at the broader ontolog-
ical level of discourse the movement is .from concept 
to object in the attempt to root the ideal sense of a 
whole utterance in the shared physical world which it 
intends. 
In talking of a 'shared physical world' in this con-
text,we can here deal with and finally dismiss the 
so-called Whorf-Sapir thesi.s of relativity. This 
thesis holds' that different. languages represent what 
may be fundamentally different ways of experiencing' 
the world. Thi.s being so we 'could conclude that 
there are as. many different worlds as. there are lang-
uages, and presumably as there are people. Such a 
view finally separates each of us from the other, con-
demning us to our private worlds and to vain attempts 
71 
to break out. To be sure, languages are never fully 
transiatable into each other, primarily because of their 
,phonological distinction and .the phonaesthetic quality 
which resists explicitation. Apparently more damningly 
there may ev~n b~ concepts exclusive to parti.cular lang-
uages; there is.,plenty of empirical evidence of languages 
having conceptual schemes not immediately accessible 
to our own tongue (Lyons, 1968; Evans Pritchard, 1937, 
etc.). But in the. fact that we can talk of them, 
however obliquely, and that they do, finally, yield 
themselves up to our circumlocutions lies the evidence 
that we are after all talking of the same world, though 
we do it in different ways. ~That linguistic signs are 
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said to be parti cular is' not in itself proof that the 
reality they refer to is particular and partial. In 
practice we experience a variety of signifiers address-
ing a single phenomenon; in fact we see that what unifies 
such variety is the other feature of the Saussurean sign, 
the signified. In Fregean terms the ideal sense of a 
word actually goes beyond a merely local occurrence in 
a closed system because it is required to refer to 
reality. Thus whilst it may be futile to look for 
linguistic universals at the level of syntai~ we should 
yet expect to find the possibility of the universal as 
the very condition of any translation. . In any event, 
such universals will be found in the real rather than 
the virtual world of signs and concepts, and the value 
of the Whorf-Sapir' thesis is that it reminds us of this 
virtual characte~ of language; the real world exists 
independently of our words, and this is what we mean by 
the ideality of language: i~ is a correlate of experience 
Which 'enables us to share that experience with others. 
In the last section we examined language at its simplest 
level of··meaning, the phonological. Structuralist 
linguistics' has shown how meaning at this level isim-
manent, deriving from the contrastive, oppositional, 
diacritical occurrence of phonemes. But what"is a' 
phoneme itself? "The phoneme /p/" is simply a way' of 
idealising the real sound we produce 'or hear -when "pot" 
··is said, or "sip" or "Cupid"; spectrographic analysis 
has shown that no two realisations of this /p/ sound are 
" 
eVer the same, and yet we are seldom deceived by the 
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variety of forms. Similarly with the vocal realisation 
of words, we can as easily recognise the West Country 
articulation of "bath" as that of the Lancastrian or 
RP speaker; in each case we-know it refers to that (often) 
long, (variably) deep, (increasingly-often) fibre-glass 
vessel in which we (sometimes) (not wholly) immerse our-
selves in order to wash (our bodies). At the semantic 
level it is no less curious that this word 'bath' guar-
antees the inclusion in a non-explicit category of a 
variety of devices whose commonality would be difficult 
to specify. Both cases of meaning - the phonological 
and the semantic - are explained by our tacit ability 
to locate sounds spontaneously within two interdependent 
contexts; one is the abstract system of the given natural 
language understood globally, the other the total but 
local context of the given conversation. This analysis 
extends through sentences to the 'sedimentations' which 
are literary texts. There is an ideal character to the 
text which is present at all its readings and which trans-
cends these local and temporal realisations. Th6ugh 
recent structuralist critics ( e.g., Barthes,1975 ) have 
emphasised this feature, it occurs early in Husserl's 
work : 
In a treatise ••• every word, every sentence, is a 
one-time affair, which does not become multiplied by 
a reiterated 'or vocal or silent reading. Nor does it 
matter who does the reading, though each reader has 
his owri voice, his own timbre, and so forth. The 
treatise itself (taken now only in its lingual aspect, 
as composed of words or language) is something that 
we distinguish, not only from the multiplicities of 
vocal ~eproduction, but also ••• from the multiplic-
ities of its permanent documentations by paper and 
print, parchment and handwriting ••• The unique 
language-composition is reproduced a thousand times 
••• we speak simply of the same book with the same 
story, the same treatise. And this self-sameness 
obtains even with respect to the purely lingual 
composition ••• 
(1969, p.26) 
This is obviously not to say that the text has one 
meaning, but that "there is an element of identity to the 
meanings it may have. It is in fact identity which is 
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the vehicle of ideal sense. It is because we respond 
to, or recognise in words a. central cor.e" however phen-
omenally fuzzy, which attends their use in any indiffer-
ent situation that we can speak of this ideal or virtual 
sense. Aristotle suggests that identity is simply the 
greatest degree of similarity, but Husserl points out 
that the notion of similarity depends on the prior 
concept of identity (Husserl,1970). If we can recognise 
the consistency and repeatability, of a phenomenon over 
time, our recognition is precisely the intentional act 
of positing identity. What unifies these acts is the 
ideal sense, the noetic identity of the given object. 
It is important to remember that this identity is after 
'all a tacitly understood 'area' which is better described 
by the exceptions which relieve its margins than by any 
shot at rigid definition. Returning to the example of 
the semantic nature of the lexical item 'bath', we'should 
arrive ata characterisation of the real thing partly by 
combining sets of physical attributes with functions and 
as much by a process of exclusion, or licensed inclusion 
of apparently less central features. More commodiously 
we could look to the dictionary for a minimal definition, 
though such an entry would not tell us how to use the 
term. 
It remains that actual use goes on effortlessly. If we 
asked our neighbour what was a bath, he would probably 
Point to one, in the same way that his words point to 
the ideal sense we share. There is this ostensive 
fUnction in both of Sinn and Bedeutung. When I talk 
of these flowers on my table, my words point to a part-
iCUlar vase of daffodils. My speaking of them. brings 
them from' the fulfilled intention which they are in 
themse~ ves to an ideal represen ta tion ,in the ,expression 
of my subjectivity. , This depiction is ideal because it 
is a cypher which must stand for all flowers in all 
in~tances, for the- attributes of all flowers, for the 
eXclusion of all" features not floral, etc. And it must 
be fulfilled by the instance and form of these particular 
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flowers. I.A.Richards U924) talks of the process of 
reading as requiring 'approximate understanding, a 
sense of the diversity of word-senses (and) ••• essential 
omission. ' I suggest that ~his is no less a requirement 
of all experiences of the word. In my example above, 
approximate understanding is given by the cue 'flowers' 
which alerts us to the ideal and objective form and sense 
of flowers; given with the same ideal cue are all histor-
ical and taxonomic instances of flowers: all 'not-flowers' 
and all other flowers than these ones here are simultan-
eously edited. 
What, then, is the reference to? In Frye's terms, it 
is at once 'centrifugal and centipetal' (1957, p.73),-it 
is a bridge between the ideal flower which I intend noet-
ically and its eventual realisation in the object of my 
perception. When Roquentin broke through to the naked 
ideality of words (Sartre, 1965), he was left with 
existing things of extended substance which could not be 
individuated by words. He deduced that the existence 
of something, not being a requirement of its concept, was 
de'trop, superfluous and absurd. Its concept may be 
recovered .in words, but its existence, not being logically 
entailed, is not properly susceptible to words. So 
stated extremely, my description of these flowers could 
not, however, detailed, distingui.sh them from the class of 
things which. indifferently characterises them. Such a 
statement brings us to an immitigable chasm between 'words 
and things, and indeed between things and persons. 
Before describing how it is the world of experience, of 
the aesthetic.and finally of faith which resolves this 
division, it is necessary to summarise this notion of the 
ideality of language. 
When we say that language is ideal we mean firstly that, 
from the level of words up through sentences to texts, 
ideas it some poirit attach to these elements. (It is 
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important so to qualify this attachment because as we 
shall see in 4. 5, there is Ii ttle evidence of the full 
intellectual presence of these ideas·at the moment of 
their utterance.) We mean next that, viewed from the 
vantage of the detached observer and not from the exper-
ience, words. have an idealised though virtual sense; the 
extreme form of this is their appearance in a lexicon • 
Finally, language communicates because these ideas appear 
to be shared, and we can conclude therefore that a word 
has a universal value based on accretions of identity 
within a given language and, subject to the modulations 
of translation, in all natural languages. We qualify 
the foregoing with the observation that although such 
ideas ~annot ba made explicit, the rules for their use 
are somehow given with their actual use. 
Richards (op.cit.) speaks of the diversity of· word-sense, 
and we have yet to explain polysemy, that·faculty of 
words for carrying variable meanings, within the thesis 
of identity. When· communication takes place.it depends 
on something being said which already means something 
to the listener; but although· the ideal sense of· the word 
guarantees communication, this unity cannot but be ach-
ieved through a personal experiencing of the word which 
is a deformation of this ideal sense, a 'synchronising 
change of my own existence' (Merleau-Panty, 1962, p.184). 
The process is analogous with text-interpretation where 
••• both factors, identity and variability belong in-
separably together and are linked to one another in 
the process of interpretation, whose very nature is 
to say the .same thing in a different way and, precise-
ly by virtue of saying it in a different way, to say 
the same thing. 
(Ebeling in Gadamer, 1976, p.xxvi.) 
Communication depends on this expressive act of speech 
finding the intentional (and therefore no less expressive) 
act of attending. Shared, ideal, objective meaning is 
the outcome of sp~?ific linguistic acts committed by 
intend~ng beings, for although 'all discourse is understood 
It 
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as meaning' it 'is effectuated as an event ••• it has 
an instantaneous existence, it appears and disappears' 
(Ricoeur,1978, p.136). We have said that in the word 
there is sense and reference," and we can now add 
Ricoeur's sub-division of 'a reality-reference and a 
self-reference, ••• intentional and reflective, thing-
bound and self-bound,' (lb., p.137.). Pace the linguist 
words are not, then, merely empty semes awaiting fulfil-
ment, but. rather what William Gass (1977) has called them, 
'containers for consciousness'. 
This observation brings us close to the problem which 
irritates the thesis as a whole: this is how language 
can be an object for science when its operation is 
actual though its elements are virtual. For the basic 
flaw in this 'examination of language at the level of 
words is the assumption that they can exist as it were 
in their own right. To be sure they exist for the 
dictionary and for other schemes which arrest experience; 
but the definitions which such arrests give to words are 
a paradoxical gloss on what is only the possibility, the 
outline of a word, for no such explicitness attends their 
actual use. Husserl comments 
Each attempt to transform the being of what is ideal 
into the possible being of what is real, must ob-
viously suffer shipwreck on the fact that· possibil-
i ties ... ~hemsel.ves. are ideal. objects. Possibili ties 
can as 1i ttle' be found in the real world, as can 
numbers in general, or tri~ngles in general. 
(1970, Vol.l, p.345) 
Speaking, we. remember after Humboldt,. is not product 
but production, and our interest is not elements combined 
indifferently in a state of system, but the global oper-
ation of tha tsystem. The system itself,' becau'se it· is 
virtual, is atemporal, whilst speaking is manifestly a 
'transitory, vanishing act~ (Ricoeur, 1978, pl14.). 
The characterisation of ideality attempted earlier 
sUddenly seems poignant against this accusation that. 
words are not real, but rather move between, simult-
aneously linking and separating the two repositories 
// 
of the real, w~ich are speaker and thing. In 4.1 we 
discovered the strictly semiotic value of word-sounds, 
and their expressive origin in the speaker; we said how 
these sounds are not verbal inages or representations 
produced according to some imagined model, but that 
there is rather 'a motor presence of the word which is 
not the knowledge of the word.' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) 
Following ohin the third section we shall talk properly 
of the semantic value of words, that is their reference 
to shared intentional objects. It is only possible to 
do this at the level of the sentence within discourse, 
as we can now define words as individual elements 
having only ideal and transcendent sense, their refer-
ence depending on their contextual situation with other 
words; 
Thus the word is, as it were, a trader between the 
system and the act, between the structure and the 
event: on the one hand it is then only a semantic 
virtuality; on the other it relates to the event in 
the fact that its semantic actuality is contemporan-
eous with the vanishing actuality of the enunciation. 
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But it is here also.that the' situation is reversed. 
The word ••• is less than the sentence in that its 
actuality of meaning is subject to that of the sent-
ence. But it is more than' the sentence from another 
point of view. The sentence ..••• is an.event~. as 
such, its actuali ty is transi tory, passing, 'vanishing. 
But the word survives the sentence. As a displace-
able entity, it survives the transitory instance of 
discourse and holds itself available for new uses. 
Thus, heavy with a new use-value (valeur d'emploi) -
as minute as thi's may be - it returns to the system, 
it gives it a history. 
(Ricoeur, 1978, p.119.) 
* 
The evolutionary nature of the scheme of this chapter. 
has so far required that we emphasise a primarily 
express.~ve individual coming to commun~cate. _ But for 
a~ult speech the rigid separation of language £unctions 
into the descriptive categories 'expressive' and 'comm-
unicative' is naive and fictive. Even to say that both 
functio.ns are al~ays present in an utterance is still 
divisive of an eventual process which is manifestly 
whole. From here on, a deliberate attempt will be 
made to avoid emphasising one. function over a~other. 
In order to do this I shall now develop the theme of 
style as the' single ground of linguistic acts which 
reveal the values and orientation of the speaker. 
4.3 Style and the sentence 
The fact that one can never depart too far from the 
linguistic conventions is clearly basic to the life 
of language: he who speaks a private language under-
stood by no one else does not speak at all. But on 
the other hand, he ·.who""only .. speaks a language in 
which conventionality has become total in the choice 
of words, syntax and in style forfeits the power of 
address and evocation which comes solely with the 
individualisation of a language's vocabulary and of 
its means of communication. 
(Gadamer, 1976, p.8S.) 
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D~s,?~ssions_~! styl~ revolve generally around 'the concepts 
of choice" and devi~ti~h. While the broadest character-
isation would include the equation of style with lite~ary 
and,historical periods or genres, and the designation of 
fUnctions such as 'journalistic' or 'administrative', I 
shall begin with a minimal definition of linguistic and 
literary style advanced by Ducrot and Todorov. Here 
style is 
the choice that every text necessarily makes among 
a certain number of possibilities included in the 
language ••• the stylistic description of an utter-
ance is nothing but the description of all its verbal 
properties. 
(Ducrot and Todorov, 1979,p.300) 
Ducrot and Todorov say that style might thus be examined 
at the .level of utterance, in terms of its verbai, sy~­
tactic and semantic features; and at the level of enun-
cia tion" (or dis course, I would suggest) where the rela t-
ionship of the protagonists (speaker, listener, referent) 
is the ground of a~y distinction to be drawn. This latter 
emphasis is currently the dominant one in linguistics; 
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Halliday (1969) refers specifically to the relations 
between participants in a language activity, and he 
hence typifies such as' the 'colloquial' or'the 'formal' 
stYle. Crystal, too, (1976) speaks of the features of 
'situationally distinctive uses of language', and sees 
stylistics as attempting to 'establish principles cap-
able of accounting for the particular choices made by 
individuals and social groups in their use of language." 
SUch a project is to be distinguished from the Cartesian 
venture of Chomsky's, which similarly seeks principles, 
but those which allow choice rather than explain it. 
Actually Chomsky - in rationalist style - rejects the 
strict Sauss~rean view of langue as all possible in-
stances of a language, and suggests that language arises 
from an intrinsic tacit knowledge which he terms 
Competence. It is in the generative nature of 
competence to promote an infini te vocabulary of possi ble 
acts of performance. The passage from competence to 
the realised performance is made on the strength of 
intUitions or judgments by the native speaker. If we 
Were to represent the approaches to language of the 
strUcturalist and"the generative grammars in terms of 
movement along a vertical axis, we could so see immed-
iately the significant fundamental difference between 
the two: Chomsky's approach moves 'up' from the speaker 
tOwards an actual utterance, where the structural anal-
YSis moves 'down' from that utterance but'has methodol-
ogically severed itself from the possibility of reaching 
its SOurce. This is not to say that Chomsky's account 
is Unilateral; on the contrary, there is little exist-
ential in the account beyond its recognition that' 
language acts are unique and creative. The structur-
alist ac~ount, on the other hand, hypostatises the 
language act in the interest of science, granting it an 
autonomy so that style, as we have seen, is a 'choice' 
made' by the text. " 
ITwe graft onto Chomsky's account of competence the 
insight tha t the word 0 ccurs as an even t, we shall be 
able to arrive at a view of th~ sentence, that is of 
any sentence, as the expression of a personal style; 
the term style itself then betokens no mere occurrence 
of form at the level of utterance, or of relation at 
that of enunciation, but as the global announcement 
of personal boundaries within the po~sibilities of 
eXistence. Ricoeur has started this process by 
resCuing the. word from the indifference accorded it 
by Saussurean structuralism; in the last section we 
showed how the word has an ideal sense but that it 
requires location in the referential experience of 
the Speaking subject for it to become properly a sign. 
Ricoeur emphasises that it is this eventual process 
W'hich makes possible the second-order of virtues which 
strUcturalism describes as product. Ricoeur's 
argument can be taken further, and in this way : he 
acknowledges that through eventual occurrence words 
become 'heavy with a new use-value • (1978, p.119), 
that is, the personal experience which generates the 
W'ord gives it an increment of meaning 'by which it is 
I 
returned to the universe'. Now if behind the occur-
rence of every sign lies this dynamic process, and if 
eVery sign returns to the system with this history, 
then beneath the arrested combination of signs - which, 
at the level of sentence or discourse structuralism 
calls style .. - must lie a flux and totality of signif-
ication which is, to echo Merleau-Ponty, the surplus 
Of 
eXistence over natural being. We experience 
the mysterious and wonderful phenomenon of speech: 
the hearing of a piece of human existence in the 
very process of hearing a human utterance. 
(Hofstadter, 1965, p.70.) 
It is only in these terms that we can explai~ the 
Phenomena of polysemy and metaphor, and indeed of the 
fOUnding creativity of language as a whole. 
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POlysemy, the property of words of having more than 
one sense,'m~st be understood as an indivisible 
operation of consciousness on the lexicon. It 
operates in fact between these two poles which are 
the parameters of discourse, and we can so explain 
the more obvious phenomenon of a homonym, as well as 
the more subtle disposition of meaning like so many 
hues around apparently unequivocal items - which 
equivocation is the justification of any interpret-
ative process. Minimising ambiguity and fixing 
values is not the drive exclusively of scientific 
language, but the duty which most discourse aims to 
fUlfil, but which has become a methodological 
requirement as well as an emblem of scientific,", 
enqu· . t· d' I lry. When we come to poe lC lscourse 
however, pOlysemy (necessarily a property.at the 
level of the word) is to be distinguished from am-
bigUity, which is an event.at the higher unit of the 
sentence. Humboldt (1970) talks of language as the 
infinite Use of finite means, and clearly it is the 
fUnction of a polysemic language to accomplish this 
by providing an economy of code and by requiring 
Ct' on extual dependencies to fix a given message. In 
ordinary discourse, a given sentence combines.units 
in SUch a way as to fix a recognisably univocal mean-
ing, and ambigui ty is then descri bed in terms of a 
pathology of discourse. Poetic discourse, on the 
other hand, takes ambiguity as a very strategy for 
extending and - on particularly successful occasions -
for exploding finite means. 
~ Ricoeur 1978, p.129 defines scientific language 'by 
he defensive measures it takes against ambiguity',having ar~umentation as its aim; ordinary language has communic-i~l.on as its theme and 'its field o·f application is real-
m Y as it is differently experienced by the individual ne~. bers of the speech community'. Poetic language is 
to as such characterised here; I take him by impression a~ m?an - rath~r after the manner of Heidegger - to mean re~ ~nstance of language carefully directed at redefining l~ty, and its occurrence thus to be a necessary 
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Polysamy is given with the nature of words, and more 
brles~ acibigu~~i,~s-the'fate of particular combinat-
ions of those words at the level of the sentence. But 
in the case .of poetry the. functional traits of polysemy, 
which are contextual dependence and economy,are employed 
with deliberation to grace ambiguity with the existent-
ial structure of metaphor. This accords with Ricoeur's 
operational use of 'ambiguity' as the passive openness 
of discourse to a variety of interpretation (1978), and 
We can therefore reserve a specially ontological char-
acter for metaphor as an 6peration of conflicting 
intentionalities at the. ideal level of the word. The 
Solution of this. conflict, which at this level ,generates 
semantic chaos, cannot be a synthesis, because there are 
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not, after all, two. intentions at the l~vel:of discourse; 
the solution is the creation on the part of the interpret-
er of the 'new' identity which yet pre-existed and' which 
therefore 'generated the metaphor. The· presence.of in-
dividual. words with their discrete, ideal senses appears 
to dissipate the single intention which lies behind the 
metaphor and which is fulfilled in the single act of 
intention which is the interpreter's unders.tanding. 
Individual words are suddenly useless to us as their 
Virtual senses fall away in the creation of an actual 
meaning. 
We break .here with the classical view of metaphor as 
concerned with nominal properties. Aristotle says that 
metaphor 'consists in giving the thing a na~e that belongs 
to something else' (Poetics/1457/b6-9),.and ~his.'sub­
stitution theory' (as Richards has it) of metaphor as a 
trope assigns it an ornamental 'and ultimately enervating 
fUnction based on deviation. The view persists .through 
eIement of so-called scientific and ordinary discourse 
a~d ~ot exclusively one of self-conscious poesy. The {~lllng ·out of this definition is largely the scheme of 
e remainder of this section. ' 
/ 
such as Samuel Johnson's notion of II two ideas for one", 
and certainly it is a- clich' of pedagogy to teach res-
titution of a missing term as the means of understanding 
metaphor. This is consistent with the principles o~ 
rhetoric of which metaphor is merely,one techne. 
Rhetoric was for Aristotle the giving of truth in a 
language appropriate to an immediate audience. ,But 
where today it has become a rather pejorative term'to 
indicate formal and often tired and meaningless devices 
of speech which are voluble rather than sincere, the 
Greek understanding was of technai finally i.r.I."educ~ ble 
to a purely argumentative or 'logical, discipline, 
because the technai are directed.to an actual hearer. 
This is to insist,on the dialogical and intersubjective 
nature of speech: the Greek understanding.saw as still 
within the competence of 'rhetoric the emotions and 
passions and beliefs of the speaker and his 'audience, 
though these operate in the service of argument. So 
although rhetoric appears to be suscepti bleto form-
Ula~c statement, properly understood it represents the 
action of language. on the soul as it Vere. The 
distinct division between a truth and the'manner of 
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its articulation represents in Aristotle the gap between 
language and reality tha,t post-Platonic philosophy 
assumes., Truth, we, remember, consists' in the Ideal 
Forms, but their representation in language is subject 
to idiosyncratic distortion. Aristotle ',distinguishes 
'h~w ••• these facts (are) set ,out in language' from 
'the facts themselves' (lb., 1403/bI8-20). This assumes 
that. language is, in Heidegger's phrase, . 'in a state of 
becoming', that i~ imperfectly realises essential truths. 
We are returned to the single intention which lies behind 
the met~phor. Could this be an 'essential truth', or 
is it a genuine novelty? 
"Metaphor has to be a disposition of the unusual in the 
recognisable. If it is a displacement, then that which 
replaces must soon be accessible to the audience, 
whilst yet having a patina of newness. Is this a 
contradiction? We should recall Nietzschers ob-
servation that genius consists in. giving identity to 
what is already known; metaphor. is not merely epiphoric, 
but demands .tha t we hold in simul.taneous perception two 
normally mutually-exclusive entities; that, certainly, 
we change something, but that we change it only to the 
extent that we can remember ~hat it originally was. 
The process is analogous to trying against probability 
and skill to perceive both the Gestaltistrs 'candlestick~ 
and his faces. Metaphor generally allows us to do 
this. But the fact remains at least phenomenally true 
that some. semantic or ontological enti ty mus~ pre-exist· 
a syntactic combination. of elements or else how could it 
have been rseen r by the speaker, or apprehended by the 
hearer? For, again' phenomenally, there is .no such 
thing as a r failed r metaphor, there is ~onl.y· nonsense. 
When we crea te or use a metaphor we 'effecti vely confuse 
the ,established bounds of meaning to recover an identity 
of meaning which has been obscured or outlawed by the 
ideal sense of those virtual characterisations. 
We have said that similarity is a function of identity, 
and that, after Ebeling, we must see variability as 
Conceptually dependent .o,ni;l.a prior, unique orientation. 
As Ricoeur has it, 
to contemplate the similar or same ••• is to grasp 
the genus, but not yet as genus, to grasp the same 
in the difference, and not yet as above or beside 
the difference. 
(1978, p.l]l.) 
.Metaphor permi ts us to dwell in this ident.i ty qui te 
before it has any conceptual character; or ·where there 
is some limiting concept which inhibits our s~eing to 
,the truth, metaphor is required continually to' fragment 
and recons.titute noemata. We ,shall only explain the 
fact that rthe same metaphor can carry both the logical 
moment of proportionality and the sensible moment of 
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figurativity' (Ricoeur, 1977, p.34) by r~cour~e .to a 
theory of intentionali~y. Sensibly there may be little 
or nothing to relate Solzheriitsyn and the bear, or the 
Prime Minister and the character of iron. But the 
metaphor more than any other form of speaking points 
up the appresentational nature of words, their limited 
surface values hiding the more generous intentions 
which make language possible. Ag.qin, what is phen-
omenally true of the metaphor is that it cannot be 
literally reduced without doing damage to the single 
intention which is its generator. 
Ricoeur has developed this general. line or' argument to 
See metaphor as continuous in its dynamics with those 
of thoUght; it is the process by which 'we grasp .kin-
ship, break the distance between remote ideas, build 
similarities on dis~imilarities' (1978, p~132.). He 
finally asks what is the function of metaphor, and 
concludes 
~hat the strategy of discourse implied in metaphor-
1cal language is neither to improve·. communication 
nor to ensure univocity in argumentation, but to 
~hatter and increase our sense of .reality by shatter-
1ng and increasing our language. The strategy of 
metaphor is heuristic fiction for the sake of redes-
cribing reality. With metaphor we experience the 
metamorphosis.of both language and reality. 
(lb., p.133.) 
At this point I shall summarise the argument of this 
Section: polysemy describes how words may have variable 
values; the sentence witnesses the temporal and ~ctual 
f· 1Xing of ·the value of words in relation to each other; 
the sentence is a unique and creative event which, 
Unlike the word requires a speaker and a hear~r, who 
~hus have some access to each other's experience; in 
Consequence it'is the sentence as a whole which has 
meaning; metaphor stands as not an extreme but· a prime 
case of thii single intention realised in often contra-
dictory collocations of words; finally we have glimpsed 
Ricoeur's suggestion that metaphor is the condition Of . 
thought itself as it addresses reality.' Now if we 
COnt· 1nUe the appeal to what is phenomenally true of 
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language we see straightaway that most language is 
manifestly poor in metaphor and, as far as the argument 
has yet been taken, we can only allow that self-conscious 
poetical discourse is thus .metaphorical.. It remains to 
show, then, that this metaphorical impulse is not the 
exclusive character of poesy, but is more or less present 
to all discourse. 
There are at least .two levels to this argument.· Firstly, 
what may be called the 'weak' argument says that insofar 
as language 'stands for' som~thing else, it· satisfies 
the criterion of metaphor that the form of an original 
entity be changed. This really takes for granted what 
it seeks to explain, and, {vrther, taken to an extreme 
would return metaphor to an ornamental function. The 
stronger argument, however, is based. on the:indivisibility 
ility of language from thought, so that to speak the 
metaphor is to think it, to think it directly and not 
think of it. If metaphor has this prime, existential 
character of ever going behind the back of language to 
root out the real which language only partly' reveals, 
then'all language is metaphorical to the extent that 
it is thorightfully directed at reality. 'Thinkin~ is 
prOperly the concern of 4.5, but we must introduce 
here the distinction between thinking and thought which 
accompanies the separation. of the 'liver from the faded 
Or 'dead' . metaphor. In each case we must qualify the 
eVent in ter~s of its authenticity. 
Authenticity for Heidegger (1962~ is the possibility 
oPen to man for realising himself in a world which he 
has not chosen to be in. The term must be understood 
as part of Heidegger's polarisation of the conditions 
of existence whereby, for example, Angst contr~sts with 
mUndane fear, true wonder with mere curiosity and, most 
importantly for our purposes, speech with idle talk. 
Speech is here understood as thought only contingently 
vocalised, in the way that the poet and the thinker 
are involved in the identical process of describing 
the world; 'The nerve o.f poetry', says Heidegger, 'is 
the act of nomination' (l971b,p.123). Speech, that 
is Rede, is heuristic, characterised by a concern to 
make new, personal meaning out of the tired meanings 
which being in the world entails receiving indiffer-
ently. Merleau-Ponty uses the term 'authentic' sim-
ilarly, distingui~hing between 
an authentic speech, which formulates for the first 
time, and second-order expression, speech about 
speech, which makes up the general run of empirical 
language. Only the first is identical with thought. 
(1962, p.l 78. ) 
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It follows that inauthentic language and thought- - which 
Heidegger calls Gerede - are not reality-directed, but 
Content to dwell in a status quo of ready-made meanings, 
of clich~ and other sterile forms of. social circularity. 
So the distinction adumbrated in the last paragraph 
between, firstly, thinking and live metaphor, and then 
thought and dead metaphor is based on ·the extent to 
which language and thought exercise the structures by 
which we know reality. Language and ·thought urged on 
by wonder ~nd a sense of the secrecy of things to them-
selves is bound to set itself apart from that which 
of pseudo-communication, but precisely 
Ricoeur calls the 'absence of the sign' 
Such speech appears to go ahead be-. 
aChieves a sort 
because of what 
to experience. 
cause abstract signs call to each other'within the 
requirements of a shared liniuistic and social code. 
But 'authenticity' cannot prove to be a diagnostic 
device, and anyway we want .to avoid accusations of the 
SOrt which threaten Heidegger's work with iabels like 
'elitist' or even 'fascist'. But, beyond the calculus 
Of structuralist analysis, how are we to evaluate 
~anguage if it is not in terms of the questions it asks 
and the relentless care with which it keeps putting 
them ? 
It is simply a truism that great writing seldom 
depends on a novel disposition of verbal or syntact-
ical elements; literary experiments - even the great 
ones of Sterne or Joyce, say - remain special and 
rather freakish, and have led to no significant de-
parture from a steady diachronic development of 
literature. It is equally truistic that what dis-
tinguishes great writers is finally the care with which 
they construct an 'objective correlative' (in Eliot's 
~ords) of the reality ~e all inhabit, and hence call 
upon as an instrument of validation. The word-counts 
of stylistic analysis offer a superficial dressing 
~hich overlooks. the fact that the fundamental concerns 
whi ch moti va te texts barely change wi th the fash"ions 
of lexis and syntax. This is the :.simpleexplanation 
of the transcendent populari ty, inexhrusti bili ty and 
ready translation. of these texts. For the reader, 
whoever, wherever and whenever 
To locate the question of the text is not simply 
to leave it but ·to put it again, so that we, the 
~uestioners, are ourselves questioned by the sub-
Ject matter of the text. . 
(Linge in Gadamer, 1976, p.xxi.) 
Textual. interpretation is an image of the·:wider process 
Of authentic speaking; the wider text it addresses is 
jUst the reali ty whi ch genera tes language, 'and whi ch 
inexhaustible density sp~ech addresses as a 'condition 
Of meaning. . Ipso facto, speech which does not address 
reality _ as, for example, in the extreme case of the 
SChizoPhrenic - has no meaning. To cease ·putting. 
qUestions from despair of ever understanding, or from 
certainty·~ of having understood is either way to im-
mu . . 
re oneself from the universe of meanings : 
Reality does not happen "behind the back" of lang-
uage; it happens rather behind the backs o! ·those 
~ho live in the subjective opinion that they have 
~nderstood the world (or can no longer understand 
1. t. ) 
(Gadamer, "1976, p. 35.) 
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In respect of such a pathology of language, the view 
We are developing of linguistic style as a style of 
being is not at all new.- Freud~s therapeutic is 
essentially a linguistic one, based on the understand-
ing of consciousness as symbolically constituted; the 
flight of the ego as.much as the business of the dream 
world is carried out in language, and it is ·the task 
of the therapist. to disclose to the analysand the 
structures of this'symbolicworld and, in a'very 
literal way, to teach him the language of his own dis-
order. The more or less subtle disturbances of the 
SUbject's language are as important a part:of the 
presenting texture of his suffering as is his own 
apparently more 'conscious' report ,on his condition. 
A basically simi~ar view of language founds the phen-
omenological-existential,approaches to psychiatry 
(Binswanger, 1945, etc.), 'although,:.:in ·the case of 
Laing (1960, etc.) for example, it is' cast in an 
oVertly political role, not merely determinative of 
consciousness from 'within' the subj ect,. but itself 
the vfr;{ means by which a particular existence may be 
So ' Cloally sanctioned, or else have that sanction more 
Or less obliquely withdrawn. Discussing the post-
FreUdian structuralist Lacan, Bowie summarises this 
idea of centrifugal. andcentr~~al 'linguistic pressure, 
Set between the poles of passivity. ,and assertion: 
(the) human subject, as he acquires speech, is in-
serting himself into a pre-existing symbolic order 
and thereby submitting his libid~ (desir) to the 
systemic pressures of that order: in adopting lang-
uage he allows his free instinctual energies to be 
operated upon and organised. It is the 'peculiar 
~rivileee of man the language-user to remain obliv-
loous while making things with words, 'of"the ~xtent 
to which words have made, and continue to make him • 
. (Bowie in Sturrock, 1979, p.126.) 
l' hi s lo' 1 . . d . . t h . s 1ke a restatement of the He1 egger1an. eS1S 
of Facticity, and it brings us to the conclusion of 
this Section: The point at which virtual words become 
actual sentences is the 'point at which an intentional 
eXPr ' essloon seeks and finds its proper communicative 
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form, and is thus the point at which style is announced. 
This style is not to be had directly from an examination 
of words at the,level of syntax. The demonstration 
that metaphor is not a syntactical operation but the 
existential and eventual direction of polysemy at 
reality - this is the chief case against the equation 
of style with lexis or syntax. We turn to the margins 
of linguistic health which psychiatry illuminates to 
demonstrate the linguist~c nature of consciousness and 
so the way existence is to be found in language. But 
this is a paradigm and not an extreme case; it advances 
into more recognisably 'normal' experience with some 
work hinting at a classroom hermeneutic for understand-
ing pupil talk, particularly that of disturbed or less 
able children (Stuart, 1972; Holbrook, 1965; Clough, 
1980) • The fact i s that these marginal :cases are only 
special in degree, and that the process of linguistic 
insertion in a world is the ,condition of all existence; 
it is contingently empirical, th~t contingency allowing 
us fi tful~y to see something of the source of expression. 
Of course we shall, not in the end be able to construct 
some diagnostic device for 'fixing' style, even if we 
wanted to. But we shall be able to return style to 
its source in experience. Gusdorf concludes: 
Each of us ••• is charged with finding the expression 
to fit his situation ••• with realising himself in a 
language, a personal' echo of the language of all 
which represents his contribution to the human world. 
The struggle for style is the struggle for conscious-
ness (la vie spirituelle). 
(Gusdorf, 1965, p.76.) 
4.4 Discourse and the will 
••• -the question is not what we do or what-we should 
do, but what happens beyond our willing and doing. 
CGadamer, 1976, p.lvi.) 
We have artificially built speech up through the 
constituting units of the phoneme, the word and the 
sentence, and have suggested that these elements are 
thematised by the concepts of experience, communication 
and style respectively. The arti~iciality of this 
analysis is pointed up by the late insight. that every 
utterance is effectively a sentence proper to a lin-
guistic context, and whilst we have claimed that it is 
expressi ve,. and shown. something of how it communicates, 
we have yet to draw the conditions of this 'context, and 
have provided no necessity for our rather idealised 
subject to speak; we have yet to relate any urge to 
meaning to the status quo of meaning conditions. For 
Langue is a disembodied system, a.science~f elements 
/' only; Parol e, . on the other hand, is an el ecti ve scien ce 
of operations. This latest antinomy of involuntary 
and voluntary is resolved in the unity of our next level, 
discourse; in showing how discourse is organis~d around 
putting, and ever putting questions, we!shall see that 
we are thus concerned with the will, and with its oper- i 
ation on established order" We can so illuminate the 
existential nature of discourse at. large, by seeing its 
coricern with sharing, that is with mutual affirmation 
and mutual objectification. 
Discourse analysis is concerned with elucidating mean-
ings as they were intersubjectively understood on a 
given occasion. In so a·ttributing intentions 'to 
speakers, it is almost inevitable that we assume that 
they, too, were expli ci tly aware of these meanings, 
that some impulse announced itself in need of words 
which subsequently dressed it and.carried it out into 
the 'shared world. There are/.two general 'implications 
of this: firstly, that language is practically distinct 
from thought, and is the issue of pre-meditating activ-
ity~ this will be dealt with more fully in 4.5. Sec-
ondly, that utterances are therefore in some way fin-
is'hed products,' that they stand as resolute and 
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calculable markers of the intentions they embodied 
and the context which called them forth. But even 
the briefest moment's reflection tells us this cannot 
be, for what is· phenomenally true, at least of all 
spoken discourse, is that it moves with an incalcul-
able rapidity and an often dogged circularity of 
occupation. If we identify discourse with these 
products we shall have only a poor notion of what is 
its essence. For even before it can be considered 
as a process, discourse must be seen as the condition 
of understanding. Hence it is not primarily a given 
. conversation or piece of writing, but it is at the 
same time the question which motivates such enquiry 
and the understanding which only partly· answers it. 
// In this way the elucidation of an idea is not the 
product of discourse, but the requiiement necessary 
for a language activity to be k~own as discourse. 
There· is not firstly discourse and then the arrival of 
of understandingi understanding and discourse are 
of the same moment, discourse exceeding. und~rstanding 
only because it comprehends the questions which pre-
cede, and remain after the event and· detail of 
understanding. 
If discourse is·:thus broadened to comprehend all acts 
of understanding made explicit in language, it follows 
that.we shall need to distinguish qualitatively bet-
ween these acts. How, for example, .should we descri be 
a philosophical treatise in the same· terms as a casual 
chat in. the street? What distinguishes the two 
activities is precisely any excess of discourse over 
understanding; discourse is generated by enquiry, and 
can be said to be authentic or successful to the 
extent that it puts its speakers in the role of indef-
atigable interrogators, that it repeatedly questions 
reality, that it is Other-directed. In 4.3, metaphor 
was"described a~ a fundamental strategy pitted against 
reality, and we can now explain the occurrence of 
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metaphor by a further-regressed structure in language. 
If metaphor is indeed an attempt to irritate estab-
lished reality, .. then it does so because that reality 
does not satisfy the questions which are given with 
existence. 
Heidegger's polarisation of the linguistic conditions 
of speech (Rede and Gerede) may be finally.a theoret-
ical extreme, but it provides the ground for the 
argument that language which is truly reality-directed 
is language which assaults that. given reality. Mart's 
facticity requires that he transform his indifferently-
received world, and he does this in language which is 
vital and engaged. We recognise such language not 
necessarily because its surface is syntactically ele-
gant, but because it has an inexhaustible referent 
which is somehow qualified by this evocation. Gadamer 
(1976) identifies three 'peculiarities' of language 
which are relevant here: the first is its 'essential 
self-forgetfulness', so that we innocently look beyond 
grammatical realisation as the 
more language is a living operation,' the less we are 
aware of it ••• The real being of language is that 
into which we: are. taken up when we hear it - what is 
said 
(1976, p.65.) 
Secondly, he talks of the 'I-lessness' of language, so 
that .firstly the 'We' of the participants and finally, 
in authentic dialogue, the subject or text.domin~tes 
When one enters into dialogue with another person and 
then is carried along further. by the dialogue, it is 
no longer the will of the individual person, holding 
itself back or exposing itself that is determinative. 
Rather, the law of the subject matter is at issue in 
the dialogue and elicits statement and counterstate-
... ment and in the end plays them into each other. Hence 
when a dialogue has ~ucceeded, one is subsequently 
fulfilled by it. 
(lb., p.66.) 
Finally Gadamer identifies the 'universality of language'. 
By this he means firstly that there is nothing which can 
94 
be excluded from the realm of the sayable and hence that 
speech must 'keep pace untiringly with the universality 
of reason'. The important point is this: 
••• every dialogue ••• has an inner infinity and no 
end. One breaks it off, either because it seems that 
enough has been said or beacuse" there is no ~ore to 
say. But ~e~ such break has an intrinsic relation 
to the resumption of the dialogue. 
(lb. ,< p. 67.) 
These are .three terribly important points, telling us 
of the authority of the subject-matter which generates 
discourse, and of how 'what happens beyond our willing 
and doing'. determines the shape of dialogue. There is 
thus a fundamental structure to dialogue which is not 
a matter'of syntax or turn-taking; these are some of 
the methodological correlates to. the ontological struct~ 
ure of the subject-matter itself. There is a 'deep 
structure' to discourse genera~ed not consciously by 
the participants but inevitably by the character of this 
subj ect-ma tter. The ideas which participants interpose 
b~iween consciousness and·this text must ever approx-
imate and never quite possess the.reality which is their 
source, precisely because they are ideal attempts at 
re-characterisation. 
But we can go fUrther with Gadamer's three points: in 
saying that language is condemned to being aimed at a 
target ~t can never reach, and is, further, a process 
'beyond our willing and doing', does this not describe 
a relativist and even behaviourist understanding ? 
That is, if there are no firmly knowable referents, 
are we condemned to the specific closures of given' 
linguistic communities? And w~thin those communities 
are we .simply operated on by an Order of language and 
linguistic process? The answer is implicitly given 
in Gadamer's later assertion that language fills out 
'the realm of human being-together, the realm of com-
mon understanding, of ever-replenished common agreement' 
(lb., p.68) •. What Gadamer does not make explicit is 
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that, whilst the will of the individual is subordin-
ated to its ludic assumption by discourse, that 
modesty itself·is an act of the will, whose chief 
project is to share its obj~cts. Language falls 
away, as Gadamer says, so that we see what is said. 
We do not see simply speech itself, nor naked objects 
nor pure consciousness, but a quality of engagement 
with those objects. It is the duty of the will, 
whilst submitting to the closure of reality which 
sharing language necessitates, yet to try and better 
understand it. But this will is not anarchic, other-
wise it could not share its objects, and nobody would 
know what it was talking about. IWhat happens 'beyond 
our willing and our doingl is an intersubjective 
creation,' Langue perhaps, or the transcenden~!~u~~tioris 
of the Bible; the will, 'on the other hand, has as its 
first project a commitment t~. obj'ectivity. Gadamer1s 
second Ipeculiarityl of language, remember, is the 
II-lessness l of language; that, when we have found the 
right word it does not represent this object or that 
object for me, but rather presents it to another 
person. Gadamer invokes the 'metaphor of ·the game to 
describe linguistic activity, to point to a shared 
activity whose essence is not, finally, the goal or 
the score, and whose Isubjects' are not, finally, the 
players. The game, like the allographic work of art, 
coniists in all its aspects and in all its presentat-
ions, and what Ricoeur has called the 'movement into 
"I'" is actually. a paradoxi.cal statement of this sur-
render·to the larger, objectifying activity: 
the.very fascination of the game for the playing 
consciousness .roots precisely.in its being taken 
up into a movement that has its own dynamic. The 
game is underway when the individual player part-
"icipat~s;in full-earriest, that is, when he no . 
longer holds himself back as one who is m~rely 
playing, for whom it is not serious. 
"(Gadamer, op.cit., p.66.) 
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Now Gusdorf (1965) sees in this sort of process the 
necessity.of alternative forms of alienation; when 
he speaks, the language of the subject must either 
dilute and so alienate the purity of his experience, 
or else it must alienate him from ~he speech-commun-
ity by reason of. its .idiosyncrasy. But except for 
marginal cases, this is wrong, there is no such either/ 
or, and it is .from such indulgence of the ego that 
the popular misunderstanding of subjectivity arises. 
Subjectivity is not the self's presen6e to itself; 
rather it is defined in terms of its.direction, 
which is ever 'outward', and is evaluated in ·terms 
of its mode of presentation, which is always 'open'. 
In fact, all the simple, daily evidence we have of 
personal behaviour shows its urgency, one could say, 
almos~ to cease on the goal of objectivity. The 
phenomenal truth that speech re~uires a hearer must 
be rescued from a largely methodological concern 
wi th symmetry;, long before this empirical. event the 
speaker is actually constituting himself in a search 
for an Other which is only phenomenally and method-
ologically 'outside' him. Lacan (1977) profiles 
this Other rather gnomically : 
What I seek in speech is the response of the other. 
What conititutes me as subject is my question. In 
order to be recognised by the other, I utter what 
was only in view of what will be. In order to find 
him I call by a name that he must assume or refuse 
in order to reply to me. 
It is from the Other that the subject receives even 
the message that he emits. 
The Other is, therefore, the locus in which is con-
sti tuted the I who speaks to h.im wh~ hears, that 
which is said by the one being already the reply, 
the other deciding to hear it whether the one has 
or has not spoken. 
(La·can, 1977) 
This will to contact the Other is finally a self-
interested project since this Other, by virtue of its 
. very Otherness, functions to keep the will which is aimed 
at it ever-unrealised. The Other 'guarantees the 
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indestructibility of desire by keeping the goals of 
desire in perpetual flight' (Ibid). This is the key 
to the other drive of the will. 
To continue wi th Gadamer's metaphor, once begun engaged 
dialogue.has the 'spirit of buoyancy, freedom and joy' 
,of the game, which proceeds not ~y virtue of self-
conscious following of the rules as the players try 
to work out the meaning of each other's moves, but by 
a manifest taking-for-granted of the larger as well as 
the material .. conditions of the game. So speakers 
manifestly understand each other. The margins of 
misunderstanding and apparent non-understanding ill-. 
uminate this other function of the will, adumbrated 
in 4.3. That misunderstanding is only a minor excess 
of confusion over shared order~is a consequence of the 
recognition by the participants that there is, indeed, 
some new gap between them. The attempt which discourse 
usually makes on these occasions to repair such 'breaches 
in intersubjectivity' (Linge, in Gadamer 1976) reminds 
us of the task discourse has to understand reality by 
asking questions of it. The steps discourse takes to 
create and recreate understanding must be seen - in 
the light of our analysis of its game-like spiritedness 
and verve - as a correlate rather than a consequence of 
the will to break silence and to know. If we do not 
always find palpable evidence of it in discourse, it 
is because· the question is an existential rather than 
syntactical structure of discourse. When we speak 
we try to follow up an intention which necessarily 
outstrips, modifies and ••• stabilises the meanings 
of the words which translate it. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.389.). 
This intention is the noematic correlate of a real 
object, which is why it can 'stabilise' our words and 
cap guarantee their reality-directedness. Since our 
words' must fa~l short of the object itself, it follows 
that the act of 'Saying the World' - as Heidegger has it-
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is endless. The unfulfilled intention sensibly 
moves speech to make explicit some poorly-defined 
noema: 
••• the sense-glvlng intention which has set in 
motion ••• speech is not an explicit thought, but 
a certain lack which is asking to be made good •• 
(lb., p.183.) 
The drive to contact the Other and to share an object 
with him is thus simultaneously a drive to answer the 
ontic question given with the positing of any object: 
Speech does not seek to embody a significative 
intention which is only ~ certain gap simply in 
order to recreate the same lack or privation in 
others but also to know what there is a lack or 
privation of. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p.90.) 
When Gadamer observes that 'a dialogue has succeeded 
(when) one is fulfilled by i~r (1976, p.66) he is 
celebr~~ing the sharing of objects and not, we should 
note, ~ noemata; this being so, the object remains 
ever in excess of all noetic acts, and so the require- . 
ment to re-characterise it is perpetual. 'Fulfilment', 
then, cannot describe the exhaustion of objects, but 
is a temporal experience given to subjects, for whom 
the breaking-off of discourse in some satisfaction 
'has an intrinsic relation to the resumption of the 
dialogue.' (lb.)· 
The:guanti ty of empirical evidence for this basi c 
structure of the question is, as we have noted, small 
because it has an ontological rather than a methodol-
ogical character. Guillaume (1973), however, has 
developed a theory of morphological systems, showing 
through his studies of verb tenses and of the article 
how discourse functions to place words in a sentence 
posi tion. Particular parts of speech combine. their 
functions to close down on polysemy; ear~y in any 
utterance the grammatical inflections necessary to 
.. complete the thought are determined wi thin only 
99 
paradigmatic parameters. In this way, 'what we are 
going to say' is determined in advance as much by the 
structure and character of language itself as by'our 
signifying intentions. To say, then, that we launch 
into words not only innocent of how they are structur-
ally guaranteed is also to admit that we often do not 
'know' quite what we are going to say. The system 
would not work, we should be incoherent if the system 
of categories did not represent the real ('appresen-
tationally', in Husserl's terms) so that our language 
is intentional and our signs are 'returned to the 
Universe' (Guillaume). Since the system 'makes in-
finite use of finite means' (Humboldt), sentences are 
hence themselves creative and finite and ephemeral 
events which seek to close down on the infinity which 
a world of objects entails. It follows that they 
. 
must be continually made and remade. 
Now structuralist theory would probably be satisfied 
with most of this account but would, of course, not 
comprehend the intentional role of the speaker. 
Structuralism generally recognises the transcendent 
and shared nature of symbols, but lacks what Bolton 
(1982) has identified as a necessary third term, 
namely the mode of being towards them. which their use 
entails. So the structuralist analysis of morphology 
works only if we remember that discourse is this process 
of operations, and not a science of static entities. 
We have said that discourse does not reveal objects, 
and we should not now go to the other extreme of saying 
that it reveals 'pure' consciousness. What is re-
vealed is something like a manner, of attitude, or a 
way of having objects. So to Hofstadter's notion of 
language revealing 'a piece of human existence', we 
can now add that this existence is known and defined 
"in terms of its commitment to its world. Bolton says: 
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It is the self's directedness towards its objects 
that is conveyed through language in human comm-
unication. When we talk with one another our 
attention is not normally focussed upon each other's 
experience, considered in abstraction from its ob-
jects, or upon objects abstracted from experience; 
what we reveal to one another in dialogue is the 
experiencing of the object, the commitment of each 
self to its 0 bj ect. 
(Bolton, 1982, p.74) 
We can find some evidence for this as we did in 4.3, 
in pathology. Language succeeds to the extent that 
the will of the subject is thing-directed, Other-
directed, reality-directed, and it is the impairment 
of the will which can so be_measured by the stylistic 
disturbances of language. Subjectivity can no longer 
properly be called by the. name when it loses sight of 
the objects by which it is defined, and which unite 
it with other persons. The inflated will ('those who 
think they have understood the world', in Gadamer's 
words) is" as unreal and privatised as the retreating 
will (those who 'have given up trying') which feels 
the threat of implosion before a world all-to"o-full 
of constituted objects;" they are variously 'men who 
"are unable to play' (Gadamer, 1976, p.66). The 
analysi s of the will to share 0 bj e cts gi ves us a better 
understanding of the nature of communication, as, 
similarly, the will to question is the essence of 
expression. But it is the unity of the will, of the 
'intentional arc' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.136) which 
is consciousness, that points to the absurdity of 
,'any analysis which could treat these' functions separ-
ately. They fail to hang together only when "the 
intentional arc 'goes limp' {Ib.)~ as when the will 
is broken; but on such occasions it is not the case 
that one function is elevated over the other •. Rather 
both functions disappear as a consequence of what may 
seem to be a local defect of one of them. 
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In conclusion let us say that the will is co-
structural with discourse; there is a dialectical 
rela tionShip between them so tha t each_rl- s coheren t 
only against the horizons of coherence that the ot~er 
provides. This is the relation, too, of Parole and 
Langue, of finite realisation and infinite possibility, 
of said and sayable. 'Nothing 'that is said,' Gadamer 
comments, 'has its truth simply in itself, but refers 
instead, backward and forward to what'is unsaid.' (1976 
p.67.) The said and the unsaid are the sum of all 
horizons which we call the World. 
/ 4.5 Being and World 
••• the life of consciousness -' cognitive life, the 
life of desire or perceptual life'- is subtended by 
an 'intentional arc' which, projects round about us 
our past, our future, our human setting, 'our physical 
idealogical and moral situation, or rather which res-
ul ts in our being si tuated in all these respects. ' It 
is this intentional arc which brings about ,the unity 
of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and 
motility. And it is this which 'goes limp' in illness. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.136.) 
Of course it is all wrong to try to establish a character 
of speech with increments like so many building-bri~ks; 
in the end, what is phenomenally true is not the 'motor 
presence' of the word, nor its 'use-value'; a 'style of 
being' is not apparent to ,discourse and the 'existential 
structure' of discourse itself cannot be discerned in 
the effects of communication. What is phenomenally true 
is that experience is such a unity that we are always 
and already in a'whole world of meaning. Breaking dis-
course down gives the impression of a hierarchy of 
functions which echo the evolutionary growth of language 
for the-individual. But such a structure has no more 
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reality than the formulae of the chemist, or the 
phonetic alphabet of the linguist. The regions of 
experi"ence which we call the word, or discourse, or 
the sentence; the syntactic or semantic relations 
which hold these regions together; finally, this 
very epoche we must perform to see the relation of 
relations: all these / 
take for granted, without explicitly mentioning 
it, the other point of view, namely that of con-
sciousness, through which from the outset a world 
forms itself round me and begins tO,exist for me. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962,p.ix~) 
Now our ~nderstanding is' s~, ,riddled wi'th polari ty 
that one could question whether this is, indeed, an' 
existential functi~n in the way that the question is. 
/ Certainly, it characterises and finally invalidates 
almost all discussions;of consciousness itself. 
Descartes attracts the most blame for this, but the 
tradition was inaugurated long before, and possibly 
the most regressed polarity is that which Descartes 
.. 
articulated so famously -'the division of the subject 
and object which rests on the separateness of 'inner' 
and 'outer'. We have, as Merleau-Ponty says, 'jett-
isoned' the subject proper by making a secret of his 
soul and a material fact of his body, (lb., p.198). 
So we oppose consciousness (or Being) to the World. 
But the experience as well as the fact of language 
give. the lie to this antinomy, as they do finally 
to the artificial structure adopted in the first 
four sections of this chapter. What is missing from 
these accounts is the system of horizons of meaning 
against which the local !unct~ons can be perceived. 
Such a guarantee is not provided by an imperious 
subject alone',or by a totality of significations'to 
be called World. As we saw in Chapter 3, the. concept 
of Being-in-the-World dissolves inner and otiter; but 
it is in language that we can actually see this pro-
cess. Left to himself the subject may have the ill-
usion of an 'in here' entertaining an 'out there', 
but the ,very movement into thought, let alone speech, 
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is a denial of such autonomy. The ·social nature of 
speech is not characterised by sociology, nor can 
psychology describe the 'I-lessness' of conscious-
ness. In any event a description will not succeed 
in relating a subject to the objects of his society 
because in experience they have never been·separated. 
It is not necessary, then, in this chapter to describe 
World .and then to characterise Being; take one only, 
and its reconstruction will leave "us without an 'other' 
to describe. I shall start, of course, with the area 
of the "I", of Being, of Self, for 
whether it is a question of another's body or my 
own, I have no means of knowing the human body 
other than that of living it, which means taking 
up on my own account the drama which is being 
played out in it. 
(Ibid, p.198.) 
So what is this "I"? What does it know? How does 
it think? One of the things ·that happens when we 
arrest speech is that we attribute·conscious projects 
to individual words. This is most particularly the 
case with the "I", which after the event we call the 
boundary of a subject which - we further assume -
'knows' itself as it speaks. But to think about and 
talk about "I" is not to live it, or even to re-live 
it. The lexical "I" is more "distinct than its exist-
ential counterpart, and so has more firmness than is 
actually achieved in the passage of dialogue, when "I" 
is functional more often than it is declamatory or 
illocutionary. But in denying the speaking subject 
a full~reflexive consciousness we do not want to 
deliver him up to a stimulus-response scheme, so that 
he speaks 'just as the electric lamp can become in-
candescent' (lb., p.175). Of course the demonstration 
of the. gestural character of speech (5.1) indicates 
the expressive, meaning-making activity of the subject 
butHwe could still suppose either that there is no 
intellectual activity, or else that such activity is 
private, 'inner'. The fiction of the merely-responding 
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"I" and the fiction of the discrete "I" depend equally 
on the separation of the act of expression into form 
and con ten t of what is expressed. The enpiri ci st 
stresses form, "and content is then an account of the 
residue of speech, of what is 'done'; for the other 
version form is a contingent attempt to communicate 
a prior and private experience. Here the supposit-
ion that thinking is something an "I" does ( because 
I can say "I think") leads us to believe in an 
authorial "I" which is, which can think and which 
can speak in three fairly distinct processes; 
expression thus intervenes between any two of these, 
rea~ing a prior term. The task is to show that the 
three are really one. 
Although the most recent theories see thinking as 
formally analogous to speech, it remains for them 
a process done largely in foro -interno. It is this 
aspect which is generally emphasised, rather than 
its object-directedness. Of course there is no 
question that thought is 'private' in that I cannot 
see another's thought, or hear it unless he speaks. 
But it is only thought to the extent that it is open 
to the reality of shared ·objects. For Aristotle, 
thinking was an act of the intellect in which the 
essence of a thing actually qualified the intellect; 
this is to say that we do not work on things so much 
as with them, and it is thought's necessary operation 
in language which achieves this. The arguments inter-
volving language and thought are too familiar to need 
rehearsal here, but what is important, in view of the 
discussi~n of style in 5.3, and of the will in 5.4, 
is the extent to which certain forms and instances 
of speech can be said to create rather than ~eport 
thought. 
Lace~ (1976) begins a discussion of thought by dis-
tinguishing datable occurrences of thought from the 
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content which may be common to all such events, which 
is a distinction of disparate action and consistent 
material. The implication of this - that these 'dat-
able occurren~es' must be characterised by their 
recasting of the common content - is not drawn by 
Lacey. It is found in Merl.eau-Ponty' s analysis, 
(1962), which posits the event' of thinking against 
the furniture of old thoughts. Thinking is not here 
an operation of intellect on empirical objects; 
thoughts whi~h we can recall are finished products 
'left in the wake' of reasoning and perception 
present together 'in one indivisible intention' 
(op. ci t. ,p. 371). It is because we can refer to these 
sedimentations that we have 'the illusion of an inner 
life' (ib.,p.183). Following on from 5.4, thinking 
is more the action of the will in finding language 
for an experience which posit~ objects; the characters 
of this process are thus that thinking is embodied, 
it is creative, is reality-directed: this is precisely 
the character of authenti.c language. '. 'Pure' thought 
cannot be an extreme of intellectual activity, because 
it would so lose the objects by which it knows itself; 
on the contrary, 'pure' thought is just that 'certain 
lack', that 'certain gap', that 'kind of ignorance' 
(op.cit.) which we said. motivates enquiry. 'Pure' 
thought is an urge to meaning which 'reduces. itself 
to a certain void of consciousness, to a momentary 
desire' (ib.,p.183). The basis of the intervolvement 
of speech and thought, then, is not their absence 
from things, but their embodiment; the acoustic 
portion which spills into speech 'returns signs to 
the universe'(Guillaume). Of course,the thinking 
SUeject is not always a speaking one; how often can 
a speaker be said to be thinking ? 
~.hinking is an act of the will, but as Wi ttgenstein 
reminds us, such an act 'is not the cause of the action 
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but is the action itself' (1969, p.87). The will 
becomes identical with thought when it responds to 
a sort of cause suggested by an inchoateness of 
things, a failure of noemata to characterise 
objects. Then 
Silent consciousness grasps itself ••• as a 
generalised 'I think' in face of a confused 
world 'to be thought about'. 
, (Mer1eau-Ponty, 1962, p.403) 
An apparently similar process must be distinguished: 
' ••• the most familiar thing appears indeterminate 
as long as we have not recalled its name ••• 
( I b ., p. 1 71) 
But this recalling of names is only evidence of the 
indivisibility of thought and language as, two sides, 
of a paper. Such names belong to the category of 
'mental' activity known by its sedimentations, and 
to the corresponding language form of the cli'ch6. ' 
When we. speak of thinking proper, we must represent 
the thinker as looking forward rather than behind 
himself, so that 
'the thinking subject himself isin a kind of 
ignorance of his thoughts so long as he has not 
formulated them for himself, or even spoken or 
wri tten them ••• 
(Ibid.) 
But this 'strange power' of thought of 'being ahead 
of itself' (ib., p.37l) raises in its turn the epi-
stemological one of what I use to think with, so that 
my thinking both arises from and foreshadows ~hat I 
can know, putting 'into things what it subsequently 
finds in them' (ib.). The status of knowledge is 
identical with that of language and of thinking; like 
Langue it pre-exists its empirical occurrence as its 
own possibility and as the possibility of coherence 
but it is the process of casting that possibility 
which describes knowing and which transcends the 
'artefacts of knowledge, as Parole merely uses signs. 
" And then there is wha t sci ence 'knows', and wha t I 
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'know' of bits of information; such knowledge is the 
record of past events of knowing, and the empirical 
truth of its e~~licative character replaces the 
presence of ~he earlier moment of knowledge, which 
is understanding. It is the his~orical ~haracter 
of such k~owledge together with the empirical portion 
of speech which gi~es us the impression that speaking 
necessarily reports or translates knowledge, as it 
often does. But another empirical truth of speech 
reveals another character of knowing; the way speech 
launches forth and the way thought similarly knows 
its way around 'new' ground is" surely the way know-
ledge is created in the service of a local need. 
This kn0.wing happens in the same moment as its need 
... -
./ is di vined. Thus the life of speaking illustra tes 
that of knowing: we may be bound by more or less 
expli ci t 'rules', but these very rules are cast by 
events, and this very bondageis hence broken. We 
can say that Langue pre-exists Parole only as a 
post hoc rationalisation, and we must say that the 
act of knowing is not explained by the facts of 
knowledge which"it organises. It remains to describe 
the constitution of these acts of speaking, of think-
ing and of knowing. 
We can hardly be said to have proved the corporeal 
nature of speaking merely by emphasising the gestural 
character beneath its acoustic presence, or that of 
thinking by indicating the 'momentary desire' which 
motivates it; but the project is not to undo a sup-
remacy of mind by" replacing it with one of the body. 
Rather, the need is to go beyo~d such priorities, 
and the proofs they entail, to the Fundierungen which 
are anterior to our polarising concepts. Before the 
Psychological reality of thinking, then, and before 
~he physical fact of speech is knowing which, as their 
single condition, can 'hav~' neither feature empirically 
and yet as a process founds and organises the psycho-
10 gi cal and Ji1:;siolo gi cal po ssi bili ti es 0 f language 
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and thought. The identity which appears with thought 
and speech is dependent on the acts which realise it; 
but these ~cts are known by their process, movement 
and direction, and not by any empirical arrest. Polanyi 
(1958) describes how knowing i.s a movement from the 
proximal to the distal, the organisation amd commitment 
of the tacitly-known so that it presents as a new cult-
ural entity. It is only by nominating the process of 
their involvement that we can relate the popular thesis 
of phenomenal knowledge - that we learn new things from 
an 'outside' world - to its counter-truth - that we can 
onlY'discove~ what we already 'know', since otherwise 
we should not be able to re-cognise it. Here the 
structure which knowing shares with speaking is most 
apparent, since, as Merleau-Ponty says 
.. .. . 
People can only speak·to· uS'a~language which we 
.already understand, each word of a difficult text 
awakens in us thoughts which were ours beforehand. 
(1962, p.l 78. ) 
It ~s the will.to create new~order fr~m the infinitely 
permutative possibility of the tacitly-known which casts 
nov~l ~tr~ot~r~~i 
Yet the probl.em being how, to all appearances, 
consciousness learns something, the solution 
cannot consist in saying that it knows every-
thing in advance. The fact is that we have the 
power to understand over and above what we may 
have spontaneously thought. 
(Ibid.) 
The examination of language at the levels suggested 
by the sections of this chapter does not reveal another 
process than this organisation, from a more or less 
opaque resource; at the phonaesthetic level, 'It is 
the body which points out, ~nd which speaks' (lb., p. 
197); the word, s~milarly, 
is not an object which I recognise through any 
identificatory synthesis, but a certain' use made 
of my phonatory equipment, a certain modulation 
of my body as a being in the world. Its generality 
is not that of the idea, but that of a behavioural 
style 'understood' by my body in so far as the 
latter is a behaviour-producing power, in this 
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case a phoneme-producing one ••• The word has never 
been inspected, analysed, known and constituted but 
caught and taken up by a power of speech and, in 
the last analysis, by a motor power given to me 
along "wi th the first experience I have of my body 
and its perceptual and practical fields. 
( lb., p. 403. ) 
Such words only appear at the level of the sentence, 
of course, and it is in seeing how 'the speaking sub-
j ect plunges in to speech wi thout imagining the words he 
is about to utte~' (lb.) that we see speech not trans-
lating but accomplishing thought as a form it can take. 
This launching into speech is the empirical trace of the 
questing will to make order, and so the sedimentations 
of available meanings may 
.r" / sometimes combine to form new thought which recasts 
them all, and we are transported to the heart of the 
matter, we find the source. 
(lb. ,p.178) 
Now if it is this will to order which motivates dis-
course, it is its other character, the drive to sharing, 
which realises the mom~nt of discourse. Again, 
Merleau-Ponty says 
available meanings suddenly link up in accordance 
with an unknown law, and once and for all a fresh 
cultural entity has taken on an existence. 
(lb., p.183) 
The 'fresh cultural entity' is the public character of 
expression, and public because it is a close, noetic 
correlate of the real, shared object, the 'source' 
newly dwelt in. Polanyi is surely in sUbstantial 
agreement with this; he insists that knowledge is 
personal and embodied and yet to be called by the name 
it must be 'pursued with unwavering universal intent.' 
(1969, p.134.) 
The ~nknown law' describes the operation of expression; 
it is not unknown because it is unfathomable, but be-
cause it is inexplicit for the speaking subject; 
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expression does not intervene as aninstrume~t'of 
his 'will, but is just that will itself made identical 
with thought or language, or both. So it is that we 
can say that speech can teach me the meaning of my. 
thought, the quality of my knowing, and finally some 
reflexive sense of my will itself. For if explicit 
speech is the cogito made into discourse, then this 
'tacit cogito which pre-exists speech is 'myself ex-
perienced by myself' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.403), 
the 'presence of oneself to on~self', made patent 
can 
only 'as a generalised. "I think" in face of a confused 
world'. A particular gap in coherence requires that 
the subject 
bring into action powers which are a closed book 
to him and that he should become a speaking 
subj ect • 
... " ... '. , 
Hence"" 
The tacit cogito is a cogito only when it has found 
expression for itself. 
(Ibid.) 
And Hofstadter says similarly, 
Man becomes a self in knowledge, in.the act of 
abandoning his self. 
(1965, p.I04.) 
If the ari~~~~t seems to be cirdulating'~6und the same 
sort of evidence, it is largely because we are talking 
of different aspects of the same process; but we have 
finally arrived at its source. Knowing, thinking and 
speaking (distinct from knowledge, thoughts and the 
spoken) are ways of highlighting the same moment of 
expression according to how we wish to emphasise the 
multiple revelation it accomplishes. The simple idea 
of a joint revelation is not quite enough; certainly 
an act of expression carries the world to me as it 
announces something of my values and experience to that 
world. But more than this we must say that "I" am 
revealed .to myself, and that the same enlargement 
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happens reflexively to the world. This is true as the 
outer/inner distinction fades; knowing is usually 
charcterised as an 'inner' 'process, a way of absorbing 
something external; even Polanyi talks of 'ingestion' 
and 'expulsion' of material. Thinking, too, is done 
'internally', and it is left to speech. to be the phen-
omenal marker of private activity. This distinction 
rests on the assumption - almost impossible' to shake 
off - of an "I" who "does" these thingS. If we can 
aSSUMe for a moment that the "I" is only continuous 
with knowing, speaking and thinking, and that these 
events we have seen to be, not merely 'turned out-
ward', but in fact to be necessarily the correlates 
of objects, what can there be left 'inside' ? What 
is 'there' is the residue of previous acts of express-
ion, old thoughts 'which we can silently recall to 
ourselves, and through which we acquire the illusion of 
an inner life' (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.183). But in 
reality 'this supposed silence is alive with words' 
(ib.), which of course belong to the world, and their 
condition of silence is contingent; whilst in discourse 
an "I" does not lurk obscurely behind these words but, 
to the extent that it is healthy, is continuous with 
its objects. So Ricoeur can say: 
The unity of the I think is no one; the "I" of the 
I think is not a person, a particular person: it is 
merely the form of the world, that is to say the 
projection of objectivity, insofar as it is a synthes-
sis of the sayable and the perceptible. In short, 
the I of the I think is only the project of the 
obj ect. 
(1978, p.27.) 
This is not to deliver the "I" up to the indifferent 
influences of a behaviouristic environment, for that, 
too, would depend on the continued distinction of an 
'outer' acting on a~ 'inner'. Rather, 
Nothing determines me from outside, not because 
nothing acts upon me, but, on the contrary, because 
I am from the start outside myself and open to the 
world. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.456.) 
112 
Two questions occur here in the light of this analysis. 
The first arises from the lived distinction of 'me' 
and 'world', since for all practical purposes I am 
bound at least within an area designated by linguistic 
markers of·the personal, and there is an equal firmness 
to the boundary of the phenomenal world; what, then, 
is the relation of' this 'me' and that 'world' ? The 
second question is the inveterate occupation of philo-
sophers: Does language, then, refer? This question 
in particular will not be aniwered here to any universal 
satisfaction, but it can at least be put again with a 
different emphasis. This emphasis is introduced by 
Ricoeur's renomination of Saussure's 'signified' as 
the 'intended' (op.cit.), and both questions will be 
put against the phenomenological understanding of the 
horizonal structure of the lived world. 
In a discussion of the heuristic character of speech, 
Merleau-Ponty describes how the speaker 'does not 
express just for others, but also to know himself what 
he intends' (1964b, p.90). Thus the thematisation .of 
the .signified (or intended) cannot precede speech' because 
'it is the result of it'. He goes on: 
Let us say that every expression is perfect to the 
extent that it is unequivocally understood, and admit 
as a fundamental fact of expression a surpassing of 
the signifying by the signified which it is the very 
virtue of , the signifying to make possible ••• 
(lb.) 
This not only reaffirms the analysis of discourse'as 
perpetually and inexhausti bl.y aimed at describing the 
real, but it says something of the way in which sig-
nifier and intended relate. The signifying can only 
mean against the certainty of a bedeutung, a~d equally 
the signified is itself characterised by its expression,' 
which 'confers on what it expresses an existence in 
itself'" (Her1eau-Ponty, 1962, p.183). This mutual 
necessity is described by a horizonal structure which 
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enables the relation of apparent polarities ( or other 
mutually-distinct areas) not so much in terms of ref-
erence as of intention; hence the moment of relation 
is neither causal not conscious by necessity, but has 
the mode of operation of a Fundierung. The structure 
also reduces the anomalous question of. reference, for 
we can characterise language as ~resenting noetically 
against (that is, as intending) the actual world; we 
can also reverse the usual Langue-Parole d$inction 
because what is said (Parole):' is noetic, i. e., it is 
not 'the thing', though it is itself real; what gives 
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it coherence is not a theoretical framework (like Langue) 
but the actual world. Language is intentional rather 
than referential beca~only such an understanding can 
/' / explain the con tinual need for play between such terms 
as Langue and Parole; if a language act 'refers', only, 
we can assume that it is completed in advance by the 
object referred to, and that this object is perfectly 
characterised in thi~ way; but objects are never ful-
filled by 'an intention, and there is always a surplus 
of intended, over signifying. Reference takes for 
granted that there is already something to refer to, 
takes for granted a whole world; therefore language 
ceases to have the job of creating this world, and 
loses its expressive function. Merleau-Ponty reminds 
us of this expressive superiority over any undoubted 
referential function : 
The word and speech must somehow cease to be a way 
of designating things or thoughts, and become the 
presence of that thought in the phenomenal world 
and, moreover, not its clothing but its token or 
its body. 
(1962, p.182) 
Elsewhere, he writes that all though~ of something is 
simultaneously self-consciousness, 'failing which it 
could have no object' (ib., p.37l.) 
To our questions, then, we can say this: if language 
can be said to refer, it does so only as a secondary 
function of a basically expressive character. More 
than this, it follows from that expressive nature that 
any reference be understood as having a dual source, 
and a dual direction. The temporary arrest of dis-
course marks, as we have said, the source which the 
expressive process of speaking can sometimes reach 
as noemata appear to equate with objects proper; 
but at the same time it is the point of origination 
in the speaker's experience, 'failing which it could 
have noobject(s)'. Reference can only be ,allowed 
if it comprehends self-reference. It follows from 
this that the relation of 'me' and tl:ephenomenal world 
is entirely one of intention, described in terms of the 
horizons which consciousness interp.oses as facts of its 
embodiment. Recall the epigraph which opened this 
section : 
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••• the life of consciousness - cognitive life, the 
life of desire or peceptual life - 'is subtended by an 
intentional arc which projects round about us our past, 
our future, our human setting, our physical, ideological 
and moral situation, or rather which results in our be-
ing situated in all these respects. It is this intent-
ional arc which brings about the. ,unity of the senses, 
of intelligence, of sensi bi'li ty and motili ty. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p.136.) 
This is a' particularly good metaphor because it shows the 
three-dimensional relations which hold between the subject 
and his world, and how 'the life of consciousness' has the 
shape, as it were, of a piece of that world. Merleau-Ponty 
continues: 'It is this (intentional arc). which goes limp 
in illness'. The collapse of the will is not a failure to 
maintain inner and outer - as the popular thesis has it -
but actually creates them, and the subject finds himself 
alienated either from a consciousness which is' now believed 
t~ be 'inside', or from objects which he can no longer hold 
'outside'. When this unity is disturbed, it is not the 
subject alone who is impaired, nor the subject and his 
language; the failure of the arc undoes a whole world. 
The natural attitude restricts this 'whole world' to the 
boundaries of a particular body, and so protects itself 
from threats to sanity because they are of an 'other'. 
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But it is not a merely poetic exaggeration to say that 
the common store of words is their common life; the truth 
of Donne's 'Yet each man's death diminisheth me' is that 
while the real world persists, the totality of significat-
ions which is the phenomenal world is impoverished as 
those who signify, who 'translate silence into words' 
(Merleau-Ponty) fail to break that silence and share the 
objects it surrounds. For we live, Heidegger tells us 
by putting into words the totality-of-significations 
/' of intelligibility. To significations, words accrue. 
(1962 ) 
This relationship of silence and words, of being and 
world has 'been explored by Heidegger, and I, shall conclude 
this section with a' summary reflection on the status of 
language necessary to his thesis. 
Unlike the other philosophers who have been cited here, 
Heidegger sees no contiguity between linguistics and the 
real life of language; hence his is a very special def-
inition of language which has no interest in actual 
utterances: but is instead globally concerned with a whole 
man who can hardly be an empirical object. There is in 
Heidegger's work generally that fault which, of all the 
sections of this chapter, is most apparent in the present 
one: in resisting the focussing devices w4ich a s~ientific 
method can provide, one is required to work with concepts 
of such size and openness that their discussion adds 
nothing to explanation (as such), ~ven if it disturbs 
understanding; and when ~hese concepts are such as Being 
and World, a refusal to be 'scientific""means- that 
discussion remains within areas which, by foregoing the 
purchase of consciousness, only schemes like psychology 
or., geography can transcend. But if this is my faul there 
it is actually a virtue of Heidegger's philosophy, 
for his linguistic is not empirical but ontological, 
and his method se~f-consciously experiential. One 
cannot transcend the word, so he proposes to 'have an 
experi ence wi th language f • The explo.ra tion of language 
becomes a task for those who manifestly care about it _ 
chiefly poets, and philosophers in the .pre-Socratic 
tradi tions: 
Language is the house of being. Man dwells in this 
house. Those who think and those who create poetry 
are the custodians of the dwelling. 
(1962a, p.129) 
Immediately, then, the question of how language refers _ 
,/-- -its communicative aspect which occupies much philosoph-
ical and linguistic activity - is subordinated to the 
prime·question of how language can be, of how it carries 
experience. with it •. Certain~y the relation of word to 
thing remains a central concern, but Heidegger must con-
sider·this relation not in terms of fa connection between 
the thing tha~ is on the one hand and the word that is on 
the other' (19?la, p. 66); the word is itself 
the relation which in each instance retains the thing 
wi thin itself in such a manner that it "is" a thing. 
(lb.) 
And again, it is 
what holds, relates and keeps t~e thing as thing 
(ib., p.82) 
It can do this because, itself, the word 
falls back, withdraws, in favour of what is said in it. 
(ib., p.76) 
In this sense,. then, the word carries us to the thing, so 
we may never say of the word that it is, but rather 
tha tit gi ves. 
(ib., p.88) 
In these four statements we find that the word is a thing, 
but that it also maintains the thing; that it presents the 
thirig and yet finally has no existence. Such a compendium 
of essences and functions establishes language as the only 
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means to what can be, if not as all there can be. In 
his analysis of George's poem, 'The Word', Heidegger 
(1971b) affirms the conclusion of the poem that 'Where 
word breaks off nb thing may be'. This is the opposite 
thesis to that which is provoked by Roquentin's epiphany 
(Sartre,1965 ); for him, the distinctness of things and 
persons can never be wholly mitigated by language, and 
only an aesthetic act of imagination can go any way 
towards resolving them. A different attack on this ex-
clusiveness of language is possible at the other end of 
the spectrum of consciousness; in an essay called 'The 
Retreat from the Word', Steiner (1958) - himself an 
apologist of Heidegger - points to the growing ·technical-
isation of , understanding, which is doing away with the 
// imprecision of words. So mathematicians may 'talk' 
across 'lingui:stic barriers ina 'language' which makes the 
rest of us illiterate in a. new·way. For Heidegger this 
would be evidence of the impoverishment of experience, 
since it is words which index values; hence his etymol-
ogising to recover their diachronic life. But, further, 
his argument would be another of Roquentin's that, cer-
tainly, in 'another' world circles keep their shape and 
are known in a particular manner; but circles - and 
calculus - do not exist. 
In any event if language is the only means to what can 
be, it must be as a process indistinguishable from what 
it realises. Speaking creates a world: 
"To Say", related to the Old Norse sagan means to 
show: to make appear, set free, that is to offer 
and extend what we call World, lighting and con-
cealing it. 
(Heidegger, 1971a, p.93.) 1 
Named things, says Heidegger, 'collect in themsel ves 
heaven and earth, the mortal and the di vine, '. which he 
1 There is an echo of this in Ricoeur's hypostatisation of 
then sign: it is 'not only that which is lacking to things, 
it is not simply absent from things and other than them; 
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it is what wishe~ to be applied, in order to express, grasp, 
apprehend, and flnally show, to make see'. (1978, p.l18.) 
calls the 'fourfold'. The word is 'the region that 
determines earth and sky to be world regions, as it 
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makes earth and sky' (ib., p.lOO). We have said that 
language is the 'relation of all relations' .which, thou'gh 
it 'maintains, proffers and enriches' is, like all relat-
ions, itself subtle, 'in that it hoids itself ••• in 
reserve,' (ib., p.107). It is because language is this 
immaterial guarantee of coherence, because it is the 
sole medium of such order and because it 'draws back in 
favour of what is said in it' that Heidegger concludes 
that what lies at the 'centre' of language must be an 
indivisible matrix which carries with it the shape of. 
all possible worlds, and has the condition of silence. 
This is why interpretation is boundless, because 
// 'Nothing that is said has its truth simply in itself, 
but refers instead backward and forward to what is unsaid' 
(Gadamer, 1976 ). Heidegge; identifies this centre 
of language with t~e Johannine logos; in another, non-
metaphysical context, Saussure has called it Langue. 
But the rationale of language is. not for Heidegger a 
human product, diachronically established by ~mpirical 
language,'· but a.' lJrimor.dial- condi tion' discovered in the 
same measure as language describes its projection, which 
is the world. Such a view reverses the roles we normally 
attribute to speaking and to man, and he becomes 'need-
ful to language, that he may speak it' (Heidegger, 1971a 
p.90). Merleau-Ponty similarly describes babbling (and 
its phonaesthetic. residue) as so many ways of singing the 
world (1962).' Again, Ricoeur identifies the "I" as the 
'project of the object', and then the thinking subject 
as 'merely a form of the world' (1978, p.27). Languages 
are translatable in the end not beacuse they share their 
'signified' - which is ~ntirely linked to a'si.gnifier';: 
whose 'virtue is precisely its place wi thin a closed sys-
tem - but because they share their intended, which is 
such another 'form of the world' given by the logos. 
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And yet languages remain local, never fully translatable 
because if there is something inevitable about the logos, 
it remains to ,individuals and to individual communities 
to characterise it, and there is nothing inevitable about 
creativity. We return to Being-in~the-World, and to 
'facticity', and to the truth of Merleau-Ponty's dictum' 
that 'We are in the world and the world is in us'. We 
mean by these ideas that we are bound by a double tension, 
to conform and to create., Expression, for Malraux, 'lends' 
a meaning to 'the world, and is valuable to the extent that 
'it is a call for and not a consequence of a way of seeing' 
(Malraux, 1949, p.154). But this heuristic character is 
not common to the run of empirical language; in another 
echo Of the mundane !shape~.to, language" Heidegger says 
that m~ch spee~~' i;es o~ 'in"a mode of g~oundless float-
ing' (l97la, p. 87). If most speech is to be, dismissed 
in this way, what is the practical consequence of luxur-
iating 'analyses like this 1 For again, the horizons of 
Being and World are never apparent to Ii ving discourse; 
'The problem of the world,' says Merleau-Ponty, ' ••• 
consists in the fact thatiit. is all, th,ere,' (1962, p.198), 
that one is innocently in such a world when involved in 
speech. But after the moment of discourse we are faced 
with a hermeneutic question, and need to ask 'What are 
the horizons of Being here 1 What are the horizons of 
this world l' For the concepts are the implicit method-
ological co-ordinates of any historical arrest of what 
is said, but mechanistic analyses of language do not see 
their devices participating in the act of expression, 
and 'interpretation' becomes a reductive procedure. 
When Barnes says 
Participants in conversation, continuously attribute 
both referential meanings and purposes (social mean-
ings) to the ongoing utterances ••• 
(Barnes 1976) 
he is wrong because he understands by this a process of 
conscious interpretation, which is also what his method 
/ 
/ 
of arrest and analysis is predicated on. But any 
interpretation in speech is precisely expression it-
self, just as the best of interpretative criticism 
is expressive.~ This is understood by the idea of the 
hermeneutic circle, through which text and interpreter 
are mutually enrich~d. In acts of interpretation of, 
speaking, then, we need to try to discover a "hermen-
eutic I", by importing into 6ur methodological devices 
and illuminating the eventual characters of Being and 
World necessarily present to speaking. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A phenomenology of language: an. observation on practice 
In Chapter 3 I said that Langue ~eferred to the ontology 
of language, while Parole belongs to methodology; in 
Chapter 4 I traced their connection in experience, and 
elucidated the existential possibilities of Langue. The 
~laboration of Parole, on the other hand, must be a prac-
tical task arising out of this earlier reflection, and 
we have to ask "What are the implications of these 
essences for a research methodology ?" Chapter 4 pre-
pared the justifications of this enquiry; following on, 
the present chapter has two aims: firstly, to report on 
the genesis of the study as a whole and secondly, in so 
telling that story to return the speculations of Chapter 
4 to the practical context in which they arose. This is 
not a matter of trying the thesis against 'evidence', but 
simply of showing how a way of organising discourse 
around certain linguistic events emerged from the events 
themselves. Methods of language and discourse analysis 
generally re-characterise these specific, contingent 
events without recognising their eventual nature; they 
reduce the events to schemata. What I hope to have 
characterised, on the other hand, are some general truths 
which are given with language; to have illustrated, that 
is, some essential rather than contingent features of 
language. 
If this chapter is not empirically-based, neither is it 
strictly theoretical. Certainly the 'theoretical' ideas 
feature in the presentation of the thesis (in- 9hapter 4) 
before their practical counterpart, but this order could 
nhave been otherwise, and I could have chosen to show how 
the theory. arose from the data without misrepresenting 
the experience. For theory and data are not distinct in 
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experience, although the making of any piece of science 
requires that we separate them. Events like planning, 
investigating, writing-up - and so on - are seldom dis-
crete in the creation of any research, and the final 
shape must always be more arbitrary than it is custom-
ary to acknowledge. 
A note on 'Method' 
Even so, there :.is, of course, a discipline to the study 
which could be described as metho~ological. The prin-
ciples which underlie the enquiry are these: 
i Enquiry must self-consciously involve the values of 
the enquirer. 
ii A phenomenological understanding of subject-object 
relations is the pre-requisite to any philosophical 
enquiry into language; the meaning and status of 
data must be understood. . 
c 
iii The experience of language is distinct from the 
study of language. Language cannot be a proper 
object for science. Psychological, linguistic 
and sociological theory and method have little 
to say about the character and experience of 
language. 
One of the aims of the study is to show 'how much more 
complex is the experience.of language than most methods 
can .allow for; I cannot, therefore, expect to offer a 
method which is simple and comprehensive and which could 
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be replicated in any conventional sense. Although I am 
addressing what is essentially true of expressive language, 
the value and importance of the research. exercise lies not 
in the predictive power of any 'findings', but in the 
process of my discovery of these essences, and this process 
must by definition be a unique affair. The study is there-
fore a personal account of a search for what it is in lang-' 
uage which transcends the personal. These essences should; 
of course, - if they really are that, be universally re-
cognisable. 
The enquiry 
The work which follows emerged out of a desire to 
demonstrate - to myself as much as to others - the con-
nection between English teaching and phenomenology. I 
had spent some two years reading in the phenomenological 
corpus, and at the same time carrying out some part-time 
teaching and observation in various Sheffield schools. 
Beyond a general interest in small-group discussion, I 
had no pre-conceived designs and therefore no data 
beyond that provided by sundry tape-recordings. But to 
say even so little is already a misrepresentation; I 
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had already a commitment to the phenomenologist's under-
standing of language, and a complementary hostility to-
wards the schemes of linguistic analysis. I am sure -that 
if I did no't have some pre-explicated framework for 
approaching my studies at this time, then I should not 
have the findings I now present here. 
One set of audio tape recordings particularly interested 
me; this recorded the efforts of three small groups of 
6th formers at a local school to understand the same 
poem. Here - where the text they were addressing was the 
the same - was 'an opportunity to see what was common in 
their approaches, and what unique. One feature emerged 
strongly from my repeated listening to the tapes; the 
groups 'dealt with the' poem in question according to the 
sections which the poet had given it, and ih each case 
they talked until some point was reached where they ob-
viously~felt' they could pass on to the next section. 
But this point ~ of understanding, or whatever it was -
was ~ot the same m each group. Now one could adduce 
'explanation' of this in terms of group dynamics, or 
of individual psychologies. But to justify any such 
explanation one would have to suppos~ a conscious in-
tention on the part'of the speakers which was manifestly, 
not 'there' during the give-and-take of discourse. 
/ 
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'Intention' becomes a way of describing the presence 
and energy and engagement of a speaker in a manner 
which boheres with a~historical overview. But any 
attempt to attribute meaning to individual utterances 
or even to stretches of speech must be so tentative if 
it is to respect the expressive processes of the event 
that it is unlikely to be scientific •• 
What we can talk about with some clarity and certainty 
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is not the way that persons appear to think or to 'dress' 
their thoughts, but what is phenomenally true of language. 
So it is true, for example, that language carries on in 
a certain fashion. This is not to personify language, or 
to subject speakers to any behaviourist scheme. It de-
pends ona view of thinking and being as continuous with 
language, and not its source or result; so we invest 
language with an existential status which science normally 
avoids. Statements about the nature of language thus 
become observations on the life of thought and on the 
quality of being~ 
The Theses 
I have organised my reflections on these speech events 
around the following questions, questions which arose 
necessarily from my dissatisfaction with a scientific 
treatment of language 
What 'unit of experience' has been edited by the 
identification of the phoneme as the most basic 
unit of speech? 
In what sense is the word a satisfactory level of 
meaning, since it seems to disappear as a discrete 
unit on the least reflection? 
The sentence can be anatomised endlessly, but can 
such analyses ever capture the meaning of the part-
icular 'combination of items' to the speaker? 
Why does language 'go ahead' ? Why does it 
'break off' ? 
Is language always thoughtful ? 
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These questions are discussed, in turn, in the remainder 
of this chapter. I begin each section with a Thesis, 
a proposition concerning the expressive nature of lang-
uage. The theses are derived from reflection and from 
observation, and have important methodological implic-
ations for the study of language. A thesis does not 
'explain' the material which illustrates it, nor do 
such illustrations say all there is to say about the 
thesis. The relationship of thesis to data is thus 
/-/ quite different from the more usual one of, say, con-
clusion to data, or category to' instance. It can be -
characterised in this way : a thesis has a relationship 
with its illustrative data which is not categorical, 
bu t e sse n ti al • 
Thesis 1 : In exam~n~ng language in terms of its 
symbols, we may lose sight of the fact 
that these symbols represent an event 
in experience. 
The problem of the meaning and value of transcription of 
speech is endemic. Two discussions of this problem in 
different contexts are these : 
i. Easley, (1981) is investigating children's scientific 
concepts," and is considering the evidence of another 
researcher (Driver, in op.cit.): 
Looking at tapes of Driver's subjects - 12 year olds 
talking about physical systems - we noted that some-
body might say, "This is really heavy!", -but if you 
heard their intonation and felt their personal energy 
as --you watched the motion of the person, you would 
begin ~o sense that 'heavy' is a process that takes 
place over a period of a few seconds and involves the 
whole body. As it functions in their thought, it:is 
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. not an abstract property of an object at all, nor 
is it a measurement procedure. It is an interaction. 
We •• ~ ought· not to think of such concepts in strictly 
logical terms if we want to represent the dynamic 
schemas by which they are experienced in these subjects. 
(p.27.) 
i~. Hull (1981) reflects on a datum he has recorded: 
Retrospectively (the researcher) could trace ( a 
particular interpretation) to what he had learned of 
the group prior to the interview through the casual 
observation of their behW"~ur in a variety of situ-
ations, to what teachers had said about them in off-
the-record conversation, and to his own communicative 
competence as a member of a linguistic community -
in short, his 'second record'. On the page before 
him for analysis was the 'first record'. Bald words 
alone endured translation, the situation pressed 
neatly flat by the typewriter like washing from a 
inangl e. 
(p. 4. ) 
The'.'problem may be the methodological one of trying to 
record speech in writing, but that relation itself re-
pr.esents the bond of existence and science. There is the 
thing, and then there is what we say about it. To the 
extent that language gives a symbolic 'representation of' 
experience it"is scie~tific, if by the term we understand 
the creation of knowledge to be shared. The balance 
between this communal character and the inevitability of 
personal constitution must be maintained. Transcription 
is hopelessly flawed because it elevates science over 
experience, meaning over event, techne over poeta. One 
of the confusions to our understanding the nature of 
speaking and, of thought is that, having evolved to being 
able to record. speech and represent thinking in writing, 
we have t~en rei~ported to speech the linear quality 
which characterisee ~~iting. It is this attribution 
which confounds much philosophy and which threatens 
the usefulness on many empirical studies of lan~uage~ 
Writing is extended primarily in space, and speaking in 
time •.. Each can be said to 'go forward', but the processes 
are not identical, nor even analogous. Speech surely oc~­
upies a period of time, has a starting-point and is con-
cluded, etc. ; but it is a function of our proneness to 
metaphor that we conceive of this period as analogously 
extended in spa~e. Now if we are measuring the length 
of a piece of noise - a symphony, say - we could cor-
rectly represent its measure in minutes; but since we 
are talking here of speech a~ meaning, and we believe 
that meaning extends before and beyond a single or 
serial utterance, then we cannot talk of the length or 
time of a'meaning. Their proper extension, of course, 
is in experience. Writing represents a very deliberate 
and palpable extension of meaning, is devoted self-
consciously to meaning, where for much speaking meaning 
exists vertically, as it were, across each note of a 
harmonising chord as well as in the melody. 
What happens when we transcribe speech out of its 
context? In fact we write down what we can according 
to what we hear - and this is always an intentional 
function of what we are looking for; what we are look-
ing for both in terms of any later categorisation we 
want to bring to bear, but even before that, in terms 
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of our percep~ion of discrete, ideal uni ts •. We organ-
ise clusters of meaning-bearing noise into orthographic 
units which themselves suppose some concep'tual purity. 
What we' do later is something else again: building on 
this primary idealisation, we make ideal attributions 
often to single words, or apparently discrete utterances. 
This 'is dealt with in another thesis; for the moment I 
want to concentrate on the passage of focus from the 
experience of the speakers to the meaning of that lin-
guistic event for an outsider. 
A concrete example of this can be found in my attempted 
transcription of the particular set of tapes on which 
this present study is based. One of the gi!ls, Julie, 
makes the following statement: 
/ 
/ 
3/23/J : I mean like that where it says Is it any 
wonder he puts on dark glasses? we're seeing that 
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from t'tourist point of view, puttin on dark glasses 1 
and also, from like that old man's point of view like 
Now between this and Vicky's 
3/28/V : and that as well, that I have two legs (etc) 
I hear at least four voices and at least the followipg 
discrete utterances 
3/24/V er he's put the dark glasses on 
3/25/S blocking out things 
3/26/J blocking out things 
3/27/D (?) negative images 
I suppose we could slow down the tape, and properly dis-
cretise these words and, using brackets and split-lines 
and other such devices we could somehow represent their 
sequential occurrence graphically. Even so, and even 
with the benefits of a narrow phonemic transcription, I 
am sure that we could not recover and record 'with any 
accuracy and character the full virtues of ~his exchange. 
We should have to characterise at least some of it as 
'noise', and we should very likely pass over much of it 
as indecipherable, or otherwiseuntranscribable. 
The meaning of this exchange does not consist in Vicky's 
interpretation of it, and consequent ability to go on 
from it (though this is important). The exchange is 
primarily meaningful simply because it occurs; it is 
not meaningful to writing because it cannot be arranged 
to satisf~ the conventions of writing. The exchange 
and each of its composite utterances are meaningful 
because they are properly expressive; that is to say 
I The observations made in this chapter are based on my 
interpretation of three tape-recordings. These record 
small groups of 6th formers dicussing, unaided, the first 
stanza "of Sylvia Plath's poem, Berck-Plage. Appendix B 
(p.233) contains the text of the poem, a transcription of, 
these discussions, and details both of the participants 
and of the general circumstances of the exercise. The 
that these utterances represent the intentions of the 
speakers directed at the context of the group. The 
exchange cannot be said to be fully communicative, 
however, and it is for this reason that it cannot 
properly be recordea in writing, where the communic-
ability of ideal notions has a higher status. 
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This exchange is as meaningful as any other apparently 
discrete and coherent utterance to be found on the tapes; 
in fact, these other utterances are only meaningful in so 
I 
far as this exchange is, for it represents the basic, if 
extreme case of eventual meaning. Why it is laboured 
here is that meaning lies in the noisy event of speech 
between persons, and is a different one to that we at-
tach with historical intent to the discrete elements 
of that event as they appear in memory, or in written 
words. The meaning in the noise is not ideal. 
My point, then, is not that transcriptions are inadequate 
records - "and no user would want to c1aim otherwise - but 
that meaning in the flux of discourse is not the same as 
that which attends writing. Meaning as it is experienced 
is not 'in' words, but in people; when we slow it down, 
yes, then we can spy it. But at the evanescent point of 
rapid utteran.ce, it is eventual and virtual. Our trans-
criptions suggest that it is ideational, and in this case 
we find meaning only where we can find form. In con-
clusion we can say that for the participants in a con-
versation, there are clusters of noise which are the 
observabl~ portion of thought, and which therefore carry 
references which head quotations from the tapes indicate 
which group is being quoted (1, 2 or 3), the serial num-
ber of the utterances in the transcribed exchange, arid 
the initial of the speaker. Thus the above ex.ample," (3/23/J :), is the 23rd utterance on the 3rd tape, and 
spoken by Julie. 
./ 
meaning. The world is primarily one of noise rather 
than of ideas; this noise is a prime reality which 
is yet recognisable in symbols which intentionally 
relate the experience of the speaker and the 'so cial' 
reality of his context. We tend, however, to at-
tribute meaning only where we see ideal form. Cer-
tainly our orthography is a second-order reality, 
often used to create orders at a third remove, and 
beyond. 
Thesis 2 Words may have lexical sense, but personal 
interpretation gives them significance. 
/ While this thesis emphasises the necessity of personal 
experience of a word, this should not be elevated over 
the shared, communicative value which that word has by 
virtue of its ideal character. In the first part of 
this account I shall show how the operation of meaning 
at the personal level may sometimes fail to achieve 
the sanction of shared meaning. 
Pupils bring to a text the expectation that it should 
be meaningful, simply because it is a text. They may 
believe that every word, every phrase has a meaning, ;' 
and that their task is somehow to crack the-codes which 
are witholding those meanings. Of course, one result 
of this is that they may develop a very literal, mech-
anistic approach to figurative language. On Tape 3, 
Sally quotes : 
3/1l/S ": Electrifyingly-colored sherbets, scooped 
from the freeze 
and '~ulie unhesitatingly renders this as 
3/12/J ,that that's er ice-cream 
Well to be sure it is; but what matters to the' life of 
the poem is quite how and quite why its image should be 
represented in quite these particular words. The ass-
umption that the p~rase 'has' a literal meaning here 
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, " 
operates against the effect the poet is trying to 
achieve. This' determination to find elemental 
meanings in poetic language is inQmical to metaphor, 
while it is yet public and lexical senses which 
structure the event. The relation of meaning, 
anomaly and metaphor is finally a contextual rather 
than logical one. 
posed by 
Let us 'consider the problem 
This is the sea, then, this great abeyance (line 1); 
An important aspect of the poem at large, this section 
in particular and of the discourse of the groups de-
pends on the conflict between 'sea' and 'abeyance', 
and then the tensive information of the rest of the 
section by this area of meaning. 'The tide is out' 
could be a fair literal rendering of this o~ening 
line; but in fact it is no mere instance of metonymy -
it is the whole sea (not merely the tide). which is 
an (rather than in) abeyance; this is not a physical 
possibility. The meaning of the metaphor and of the 
whole section" depends on the choice we make between 
preserving the literal (and lexical) senses of both 
the subject and the predicate - in which case we have 
semantic chaos - and allowing a new sense to attach 
to either subject or modifier. The result is contra-
diction, to be sure; but it is significant contra-
diction which permits the stanza and the discourse 
to go on. 
GrouP.1 r~a1ise this: Tony says 
1/17/T : you shouldn't, don't go away wi' t'idea 
that being by the seaside'll make you better, erm 
and Paul's 
1/18/P : I think there could be something in the 
fact that, y'knowthe people are by the sea but, 
y'know, they're cripples ••• 
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and 
1/20/P it·its not going to do anything to them 
anyway 
draws Tony back to the text and calls from him 
1/2l/T : its abeyance in'it, its but 
Group 2 spend a lot of time reaLising this special 
meaning which Kevin introduces too elliptically for 
them, to the extent of attributing a clearly 'wrong' 
meaning to a key concept-area in their attempt to 
realise ideal meaning: 
2/l0/M : what's abeyance mean now 
2/ll/S : vastness 
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/" 
/ 2/l2/Kl: oh is it I thought (?) confused 
2/l3/K2: yeh emptiness 
2/l4/S : it~ just a vast empty sea and they're all 
crippled aren't. they so its really worthless to 
them 
2/l4/M : this is a (etc) 
This is doubly. interesting. Shane's equation of 
'abeyance' with 'vastness' and 'emptiness' is 'wrong' 
in a literal sense, though he shows a loose, connotat-
ive sense of the context; what he hasn't got is the 
word's presentia1 value. Now metaphor may appear to 
be an extreme case of the play between ideal/lexical 
and figurative/personal meanings, and so far the ex-
amination has been largely at the level of the text; 
but Shane's understanding of 'abeyance' is actually a 
good demonstration of the operation of metaphor at 
the personal level as it addresses the intentional 
obj ect. 
Talk of meaning must in any event comprehend shared 
meaning; a meani~ which doesn't mean to more than one 
person" could.not be so called. It is'absurd to talk 
of meaning outside of a public context, in quite the same 
same way that it ip wrong to talk of 'private' languages. 
But, in an entirely real way, absurdity is actually 
a tactic of poetry. Metaphor stands as the case of 
authentic language which strains at logi~ and re-
sists absurdity only to the extent that it is directed 
towards the real. Now one of the functions and effects 
of discourse is to maintain the public currency of 
language, by checking and refining meanings against 
each other; we have said that 'ideal' meanings are 
something like templates from Langue, against which 
the working hypothesis of nascent meanings are tried 
and qualified. Shane's imperfect realisation of 
'abeyance' - which clearly works for his experience 
of .the poem - is in fact refined by the discourse, 
since he explicitly approves Kevin's second attempt 
at statement of his theme: 
2/26/Kl: ••• I think they I definitely think that 
they that the sea's sort of seen as a, a sort of 
harbour of life ••• whereas they 
2/27/S : where they're separated 
2/28/Kl: whereas this place they're separated from 
it because there's something wrong with them 
2/29/S : yeh I agree with that 
The discrepancy between Shane's understanding and the 
-lexical sense of 'abeyance' is no impediment to the 
work of the metaphor on this discourse. His experience 
of the word appears to vary .. between this. 'prop.er' 
sense and a sense p~rmitted by the discourse. l 
Words, then, have an actual meaning only in a context, 
in a sente~ce or utterance; lexical val~es are only the 
. I beginning·6f meaning. But it is equally true that per-
sonal significances are inchoate until and unless they 
accord with shared meaning. If we look again at the 
-
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1 Hull (1981) cites an example with some similar fe&tures. 
He reroxts a girl's claim to be 'bored ' .. in small group dis-
cussion, 'although her observed activities •• were rarely 
symptomatic of boredom •• Once she had used the word, how-
ever, .it assumed a powerful and central position in the en-
suing discussion •.• The girls who were part of Katrina's 
friendship group •• borrowed her terminology and intonation 
and .... each offered a similar view, in two cases clearly 
second tape-recording, it is clear that Kevin's original 
insight and observation need some re-modelling to arrive 
at an articulation which can satisfy at once the person-
al values of that intuition, the critical intelligence 
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of the group and the meaning-of the text._ Meaning is 
realised as the group can so manifestly share in its 
articulation. (Note in the above example how Kevin in-
corporates Shane's observation that 'they're separ~ted' 
into his concluding 'whereas this place they're separated 
from it •• ') 
Communication ensures that language goes on and is not 
arrested at the level of personal significance. On 
Tape 1, Paul makes an observation which appears to be 
/' / qualified most usefully (and, for Murray, unusually) . 
by Murray, and his acknowledgement of this cont~ibution 
is not merely a superficial feature of the circularity 
of discourse, nor of 'turn-taking' or whatever, but is 
an operation at an ontological level of communication 
which is realised in language.· Again,' Murray's observ-
ation permits, discourse to go on. 
1/25/P 
1/26/M 
1/27/P 
point 
getting to be old infirm y'know there no 
chance of carrying on life' at all 
in the normal sense 
in the normal sense of the word yes good 
This might seem like a top-heavy handling of a very 
innocent exchange, and indeed the point has been lab-
oured a little. However, it is particularly interesting 
in the way it contrasts with an earlier exchange, where 
Paul again· acknowledies a 'good point', but this time 
with some good-humoured irony which could (in his case) 
contradicting what they had said only moments- earlier. 
The fieldworker had sensed strongly at the time that the 
word itself was acting to move group cbncensus and that 
its 'song' was serving a social function that trailed its· 
apparent lexical meaning.' 
/ 
very easily have been contempt. What we have is act-
ually an instance of failed communication, because 
Tony's observation has significance for him, but does 
not have the sanction~ meaning dictated by the text 
and required by the group. This is the exchange: 
1/12/P : it begins with it begins with a description 
of the actual scene at Berck-P1age the seaside resort 
and as the poem progresses, er other ideas are intro-
duced so on top of the sort' of main theme (noise) and 
,these extra themes carryon until the actual scene 
changes In 
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1/13/T : it seems that she puts ideas on to t'actua1 
description but 'n then ideas get more and descript-
ion gets less, and eventually its all ideas and actual 
description just fades away · 
Beyond the obvious fact that ideas must accumulate necess-
arily as a poem lengthens and develops, this is not the 
case. But we must suppose that it has reality for Tony, 
for he delivers it with some authority and enthusiasm. 
My suggestion is that Paul's intelligence 'defers for 
reasons of friendliness to Tony's construing of the text. 
Murray (the only other member of this ,group) takes his 
cue from Paul so the communication is allowed to stand. 
It goes forward by Paul's somewhat tactful and efficient 
moving to a new topic: 
1/14/p yes er I see what you mean yes good point 
1/15/M yes yarse 
1/16/P erm we have some erm sort of pointers here,l 
like erm What chara-characterises each section of the 
poem? well if we take section 1 first of all ••• 
A second example of significance whkhcannot aspire to 
the public meaning necessary for communication is to be 
heard in Martin's identification of tElectrifyingly-
colored sherbets' as 
2/l7/M : I thought it could be er t'foam on t'sea 
2/l8/K2: no 
1 Paul is referring to some guide-line questions issued 
to each group. See Appendix B 
2/l9/M : sherbets yeh they all fizz up don't they 
like white,·· what's up wi' yer ? 
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There are two points to be made here. Firstly, while it 
has evident meaning for him, Martin's explanation of the 
sherbet is not verifiable iri.the text, and, secondly, it 
hence cannot pass into the currency of meaning proper 
with which the group communicates. l 
The valu~ of this thesis is limited because in practi~e 
words do not appear as isolable, discrete entities. They 
always have a context, and what Wheelwright (1968) 
says of metaphor is equally true of any utterance: 
Metaphors escape literal reductions ••• because 
they are events, and the context in which they 
happen is the indispensable element in determin-
ing their meaning. 
The personal horizons of such events are explored in 
the third thesis. 
Thesis 3 : In' speech we re-create meanings in a personal 
style. 
Is what we say bound up with what we are? When we 
listen to tape-recordings, or look at transcriptions, 
we attend to the words differently from the way in 
which we involve with them when we talk with someone. 
When we talk, words somehow withdraw in favour of 
sharing meaning with another speaker. After the 
event, the record gives us only those words, and the 
meanings are matters for deduction. IS'it possible 
at this stage to spy something of the meaning which 
1 Martin's equation of 'sherbet' is perhaps with Bassett's 
little yellow packages; presumably, Plath is using the word 
here as it occurs in American English, to refer to what we 
call a .. sorbet. What Martin fails to include in his char~ 
acterisation is the intelligence of the predicate 
••• scooped from the freeze 
By pal e gi r 1 s •. ~. 
which does make her meaning accessible to Anglo-Saxon 
und~r~tanp.ing= . 
has generated the words? I suggest here that this 
can be done - to a limited extent - by seeing how 
care and thought and energy address th~ objects of 
speech; a style of being lies in words which is not 
immediately evident in recordings. 
If expression and communication are always present in 
speech, then style can be understood as the third 
dimension which describes the way in which something 
can have personal. significance and common meaning. 
In the way that Parole must emerge as unique real~ 
isations of Langue, language itself requires that 
each utterance shall be novel; it is the internal 
consistency of a series of utterances through their 
variety which is commonly understood as style. The 
style of a person can be known in this way, as can 
that ofa text; it is significant and consistent 
features which deform the purely communicative and 
resist the wholly expressive which allow us to point 
to style. 
But there is more than this, though it is not usually 
allowed. One implication of separat~ng language from 
thought is that style comes to represent a fairly 
deliberate dressing of prior thought to a particular 
end. When we dissolve the need to talk of logical 
priority, we can admit the further possibility that 
style can comprehend being, to the extent that ex-
p~rience is linguistic. This is to say that we can 
identify ~anguage as not only inseparable from thought 
but thereby declarative of being-in-the-world. This 
is not susceptible to measurement, but I think may be 
signalled by the quality and values of language.· 
Subjectivity, understood as the response of the indiv-
idual to an inevitable world, may be diminished so 
that language is formal, perhaps wholly clich~; or it 
may be exaggerated, as in the extreme case of the 
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schizophrenic, so that language becomes privatised 
and eludes our understanding. The following reflect-
ion sees language as the means of access to the real, 
and the text as an aspect of this real which must 
have its meaning re-created through signification by 
a personal style. An important question throughout 
is uWhere is the text?U 
3 cases of style-a te~tative observation 
The illustration of the expressive nature of speech is 
the most diffi cuI t to achieve for all sart.s of reasons. 
Principally, it requires that we make an artificial 
separation of speech from the global event within 
which context expression has a meaning. Speech is the 
surface.portion only of a gestural realisation of 
presence, so any assessment of this speech cannot be 
other than my own reflection on observable behaviour. 
If this is honestly admitted from the start, then a 
virtue can be made of offering a personal response to 
what appears to be expressive language. The question, 
then, is not 'What is happening for the speaker ?', 
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but 'What does this language tell me about the speaker ?' 
Of course, objections to my observations can be made on 
several grounds, such as the fact that the children in 
these recorded instances were not used to working with 
a tape-recorder, or that these are anyway first attempts 
to understand a very difficult poem, etc. However, 
since I am concerned to say something essential about 
the charac,ter of speech, I am content that this cannot 
be a scientifically-exact affair. 
I suggest that it is the way in which the text is re-
created which is the measure of language function for 
each c4ild. That is, it is not so much elegance of 
syntax or vocabulary,·· or authority of speaking-manner, 
for example, but the indication that the text has moved 
from the page to the experience of the speaker. : This 
indication is ~iven, certainly, by syntactical and 
lexical markers, by tonal qualities and paralinguistic 
signs of assurance, but these actually inform personal 
style which is properly mark~d by the approach to the 
text, the negotiation of it and its final re-present-
ation with the increments of personal, expressive app-
reciation. 
Julie does not achieve this (Tape 3); she is arrested 
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at the level of clich~, synonym, paraphrase and hunt-
the-meaning activity. She has enthusiasm, but it serves 
largely to betray the complexity of the text. The par-
ticular group she is in, and patterns of exchange it 
requires set her up as ~he chief speaker, but it is a 
role which she takes on willingly, and she is always 
'up-front', always ready with an often gratuitous 
answer. She is prepared to have any meaning that is 
to hand, and therefore covers the text in a'quite 
irresponsible way. For Julie, the text remains firmly 
on the page; it communicates to her, certainly, in as 
much as she can translate some of its details. But 
there is little sense in her speech of any proper 
dwelling in a work of art. 
Kevin similarly finds himself at the centre of his 
group's discussion, but where Julie seems to field 
observations and queries rather frenetically, Kevin 
plods soberly through them. His dourness is actually 
attractive, and suggests some authority. Kevin is 
aware of the importance of the author's intentions, 
but his appreciation is not handicapped by them, and 
from the start he covers the text with ideal values 
and personal extrapolations. His approach seems to 
approximate the poem until it is realised for him 
and for the group. His final appraisal before the 
group passes on to the next stanza (2/26/K) is quite 
a considered statement of the poem, and the manner of 
its delivery shows the concern of his thought. 
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It is difficult to say exactly why I have the impression 
that it is Paul (Tape 1) who- somehow manages to re- create 
the text. Like Kevin, he starts'with a logical approach, 
~hough is far more self-conscious and clearly aware of 
his performanc~. He had, of course, had some more time 
than the others to consider the poem (See Appendix B), 
and was therefore more familiar with it. I still doubt, 
though, that Julie (for example) could have achieved 
this poise of insight and expression. Again, the 
instance of Paul reminds us that these are, after all, 
group discussions, although each is dominated by one 
person; but there is something in the way in which Paul 
shares his significances with Murray and Tony which 
distinguishes him from Kevin and Julie ( who also dom-
inate their group's respon~e). Perhaps I am merely 
seduced by Paul's tone and the importance of his point 
about 'contradiction', but I find this piece of summary 
speech far more evocative than Kevin's - which says 
substantially the same thing: 
1/23/P : theie's a sort of contradiction in the 
actual thins because there y'know the sea is sort 
of the place where all life came from in the first 
place a sort of life-giving force while y'know 
these people sort of, life-defying if you like 
cos their lives 
2/26/K : ••• she seems to be alternating in ea ea 
within each sort of section with positive and neg-
ative thoughts and also er just ideas and images 
and also actual, experiences 'like probably she's 
obviously been to this place, she has been to 
Berck-P1age, erm and she sees these mackere1-
gatherers, that sort of shows a positive side of 
life er and then ideas contrast er.between death 
and disease and er the sort of the land and the 
sea .. where these people are I think ,that they I 
definitely think that they that the sea's sort 
of seen as a a sort of, harbour of life ••• 
These are, of course, statements required by-their 
particular contexts, and should not be too closely 
compared. But I think the final point is not to be 
had from the superficial authority or grammar or 
vocabulary of Paul's s~eech, but that these are given 
with his recreation of the text, his 'saying the same 
thing differently'. 
This argument suggests the following: JUlie's ex-
perience of the poem is minimal; she barely recreates 
it and its significance for her is at the level of 
rather banal paraphrase. l Kevin demonstrates the 
poem's significance for him and clearly moves towards 
its meaning; that is, the poem lives in his treatment 
of it. The poem ~chieves meaning under Paul's 
handling as expression validates significance, and 
the text 'leaves the page'. 
The most serious objection to these observations -
and to the observations of the other theses -is 
actually their virtue: How do I know that Julie's 
or Paul's experience are as I have described? Of 
course, I cannot, but I allow for this when I say 
that a style of being is 'not immediately evident' 
in recordings. The mediation that is required is 
precisely that of my own values, and this is true 
of all interpretative actions. To the bald text 
of the transcription I add my own experience and 
understanding, my 'second record'; these existent-
ial criteria make coherent, in any event, the 
information which a linguistic account of 'style' 
provides. 
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I JUlie's work always brings to my mind Leavis' comment 
on certain forms of criticism: 'There js a clear tenden-
?y to frustrate the enormous labour expended by the poet 
In undercutting mere ~cceptance, inhibiting inert ac-
quiescence, and circumventing, at every level, what may 
be called cliche; ~ tendency •. to abet the reader's 
desire to arrive without having ~ravelled'. (1947) 
.' 
Thesis 4 : Mostly dialogue is neither pre-meditated 
nor'a finished product. 
Textual interpretation is necessarily an act of 
'filling-in'; it is given with the act of examination 
to minimise the opacity of a text. Or, alternatively, 
it is a 'filling-out', because what happens is that 
we amplify references to mine the full, polysemic 
values whose condensation is a virtue of poetic 
method. Much of this activity is based phenomenally 
on paraphrase and the,f~nding of synonym. But 
perhaps the prime virtue of a poemi.is that it is not, 
finally, reducible to a literal explanation, that its 
meaning eludes even its author, and that it can, and 
must be returned to again and again. 
On the level of the single idea, or phrase, this 
obviously happens repeatedly as the idea takes on 
meaning against the broader development of the text 
generally; as the general meaning of the poem ac-
cumulates, increments are added to particular 
interpretations, or other qualifications are made. 
Thi~ filling of the gap is the making patent of a 
latent, but felt idea. But this idea, or area of 
ideas, is never fulfilled. An idea is negotiated 
not with deliberation, but only so long as it is 
fel t to be in need of filling-out. . The idea works 
itself out, and is not the act, as such, of a 
participant. In retrospect we might see it like 
this, but in the event itself it is a requirement 
nota result of discourse. 
A good example of this can be heard on Tape 2. .1 
am fascinated by what happens to Kevin~s idea of 
the sea as 'a creative centre'. There is no such 
explicit mention in the text of the poem. It is 
a notion given with the ideality of the word'sea', 
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but is in fact overshadowed if not deliberately 
cancelled by its collocation with 'this great 
abeyance'. Kevin's notion is explicitly rejected 
by the group, and Kevin acquiesces. But in retro-
spect, and with the artificial intelligence of 
audio-tapes and transcriptions, we can see that the 
idea is the foundation and dynamic of the whole ex-
change. The idea is inevitable, and the language 
serves not to argue the point, but to make good the 
lack. The idea arrives at general approval not 
through any conscious efforts of Kevin's, but 
because it is contextually necessary to the dis-
course, which in.turn is responsible to its own 
ostensible referent, the text. 
This 'necessity' is apparent in the work of the 
other groups. Paul has no doubt about the function 
of the reference to the sea, as he observes with 
some succinctness and authority 
1/23/P : there's a sort of contradiction in the 
actual thing because there y'know the sea is sort 
of the place where all life came from in the first 
place a sort of life-giving force while y'know 
these people sort of life-defying if you like cos 
their lives 
The poem says clearly 
The sea, that crystallised these, 
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Creeps away, many-~naked, with a long hiss of distress. 
(1.17-18). 
And recognising the antinomy of the sea with the deform-
a tions on ··the beach, Sally 0 bserves on Tape 3: 
3/44/S : it's an idea that the sea's sort of dis-· 
tressed with what it sees 
So, we learn at the end of the stanza, the sea is an 
'abeyance' at least partly because the tide is out ! . 
It is then a symbol and an echo of the· retreat from 
vi tali ty to be found on the beach. 
In the case of .. each group, there is something to say, 
and conversation goes forward, precisely because there 
is a lack which needs to be made good; a temporal 
distance between participants and text which must be 
negated. The lack in this instance is signalled by 
the opacity o~ the text; this obscurity somewhat 
diminished, the conversation is temporarily at an 
end. What I am trying to demonstrate is how language 
approximates until it reaches a sufficient truth. 
This sufficient truth is one which reflects the 
necessary truth of experience.· Then the ostensible 
subject of discourse can change. But it is not 
given to the individuals in each group formally to 
argue a point or case, or to pursue with conscious 
intent a 'line'. Thought fills out the discourse 
until it has - in this instance - re-created the 
poem, or at least a sufficient characterisation of 
it. Each group comes to a point where it feels it 
can move to the next task - the second stanza of the 
poem - because this part of the text has been realised. 
Group 3 does not articulate its conclusions as such, 
but moves on after a fairly perfunctory covering of 
the text. Group 2, with the benefit of Kevin, who 
elects to lead the discussion, leaves this section 
with a characterisation which equates loosely with 
the feel of the verse. Group 1 concludes more neatly 
with a rather summary statement. 
So the participants do not 'make' literary, or 
associative responses as such; rather the ideality 
of words - on which discourse as much as poetry 
depends - undergoes deformation as language is 
experienced; expression accomplishes the realisation 
of an ideal form by returning a necessary meaning to 
words •.. That the process is not wholly· intellectual 
will be suggested by Thesis 5. 
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Thesis 5 : Meaning - even to the speaker - often comes 
with the act of talking 
We do not have to look far in everyday useage for 
examples of ungrammaticality in speech, for its false 
starts, its un-selfconsciousness, etc. These are 
shown up well enough in transcriptions. But I want to 
use some of these instances to supplement and develop 
Thesis 4, and therefore to point to the role of tacit 
knowledge in determining speech. In this last thesis 
I called attention to Kevin's recognition of the sea 
as 'a creative centre'. He is asked to account for 
this by two other members of the group, and he first 
of all seems to fail. But I have suggested that the 
idea is necessary to the exchange at large; the dis-
course does not collapse, though Kevin's 'argument' 
does. His problem - in the group at that time - is 
that he cannot articulate his 'case'. 
Gadamer describes speech as 'forgetful' (1976). His 
emphasis is on the speaker's ignorance of the modul-
ations of Langue which are realised in his Parole, 
and this is an obvious case of tacit knowing. We are 
unaware of the permutations of a grammar even while 
we are using it. We could add to Gadamer's hypostat-
isation. that language is also 'hopeful'; improbably, 
we complete with innocent ease spoken sentences 
requring' great dexterity in attention to concord, 
sometimes across many subordinate clauses and several 
seconds; sentences which would have taken far'more 
time and effort to compose in writing. Of course, 
transcriptions bear witness to the fact that sensible 
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and successful utterances may well not satisfy the 
grammatical conditions which indicate written correctness. 
I should like to consider where and how grammatical 
coherence would appear on a continuum of explicitation. 
On Tape 3, Dawn asks 
3/40/D : wha t ' s A sandy damper kill s the vi bra tions ? 
and Julie replies 
3/41/J : we thought that -that were y' know when you 
sit down on't beach y'know I don't know if you feel 
it when you sit down its like a right damp dumb thud 
y'know and it does, when yer lying on the beach yer 
can't 
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The poverty of expression here is not to be found merely 
in the disjointed sentence-formation and the rather 
cheerless delivery. What Julie says is inappropriate in 
the context of the poem. But this poverty of expression 
is in contrast with the explicitness of the thought 
which it accomplishes. The crudeness of the thought -
by which I mean its literal-mindedness, completeness, 
lack of subtlety - is a feature of Julie's style. 
There is little life to it. I should want to charact-
erise this utterance as the worst sort of slot-filling, 
as noisy 'maintenance work'. Julie provides another 
example of sedimented thought later in the exchange, 
when she o-ffers the gratuitous observation: 
3/58/J : yeh yeh they do you give fish for protein 
The information is offered as an ideal response to the 
previous speaker's reference to fish; again, -the loose-
ness of Julie's expression is in contrast with the 
baldness of her proposition. 
By contrast-with Julie, Kevin (Tape 2) makes several 
relentless 'attempts to organise his thought. This is 
typical : 
2/20/K": there is holiday-type atmosphere isn't it, 
erm then description of the sea y'know like it its 
vastness it sort of describes a certain lack of 
human contact, that'd fo11 that'd follow through 
with these people they sort of they're away from 
everybody else, they're sort of away fro m society_ 
aren't they, a separate er community on their own 
This does not occur in response to specific questions 
or pre-occupations of the group - that is, in response 
to any 'social' requirements - though it is directed at 
the others while it is yet a personal exploration. The 
false starts, the incomplete thoughts are here markers 
of the urgency of Kevin's thought. Is this felicitous 
launching into words co-procedural with the growth of 
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a thought for a speaker? Is there, rather, a pre-
constituted thought which words more or less imperfectly 
realise? Do we struggle for words to address a coher-
ent, existing thought? We launch into words certainly 
ignorant of the grammatical subtension of our words, 
and unable to say how that utterance will end precisely 
because we are giving shape and colour to an emerging 
thought, not trying to describe it. (This is one of 
the qualitative differences between Kevin's and JUlie's 
typical utterances.) The thought is not a picture we 
present, but is our very action, and words are illocut-
ionary features rather than ostensive instruments. 
Kevin launches into words which are no more than necessary 
to the realisation of his intuited sense of the poem. 
If the 'thought' was 'there' explicitly 'before' he spoke, 
there would be no problem, no need for this exploratory 
talk. That it is not 'there' is indicated by Kevin's 
signal failure early in the exchange to justify his 
notion of the sea as 'a creative centre'. The thought 
is Manifestly 'not there' until language puts it on 
(in this case, public) display •. His realisation that 
2/26/K : the sea's sort of seen as a, a sort of 
harbour of life 
is the realisation of the thought. 
To summarise thus far, most knowledge exists in a tacit 
form and requires the explicitation of language for its 
realisation. This means that generally we know.far more 
than we can actually speak of, although self-conscious 
talk c~n bring this knowledge out. La~guage an~ thought 
we should see as moments of the same event, simultaneously 
constituted as 'our body lends itself to some new gesture' 
(Merleau-Ponty). This gesture is in greater demand when 
language address~s an audience ( we seldom gesture to 
ourselves), which is taken to include the paper we 
write on; a 'live' audience may require the sort of 
explicitness of a speaker which he might not otherwise 
realise. There is a sense in which, reduced to him-
self, man is much less than the possibilities which 
openness to others provides and requires. 
Now these ideas are somewhere to be found in observ-
ions like that of Barnes· (1969): 
Language here :has the function of making explicit 
to themselves - as much as to other people - the 
nature of an insight already partly intuited. 
(p.68). 
But Barnes 'fails to prosecute the full implications 
of his observation for epistemology. Thought and 
language are moments of the same event. The essential 
aspect of language is that it teaches me the meaning 
of my thought, which yet issues with it; the essential 
aspect of thought is that it can run ahead of itself. 
Language accomplishes thought; pre-existing thought 
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has a different status,. and - as in the case of JUlie -
a depressing effect on the life of language. 
The real matter which discussion of the tapes demon-
strates is this: 'thought' is not an 'internal' thing 
which exists independently of the world. It lives in 
words which must be public and accountable. To a very 
large extent the best of speaking is a thinking out 
loud. Already-constituted thoughts give us the illusion 
of an 'inner' linguistic life - 'and it is to these that 
we can attribute meaning most easily, for they are 
precisely areas of meaningful, sedimented experience. 
But thought itself is th.e making of meaning as a. flow .of 
words is set in motion. Finally, as thought should 
not be equated with grammatical coherence, so 'meaning' 
is not a function of .phenomenal elegance; it is, in 
Leavis' phrase, something that happens 'in the criss-
cross of utterance .. between us' (1975), and the record 
of that event is likely to be as opaque as the event 
was Ii vely • 
. Conclusions 
Comment on the theses falls into three parts; some 
evaluation from the point of view of methodology will 
be offered here. The implications of the work for 
English teaching are discussed in Chapter 6, and a 
general reflection on research methods is offered in 
the concluding Chapter 7. 
In the introduction to this chapter I described the 
scope and terms of my enquiry. In the light of this, 
and of the tenor of the work as a whole, I feel that 
there is no need to try the enquiry against the normal 
tests of typicality, of validity and the like. It 
would be more proper to assess the theses in terms of 
the principles.whichI claimed guided them ( p.123). 
In fact, objections to the work could be organised 
into the three areas suggested by these principles. 
i. Though the theses themselves appear to be neutral, 
their operation involves speculation and the making 
of value-judgments. In Thesis 3 I suggest that what 
we say reveals something of the sort of person we are, 
that a 'style of being' affects the words we use; 
conversely, language may indicate the quality of care 
and thought behind it. In particular, in my comments 
on the pupils' discussion earlier in the chapter, I 
am critical of JUlie's efforts, and I uphold Pa~l as 
o~e who thoughtfully and carefully recreates the text 
in spe~ch. How are these conclusions justified ? 
If we want to speak of the power of a work of art, 
there is no measure which does not reach back into 
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experience. It is the same with speech; one can 
quantify it only at the level of how it signifies, 
and then on pain of it ceasing to mean. Talk of 
meaning involves us with the- values of the speaker, 
and how else do we know. those values - and recognise 
meanings - except as they impinge on our own? How 
else can I evaluate speech? The question remains 
'How do I know that Julie's speech is less thoughtful 
than Paul's?' I know only to the extent that I see 
speech as mostly continuous with thought, and I take 
my evidence of thoughtlessness from the meagre stim-
ulation I find in Julie's .talk as it addressess 
objects which I know and engage with. The indispens-
able element in the process is me. 
ii. What exactly is the datum we are evaluating ? 
Is it the special circumstance of these children 
talking about poetry? Is it the audio-tape, or its 
transcription? Is it the 'second record' of my own 
p rej udi ces ? 
I suggested that.Paul's speech was the m~re authentic 
be~ause he recreated the concerns of the text; it 
would be no less the case if the subject were football 
or film. Tensive, engaged speech does not merely 
signify, as does the clich~ or cypher; it intends 
something beyond the limits of reference, and it is 
that intention, and its mode of being towards its 
objects, which speaks to us. We seem a long way from 
realising that language does not present values; 
language simply is the continual evaluation of the 
objects which transcend it. My discussion of a~other's 
speech must be directed at the objects of that speech, 
and must reveal my own orientation towards them. 
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In this sense the datum is whatever interposes between 
me and the intenti~nal objects I share with others. 
The role of the interpreter is to characterise that 
datum - tape, transcripts, or whatever -_in a way. 
which represents the objects intended by it. We 
wish to go beyond the limits which data establish, and 
see as contingent or incidental the rfacts r provided 
by audio-recording or orthography or linguistic 
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register or group dynamic. "To the things themselves !" 
Standardising circumstances gives reliable data which 
hides the fact that all circumstances are special~:and all 
data particular; reliable data have no necessary con-
nection with the truth of things. Rather the truth 
of things is to be had from dismantling data and 
engaging directly and personally with the objects 
it characterises. All, finally, is grist. 
iii. I have objected to the systems which the disc-
iplines of psychology, sociology and linguistics 
impose on language, but are the theses themselves not 
dangerously schematic? Their fixed number, for 
example, would suggest this. 
The theses are concerned with describing the expressive 
process of speaking, not with quantifying its products. 
The theses cannot identify the contingent or occasional 
content of speech, but together present the conditions 
for speech to be meaningful; taken individually they 
have limited value. They have no diagnostic or critical 
use without the mediation of personal values. Their 
illustrative relation to any data confirms that any 
schematic form thay appear to have does not limit the 
events they address to fixed values. 
If, in the light of this, the 'essential' appears to 
be the obvious, then we have only to look to the models 
of language with which social science mostly operates 
to see that itis an obviousness taken for granted. 
The theses emerge, then, with the dual function of 
revealing the essential and of pointing to its oc-
clusion in other accounts o~ language. 
Granted, then, that there must be a scheme of sorts 
to the theses, is there something essential about 
their actual number? There is nothing binding 
about this number, beyond its ability to organise 
my reflections on what is essential. Doubtless, 
this would be done differently by another enquirer. 
The fact is that what is essential is not revealed 
simply and unequivocally for all time, but must be 
continually discovered and re~presented. To argue 
that no one characteristic of language is trans-
cendent is not to deny the existence of the essential; 
what is transcendent is the attempt to speak ,of the 
essential, 'and such attempts intend and share that 
essence. The 'five theses are a particular way of 
intuiting and representing that essence. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Language, the arts and English teaching 
In this chapter I want to offer some evaluation of 
all that has gone before. In particular, I want to 
return the speculative thread of the argument to the 
context of English teaching in which it was first 
noticed. 
In Chapter 2 I sketched out in a broad way some of the 
ways in which language has been viewed in education; 
this was deduced from the explicit statements of 
philosophers and linguists as well as· from the .models 
implicit in the operations of sociologists and 
psychologists. It was suggested that although no 
single explicit theory or model attaches to English 
teaching in our schools, this practice goes on very 
much under the influence of characterisations of 
language provided by social science. These disciplines 
deal largely with those communicative functions of 
language which can be taxonomised and quantified; it 
is this pragmatic concern which is inscribed in so 
many textbooks,sedim~nted in so much pedagogy, and 
even legitimated in the Bullock Report (HMSO, 1975). 
The greater expressive world which language is has 
been contracted into this observable portion. More, 
an uncritically-accepted structuralism has allowed the 
severance of this communicative system from the.very· 
whole of aesthetics and ethics in which it draws its 
life-breath, and without which it is meaningless. 
From a stance of naive enquiry one could wonder at 
this situation ~~e English teachers not concerned 
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with literature, with personal growth and with radical 
thinking? And are these not finally existential 
concerns? The answers are too obvious to be of use, 
for these questions occur at" such an uncontroversial 
level of curriculum philosophy. Once put - however 
formally or tacitly - their answers lie mute in a large 
and practical curriculum design. But it is the 
minutiae of daily practice which reveal the value of 
those principles; the pragmatic concerns of situation 
dilute the aspiration to principle. English Studies 
should be subversive, for the school itself subverts 
the expressive impulse. This is a dialectical and not 
merely political case. But the view arises not from 
what I take to be in the character of society or of 
human behaviour, but what is'essential in the nature 
of language, and what is systematically overlooked. 
Language has an identity beyond the phenomenal which' 
cannot be wholly recognised in the uses we put it to, 
and which is therefore assumed to be at best subordin-
ate to function. This identity is realised by 
expression. 
This is not to elevate expression over communication. 
There seem to me to be two ways in which English 
teaching may be threatened by misunderstanding, an~' 
they arise from the same source - a confusion about 
the relation of expression and communication. The 
truth is that the communicative, functional under-
standing of language pervades our pedagogic theory, 
and this - however subtly - spoils our urge to 
, expression in the classroom. The idea that language 
principally refers to something more or less material 
still inhibits English Studies, as it did the romantic 
reading of the novel, for example; the other ·heresy 
here - that words primarily signify -is equally 
ignorant of the intentional relationship of the speaker, 
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his words and the world where all happens. 
The second point is a crucial corollary.of this: 
expression and subjectivity are commonly taken to mean 
indulgence in the purely personal, whereas (to adapt 
MacMurray, 1935) the real value of expression consists 
in its chastity, that is, in the way a,.subjective voice 
aims itself at objective acceptance. 
What is needed is a proper understanding of this relat-
ionship of the individual to his language. But not an 
explanation, in terms of phonemes and structures and 
dynamics: there have been enough of those. What is 
required is a pedagogic philosophy of language, a true 
science which respects the nature of its objects but 
which, even more importantly, understands that it is 
persons who initiate sciences. 
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But, one could ask, who requires such a science? What 
is most alarming about the Bullock Report is just that 
it was possible, that things could be in a state which 
would permit such comment to arise in the ground of 
English teaching, and allow such values to be urged on 
pedagogy. In a sense, then, one could say that English 
teaching got the report it deserved; it is a report 
which not only licenses a lot of bad practice, but which 
articulates as virtual principles the dross of that 
practice. A communicative model of language can be 
rigorous and accountable and structural, and it is all 
too easy in a disaffected classroom for a confused 
pedagogy to see such features as desirable and achiev-
able ends in themselves. 
One ex~mple will suffice to illustrate the tone of much 
contemporary work. Commenting on various contributions 
to the Yearbook of the National Society for the Study 
of Education (Squire, 1977), Rouse (1980) finds a 
depressing uniformity in the writers: 
For the most part they agree that English should 
be concerned mainly with the development of lang-
uage skills for communication. 
(p.150) 
The view is endorsed by Britton in the same Yearbook. 
In a most explicit formulation of this view, Moffett 
(1968) transforms the events of discourse into func-
tional systems; poetic fictions are useful 
to heighten awareness of the informational and -
communicational processes operating in both real 
life and literature. 
(p.154) 
According to Moffett, 
We ask ourselves unnecessarily complicated questions 
about what a story means •• when a simple glance at 
the communication structure of the work would answer 
many of these questions. 
(p.150) 
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The effect is to identify 'language' with the processes 
which appear to realise it. (One wonders - to take but 
one obvious e~ample - what Moffett would make of Kafka's 
story, 'Up in the Gallery' (Kafka, 1971). ) 
Of course we need not attend too seriously to such work 
in itself; few English teachers would find such explicit 
statements other than absurd. But my point is that the 
spirit of such work infects out teaching subtly, that 
this infection of positivo-structuralismwas indeed 
already there for Bullock to determine. -Although our 
--primary allegiance as English teachers should be to the 
arts, and -we would explicitly say so, we have all too 
often acted as if the categories of behaviour w~ich 
linguistic science has elaborated have a better purchase 
on reality than have our sensible, feeling re~ponses. 
Science and linguistics have made a virtue of divorcing 
objects from individual experience so that they appear 
I 
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to stand free of the entanglement of human values. 
But the whole scientific endeavour rests on the brave 
and particular object-sensible acts of 'wholly attending' 
which men have made and which must in some measure be 
recapitulated on every occasion when somebody presumes 
to understand them. Facts are objects without life, 
where for consciousness there is no such thing, where 
merely to entertain a fact is to recast it in the event 
of attending to an object. Scientists surely understand 
this well, if not better than anyone, but their dedicat-
ion to what transcends individual experience seems to 
require ·that they take for granted the realm of conscious-
ness. Since consciousness determines objects, what is 
discovered by such an attitude is categorical r~th~r than 
/ transcendental. 
If - though there is a case to the contrary -English 
Studies aTe concerned with literature, with personal 
growth and radical thinking, it is clear that they have 
Ii ttle in common wi th the aims of science as normally 
concei ved. 
Setting out to reaffirm the heart of English Studies 
is no new venture; a minority of writers and a host of 
teachers who uphold with F.R.Leavis the 'living principle' 
of English Studies have kept a flame alight at all times, 
particularly during the bleakness of the last decade. 
Chief among the written works are Peel (1967), Hourd 
(1977), Leavis (1975), Whitehead (1966), Holbrook (1979); 
but the more diverse work of Heathcote (1980), Ross 
(1978), Witkin (1974), Abbs (1982), Poole (1972) and 
Harrison (1983) are moved by similar concerns and 
inspirations. Bibliographies almost invariably adduce 
Grene (1966), Polanyi (1969), Merleau~Ponty (1962); 
Lomas (1973), Guntrip (1968),Winnicott (1971); Leavis 
(1975), Sampson (1973) and Thompson (1978). What all 
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these works share in some measure - before any theor-
etical or methodological particularity - is an approach 
to epistemology which is existential; as the individual 
creates the stuff of his world so he finds himself more 
or less in the world of others; nothing is real before 
these events of creation. The categories of psychic 
life we normally talk of - reason, emotion, thought and 
so on - are conventional ways of prescribing a single 
impulse to meaning whose urgency is so profound that 
separate sciences of mind and body cannot picture it. 
A man is not separated from his world by processes 
like thinking, happening between an inner and an outer. 
And it is the same case with language; words do not 
exist except as, places vThere consciousness briefly is,' 
and to speak is not primarily to utter words, as it were 
from behind them. The upshot is that comment on thought 
must be itself a greater engagement than psychology can 
allow, 'and that to speak of language one must 'undergo 
an experience with language', as Heidegger says. What 
all these'writers share, then, is the desire to engage 
with th~iT objects in a way which keeps alive the ir-
reduci ble, human val ues whi ch ha ve crea ted and whi ch 
sustain those objects. 
Inspired in this way, English Studies belong in the 
centre of the Arts tradition. I have spoken of the 
single impulse to meaning which science will not 
perceive; Abbs (1982) similarly describes art as an 
enduring means for representing (for oneself and for 
others) those truths latent within our experience, 
those meanings which are, as it were, curled up in-
side the seeds of impulse. ' 
(p.56) 
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The expressi ve disciplines, he says, are concerned wi th the 
'sensuous Embodiment.of representati ve meaning'.-The descript-
ion is a good one for i t resolves the artificial separa t-' 
ion of expressive and communicative functions; art is so 
expressive only as it finds a recognisable voice. The 
... 
/ 
same definition makes clear that we are not talking 
of art-products studied for art's sake, but that we 
are concerned with the search for form for the sake 
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of meaning. Abbs has recently articulated the case for 
for English Studies as a ground of the expressive arts 
in English Within The Arts (1982). This work is cognate· 
with Holbrook's English for Meaning (1979), and both 
books celebrate the spirit of Leavis' The Living Principle 
(1975). The second part of this chapter is intended to 
contribute to work like this by showing how the phenom-
enology of Chapter 4 and the Theses of Chapter 5 reflect 
principles which art-making shares with English Studies 
method. In particular I want to say that speaking, as 
it is revealed in these chapters, is identical with the 
process· and end of art-making, and this is why English 
Studies and the other expressive disciplines belong 
together, and are best described by phenomenological 
enqu.iry. 
My method will be to recall some of the insights of 
Chapters 4 and 5, and to make explicit in each case the 
principle of art-making cognate with the essential 
character ·o.f language under discussion, and finally to 
show how this contiguity must not be avoided in the 
classroom. 
i. 'Wholl.'y attending' 
To use language requires certain uses of intellect just 
as intellectual activity is rudimentary if not .meaning-
less without the symbolic forms of language. In exper-
ience,. however, language and intellec.,t, thought and 
feeling, etc., are not interdependent functions as such;. 
the terms are ways of highlighting human experience by 
arresting it at c~rtain moments and having those moments 
appear discret~. In experience language does not have 
such shape and firmness, but is a far more basic affair. 
Though it becomes a fact for science it is always first 
of all the embodied condi tion of finding oneself not in 
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a world of ideas, but one of noise, of colour, of warmth 
and hunger. To speak is to speak of this condition, and 
no words are spoken which do not reach back into this 
well of experience. This is no less true of elegant and 
considered speech than of casual chatter or urgent infant 
noise, though sophisticated speech has made conventional 
the relationship between expressive impulses and partic-
ular gestures. For this is what words are: gestures in 
the full. sense of bodying forth an intention that sur-
vives the sign which realises it and creates a meaning 
in the symbolic experience of others. This meaning is 
distinct from the sense which words leave behind in a 
dictionary as a purely abstract record of use, and which 
gives the illusion that words .have an exact and proper 
character which actual use refers to. But words could 
not have even this limited power of nomination if they 
had not already excited the event of meaning which 
brings about understanding. When we speak or write or 
listen or read we involve ourselves in. a world which 
cannot be conveyed by a simple concept of mind, because 
this world calls for a manner of attending to reality 
which moves alike out of impulse and symbol tacitly 
sustaining consciousness. In Lawrence's phrase, it is 
a matter of 'a;·lman in his wholeness wholly attending' 
(1964). The truth that the word serves as a symbol is 
not the truth of fact, but the truth of experience. The 
intellectualist, however, removes the word from its 
sensuous context; at one stroke he thus elaborates the 
reasons for its purely communicative effectiveness, and 
severs· it from the event of its having any meaning. 
These are the features of experience we are talking of: 
experience is first of all sensuous, and not attached 
to symbols; the -expressive impulse is always a gesture 
of the body; and meanings are enjoyed in the instance 
of gestures me~ting symbols. 
It is clear that these are not exclusively linguistic 
features, but that they describe the very basic con-
di tion of experience in the world •. The growth of 
symbolic life has this character whether it finds form 
in words, in paint or in music. What is crucial is 
this quality of attending to the world; it is this 
openness which is revealed in an expressive act, not 
the artist himself. In fact, what completes his act 
is our recognition not of the personal experience 
which founded it, but of the sensible world which a 
particular symbolic form points to. The very impulse 
of subjectivity is towards sharing aesthetic experience 
with others, and we can express the first principle of 
art-making like this : 
Art expresses an impulse to give the sensible world 
a symbolic form.· 
All artists know the meaning of this 'standing for',· 
and some have made it as much a thesis as a condition 
of their.work •. The twentieth century revolutions in 
form are attempts to pack more of the sensible world 
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into symbolic representation, most often by fragmenting 
it and holding up its pieces as though they were innocent 
of scheme. If modernist experiment fails to persuade us 
of a sympathetic purchase on reality it is because, for 
all that ~ts data-like texture points up the haste and 
involvement of life, it fails to see in such tragedy the 
crucially intentional character of consciousness. In 
this much-quoted passage from Virginia Woolf's ~riting, she 
she is right to uphold the life of impression, the flux 
and to~ality of things: 
Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary 
day. The mind receives a myriad impressions - trivial 
fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness 
.. 
/ 
of steel. From all sides they come, an incessant 
shower of innumerable atoms; and as they fall, as 
they shape themselves into the life of Monday or 
Tuesday, the accent falls differently from of old 
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••• Life is not a series of gig-lamps symmetrically 
arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent 
envelope surrounding us from the beginning of con-
sciousness to the end. 
(Woolf, 1925, p.189) 
But this is the fallacy of supposing. that one can merely 
receive impressions, of overlooking how perception it-
self stylises things so that, indeed, life is a series 
of gig-lamps no less than it is a luminous halo. Things 
do not have meaning without we entertain them. A raw, 
unexamined world is not a sensible world at all; how 
ever could we know it was there? Bernard, in The Waves 
(Woolf, 1933) complains of the betrayal of what he sees 
as passive impres~ion by narrative 'form : 
Lying in a ditch on a stormy day, when it has been 
raining, then enormous clouds come marching over the 
sky, tattered clouds, wisps of cloud. What delights 
me then is the confusion, the height, the indifference 
and the fury. Great clouds always changing, and move-
ment; something sulphurous and sinister, bowled up, 
helter-skelter; towering, trailing, broken off, lost, 
and I forgotten, minute, in a ditch. Of story, of 
. design, I do not see a trace then. 
(p. 261) 
But the very source of Bernard's passion is his own 
giving of sensuous form to the passions of the skies, 
so that his words can be irradiated by this ragged 
grandeur. It is simply not true that 
When the storm crosses the marsh and sweeps over me 
where I lie in the ditch unregarded I need no words 
(p.323) 
Rather, as he realises elsewhere, he needs some expression 
more in accordance with those moments of humiliation 
and triumph that come now and then undeniably. 
(p. 261) 
Words 'he wants which will theMselves be cries- of passion, 
urgent sounds of impulse close to the heart of movement 
and being: 
I begin to long for some little language such as lovers 
use, broken words, inarticulate words, like the shuf-
fling of feet on the pavement 
(lb.) 
or, 
words of one syllable such as children speak when 
they come into the room and find their mother sew-
ing and pick up some scrap of bright wool, a 
feather, or a shred of chintz ••• 
(p.323) 
and, finally, 
I need a howl; a cry ••• a bark, a groan. 
(p.323; 274) 
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What Bernard fails to realise properly is that all words 
have this sensuous urgency immanently, failing which the 
'phrases laid like Roman roads across the tumult of our 
lives" (p.284) would have no meaning. Words do not only 
point to things and to experiences, but are in themselves 
vital, sensuous experiences. 
The painter C~zanne recorded his gradual realisation that 
one cannot determine to paint, say, an expression of glee 
or of sadness - as Bernard cannot express pain with a 
groan; but that facial expression is in the life of the 
whole configuration of tones and lines: 
If I paint-in all the little blue and brown touches, 
I make him gaze as he does gaze ••• Never mind if 
they suspect how, by bringing together a green of 
various shades and a red, we sadden a mouth or bring 
"a smile to a cheek. 
(Cezanne, in Gasquet, p.117) 
So although Bernard feels that language cannot really 
evoke the thing itself -
What is the phrase for the moon? And the phrase for 
love ? By what name are we to call death? I do not 
know. "" 
(p.323) -
his words have an expressive, sound-sensuous life, and 
they have it by virtue of their independence o~ the thing. 
Such is the life of symbols. 
It is the peculiar gift of the symbol at once to speak 
to phenomenal experience, and to represent that life in 
... 
a manner charged with permanence. Bernard realises this. 
He recalls visiting Susan in her father's home, and 
remarks that part of him which remained just 'outside' 
of the scene. He is moved by Susan's vital grief 
against the weird torpor, the remoteness and decay of 
her surroundings. But beyond, his engagement in the 
close fabric of this sensible present, Bernard watches 
himself refine the meaning of it all: 
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Her father trailed from room to room and down flagged 
corridors in his flapping dressing-gown and worn 
slippers. On still nights a wall of water fell with 
a roar a mile off. The ancient dog could scarcely 
heave himself up on to his chair. And some witless 
servant could be heard laughing at the top of the 
house as she whirred the wheel of the.sewing-machine 
round and round. 
That I observed even in the midst of my anguish when, 
twisting her pocket-handkerchief, Susan cried, 'I 
love; I hate'. 'A worthless servan:t,' I observed, 
'laughs upstairs in the attic,' and that little piece 
of dramatisation shows how incompletely weare merged 
in our own experiences. On the outskirts of every 
agony sits some observant fellow who points ••• to 
that which is beyond and outside our predicament; to 
that which is symbolic, and thus perhaps permanent, 
if there is any permanence in our sleeping, eating, 
breathing so animal, so spiritual and tumultuous 
lives. -
(p.271-2) 
But the achievement of this passage is not Bernard's 
explicit statement about symbols, nor Woolf's visiting 
on him the genius and tentativeness of her own grasp 
on reality; it lies in the formal texture of the art so 
that - like C~zanne's expression - the meaning comes off 
the form sensuously, and the explicit statement only 
draws toi~ther these subtleties. The iambs which open 
the passage quoted, 
Her f~ther triiled from rdom to rdom and ddwn 
measure the even dullness of the house, the corridors 
(do homes have corridors ?) 'flagged' with slabs of' 
stone, but charged, ,too, wi th the oth'er sense-s of 
languor and fading involvement; the 'flapping dressing-
gown' (which pickp up alliteratively from the flags) and 
'worn slippers' (imagine them on the cold stone) 
confirm this drift. 'On still nights' (were there 
ever other ones ?) 
a w'll of w'ter f'll with-
a very different energy, though realised in the same 
metre; but its roar (the 'r' not easy after the repet-
ition of the 'w') is a mile off and here (still iambic) 
The 'ncient d6g could sc'rcely h/ave 
another old body about. And then the odd, arresting 
image of the servant, a Grace Poole figure tied to the 
reasonable rhythm and non-human energy of the sewing-
machine. (And, again, the w-r opposition as she 
whirred the wheel of the sewing machine round and 
round. ) 
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In this con~ext her laughter can only echo through the 
house as it punctures the texture of this passage -
eerily, not quite right, 'witless'; and what a sharp 
word, whose simple sound is that of reproval or contempt. 
In the second of the two paragraphs the energy of 
contrast is d~awn off the present moment, and the pain 
is defused, as it were, by ironic poise. The vigour 
of Susan's anguish and her cry 'I love; I hate' is 
pointed up by the remote laughter; but Bernard's 
attention to what is off-stage creates an emblem 
which allows him and us to cull from present grief a 
meaning beyond it; what is left is reasonable; even 
'witless' has been transmuted to 'worthless', a less 
excitable., and abrasive word. Bernard's observation is 
a note of excuse: 
'Aworthless servant ••• laughs upstairs in the attic 
The 'observant fellow' is our constant attempt ~o wrest 
that special excuse from the tenor of sense. 
What Woolf says is not unique, since she is describing 
some general property of words. Her achievement is to 
put forward her view poetically and implicitly, through 
the formal texture of the word as much as by direct 
statement. And her work is a more humane and hop~ful 
one than Sartre's, for example, who despairs (in 
Nausea) of the hold words have on things; Roquentin 
yields to a final separatene~s, but Woolf-rather more 
hopefully points to the energy released by words when 
they are used; it is the making of effort· to organise 
this energy which creates meaning, and which goes as 
far as we may towards evoking the thing itself. Eliot 
says something similar in Four Quartets: we are prey 
to the 
••• general mess of imprecision of feeling 
Undisciplined squads of emotion 
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but what matters is that we go on to transmute it, 'by 
strength and submission'. So The Waves ends as Bernard 
resolves himself against the inar.ticulate, against chaos 
and the possibility of silence between thought and thing. 
It is the power of art - even of unsatisfactory little 
phrases - to dwell feelingly in these spaces which 
Bernard celebrates heroically. The last to go in a 
restaurant late at night, Bernard gives in to the bleak-
ness of the moment: 
I have done with phrases. 
How much better is silence; the coffee-cup, the 
table. How much better to sit by myself like the 
solitary sea-bird that opens its wings on the stake. 
Let me sit here for ever with bare things 
(p.323) 
But, going out into the first tiny movements of dawn 
itself creates sufficient momentum to thrust him back 
into the ,;J .. ife of things, and his language again takes on 
a sympathy with the event; another dawn begins, 
And in me too the wave rises. It swells; it arches 
its back. I am aware once more of a new desire, some-
thing rising beneath me like the proud horse whose 
rider first spurs and then pulls him back. What 
enemy do we now perceive advancing against us, you 
whom I ride now, as we stand pawing this stretch of 
pavement? It is. death~ Death is the enemy. It is 
dea th against.whom I ride wi th my spear couched and. my 
hair flying back like a young man's, like Percival's 
when he gallop'ed in India. I strike spurs into my 
horse. Against you I will fling myself, un-
vanquished and unyielding, 0 Death! 
(p.325) 
.* 
We have now the technical problem of showing how these 
reflections on art bear on the practice of teaching. 
It is a technical problem because, as the close 
discussion of text has shown, art is a much more elus-
ive and less precise affair than the rough practice of 
education, and education is not normally evaluated in 
such a circulating, discursive and inconclusive manner. 
But this is the precise fault, that the so-called 
masculinisation of education has covered over the 
aesthetic necessity in its concerns with the pragmatic. 
Although we readily acknowledge language as the medium 
of learning and thought, the principles which unite it 
with the processes of art are ignored. 
I offer two records of children talking which impinge 
168 
on the discussion so far. The first example, of group 
discussion, is a superb reminder that rmeaning' is 
itself a fuzzy area between the rfacts r which are hung 
about a work of art and the experience which an audience 
brings to. that work: talking may be one of the ways to 
cross this middle ground. Too busy to attend to them 
properly, I gave a group of six lively ESN(M) fourteen 
year olds Vaughan Williams Fantasia on a Theme by 
Thomas Tallis to listen to, and asked them to record 
their reactions to it. The discussion as a whole was 
not much longer than what is reproduced here, the 
children having little to say and no guidance. Only 
four of them speak: they are David, Colin, Roy'and 
Steve: 
D : I don't myself like it but I can see that its 
good like 
C why's it good if 
R why's it yeh why 
D oh I don't have to like it if it's I mean for 
it's to beg 00 d y' k now it's I don't k now vi 01 ins 
and it's good 
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S he means it~ a sort of music I mean a particular 
and it's not what he likes but it has er qualities 
D don't tell me what I mean 
(general laughter; long pause) 
S music doesn't have to mean anything does it I mean 
like 
C a poem does like a poem does 
S like a poem like a poem like a painting 
C oh it does it's all this is Arabian nights ~t's 
all swirly 
S (Mr) Bradley used to play records at our Juniors 
didn't he and he'd and we'd and he'd say now 
write what you've seen now write what if you felt 
this 'n if you felt that 
The meaning, the value of this exchange is of the same 
order as that of the music they were listening to - it 
is in the playing, the speaking, the event. This is 
why language analysis schedules are finally unsatis-
factory, because they attribute meanings to .the outer 
shape of words (the sounds or the printed letters) and 
know nothing of the sculptor of meaning who is working 
inside those words. Our practice as teachers must 
occupy the space between Steve's insight that music 
doesn't have to mean anything, and Mr Bradley's appar-
ent over-enthusiasm for bringing experience to express-
ion in a rather arbitrary way. 
Being more practical, it remains that. words are most 
of what we can know of other people's thought. As 
teachers committed to some particular content in a 
lesson, there are certain. words and phrases we are 
cued to hear, and certain forms of behaviour we read 
as in~icating learning; we may overlook the process 
by which meaning is ~merging. It might lie, ~sin 
this next example, embedded in desultory chat. Twelve 
year olds Sean and Mick are working through some 
compr~hension q~estions, unaware that they are being 
recorded. It is in fact the recording and transcript 
which show up the value of their talk; the teacher 
was unaware of this and, immediately after this 
exchange, separated and silenced the boys: 
M what's it say then Is-there 
S Is there a reason for Poll's anger? 
M s'obvious obvious what's next Why does Poll 
decide not to go to Lowestoft ? 
S our Eric worked in Lowestoft he worked there 
M Why does Poll not decide to go to Lowestoft too 
far for one thing I mean not enough time 
S : buses Eric went on a bus oh buses yeh 
M : they didn't have buses then or not buses anyway 
it doesn't say he decided it doesn't say he 
decided where is it 
S 
(pause) 
Poll looked at the picture and knew he would not 
go to Lowestoft 
because he had to be up for work for work in the 
morning 
M : right shall I put that 
S : yes no he used that to sort of as a sort of 
excuse himself see to give hi~self an excuse 
M he didn't want to go like but he hid that he 
told himself he hadn't time like 
S : that's good write it 
M : you I wrote last one why's Pill sitting with 
Williams Pill Pill why you sitting with Willy 
Pill: sir put me 
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M : Pilly and Willy right how we going to put this one 
one put-put 
(wri ting) 
Poll didn't so much decide not to go it was 
S : inevitable 
M : inevitable Pill what you put for number 3 no 4 
Pill: Poll decided not to go because it was too late 
M : typical 
S : that's typical 
M Pill-Poll 
Listening to the tape it is easy to see why the teacher 
thought Mick and Sean should be separated: the good-
humoured collaboration on the shaping of an answer 
which would satisfy the text and their understanding 
is evident in the transcription, but sounds far more 
like disruptive noise and time-wasting on the tape 
itself. 
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From these two instances I draw these general con-
clusions about the processes of talk: Meaning in 
language as in other art-forms is not primarily 
intellectual, and in the case of speech is a noisy 
affair. Children respond to symbolic forms with their 
own symbolising acts, and these may well be ragged 
processes if they are really creative. But I am saying 
chiefly that if, indeed, expressive impulses must find 
words, it must be no less true that these chosen symbols 
thus carry with them something of the emotional charge 
which generated them. This is actually a'condition of 
our being able to respond to them at all, since other-
wise they could not touch on our own experience. 
Beneath the phenomenal elegance or ungainliness of 
symbolic expr~ssion lies a way of knowing which has 
the wholeness of the things provided around it. When 
we use symbols we participate in this wholeness to the 
extent that we are ourselves whole. 
There are two general points to be made further. 
Firstly, we should not undervalue the purely sensuous 
portion of symbolic form. Both prose and verse should 
be spoken often and by all. The musical qualities of 
voice cannot be separated from the more reasonable 
communication of sense, but neither should they be 
viewed simply as their vehicles; the phonaesth~tic 
shape of words is as much at the heart of their 
meaning as any referential or logica~ qualit~. 
Secondly, we should .recognise and even encourage 
noise as a possible process of coming to know; again, 
not yet in the farmal sense of ex~loratory talking 
through of ideas, but at the much more primitive 
level of sound-sensuous meaning. Both these riders 
insist on the affective and insubstantial character 
of the symbol, which only lives in experience. And 
they are further consequences of the view of know-
ledge as an embodied and thoroughly human affair. 
They are therefore about the passage of meaning 
between impulse and realised form; implicit in them 
must be a resistance to a too formal examination of 
these meanings, since they are events in experience 
which are poorly sketched by literal reductions. 
ii. 'the crust of shape' 
There is a continual tension between a purely 
cultural world of language and the world of the 
individual whose impulses in their purity know 
nothing of such institutions. Again, 'it is the 
virtue of the. symbol to carry both this regime of 
sense and the labile charge of meaning. The trouble 
with such an opposition is that it leads us to 
believe in the 'reality of a sort of a-linguistic 
individual who dips according to some explicit 
necessity into the separate store which is grammar. 
Rather, the truth of the matter is that institution 
and innovation are not to be , distinguished in 
experience. Our analysis of the word has shown 
that we do not often reach for any legacy of sense 
it may have, but that our act of speaking itself 
originates meaning. The fact remains that language 
precedes us historically, a fact attested to by the, 
possibility, and usefulness, of the dictionary. 
However, a word doei not mean because it refers to 
a historically-giyen sense, but by virtue of its 
context both in syntax and in experience. That 
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occurrence is obviously always a unique event, to be 
set against any notion of f~xed meaning. 
Here, then, are two aspects 6f a process at work. 
One is the conservation of sense, the other the 
creation of meaning. These processes are generated 
by the characters of the symbol remarked in the 
pre~ious section, that it is both permanent and felt. 
What resolves the otherwise separate processes and 
any apparent paradox is the intentional nature of 
the symbol. Symbols 'stand for', they intend or 
embody realities beyond themselves. Words or 
musical figures or painted graphs are forms of a 
greater form which they indicate. The inexhaustib-
ility of reality demands that ever fresh attempts be 
made to say the same thing differently, to present 
and re-present the intentional source. To use any 
symbolic form is to attempt to speak of that larger 
reality not according to some imagined model given 
with a legacy of form, but precisely by transforming 
the symbolic ~tatus quo to the end of a greater 
realism. To state the obvious, art is not a 
celebration of form but a continuous attempt to 
de-form and re-form. Expression gathers up the 
historical sense which has stuck to a symbol and 
presents it anew as an urge to meaning. The life 
which an expression has is not bound to service of 
some sustain~ng content; rather it is the other way 
round, that content is a contemporary if not later 
moment of phenomenal form. 
This is true of the simplest utterance as it is of 
the most self-conscious piece of art-making •. In 
fact, "as in the first section, we ar~ not her_e talking 
of purely linguistic features, but of those aspects of 
experience which found all expression. The principle 
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of art-making we are talking of is this 
Art continually dislocate~ cultural forms 
Such an understanding does not confine art-making to 
the apparent initiator of an art-work, or utterance, 
or other form, but emphasises the indispensable com-
munity in all events of creation. Speaking does not 
have form so much as it gives form to those who hear 
it and whom it speaks to. The critical respon~e, 
therefore, is such a necessary p~rticipant of the work 
of art it addressess as to be itself founded in 
entirely the same urges to meaning - to say the same 
thing differently. Criticism is crucially creative 
or else it is nothing at all and art is merely a 
trick of form if criticism does not return it to the 
universe of discourse in which it began. 
This area of ideas is probably nowhere so approp-
riately expressed as in Eliot's Four Quartets (1944). 
The Quartets are themselves divided into five sections, 
and the last section in each Quartet treats self-
consciously of the experience of art-maki~g, whilst 
clearly making art itself. One of the problems which 
Eliot addresses in the first Quartet, 'Burnt Norton', 
is the adequacy of words to hold meanings still, 
and the verse itself is crafted in a spirit of 
hesitancy and profound innuendo. In a sort of summary 
comment 6~ the verse that has gone before, Eliot states 
the precise problem: 
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Words strain, 1.149 
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden~ 
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, 
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, 
Will not stay still. 
But what remains from a reading of this first Quartet 
does not have sUGh a pithy character; on the contrary, 
like the memory of the rose-garden Eliot has evoked, 
it is hard to say what status it has in time or space, 
or in a world of ideas, but in experience it is surer 
than words. Harding (1974) ~as suggested that Eliot's 
achievement is to forge from the store of-proven 
concepts and emotion a new area of experience which 
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does not describe that experience but which takes its 
place. In exploring the 'possibilities of meaning 
that lurk in the interstices of familiar ideas', Eliot 
creates 'a new concept, with all the assimilation and 
communication of experience that that involves 
(p.108-9). This, says Harding, is perhaps 'the greatest 
of linguistic achievements' (ib.). 
In section V of 'East Coker', the second Quartet, Eliot 
humbly confronts the problem : words provide a legacy 
of form which will describe what already exists, but 
how shall we. go beyond that to a newer form, a better? 
Form binds 'us, as it is bound itself to the parsimony 
of the known, and it is only a terrible effort which 
can detach sense anew from such a s~atus quo, and 
against the drift of emotional habit. But even then, 
that 'new' sense is no proper innovation; it is matter 
recalled and recast, only 'knowable' because it is 
som ehow 'known I • 'So here I am,' Eliot says, 
Trying to learn to use words, and every attempt(1.172) 
Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure 
Because one has only learnt to get the better of words 
For the thing one no longer has to say, or the way in 
which 
One is no longer disposed to say it. And so each 
venture 
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate 
With shabby equipment always deteriorating 
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling, . 
Undisciplined squads of emotion. And what there is 
to conquer 
By. strength and submission, has already been discovered 
Once or twice, or several times, by men whom one 
cannot hope 
To emulate - but there is no competition -
" There is no competition; what is important and vital is 
the perpetual struggle with form, and not for some 
transcendental product : 
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There is only the fight to recover what has been lost 
And found and lost again and again ~and now, under 
conditions 
That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor 
loss. 
For us there is only the trying. The rest is not our 
business. 
The idea is developed in V.of 'The Dry Salvages' against 
the 'usual. pastimes and drugs' of 'men's curiosity (which) 
searches past and future/And clings to that dimension'. 
Men's occupation with phenomenal form creates false and 
empty arts. At the other extreme, the saint seeks 
to apprehend 
The point of intersection of the timeless 
With time ••• 
1.200 
In the human, temporal middle, things as they are are 
revealed only fitfully and dimly, in sensation so subtle 
as to cease to be that, by a communion that undoes any 
notion:of interposing form 
For most of us, there is only the unattended 1.206 
Moment, the moment in and out of time, 
The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight, 
The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightning . 
Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply 
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music 
While' the music lasts. 
·What matters, what reveals things is the effort of 
attentive ·vision and continual revision: 
For most of us, this is the aim 
Never here to be realised; 
Who are only undefeated 
Because we have gone on trying; 
We, content at the last 
If our temporal reversion nourish 
(N.ot too far from the yew-tree) 
The life of significant soil. 
1.226 
In 'Little Gidd~rg', the last Quartet, Eliot insists 
that words cannot create more than a pause in the relent-
.... . .. 
less search for form, however carefully we may craft 
them: 'Every phrase and every sentence is an end and a 
beginning In 'The Dry Salvages' he has reminded 
us that so often 
We had the experience but missed the meaning, 1.93 
And approach to the meaning restores the experience 
In a different form ••• 
So now the task is to say and say again, and then again, 
ever urging new meanings from familiar experience, ever 
creating new experience from familiar meanings. And 
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We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
L.G.l.239 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
The poem demonstrates how integral is experience. For 
Eliot style is clearly an ethical and personally urgent 
question, and one detaches separate moral or aesthetic 
functions at the cost of the coherence of the whole. 
So to call his tone or purpose 'religious' in any ex-
clusiveway-as he himself attempted - iS,at the same 
time to miss its artistic achievement. This achieve-
ment is a fusion of feeling and idea, art and morality 
in a poetic event which, by taking the place of rather 
than merely pointing to its bare referents creates 
reality anew. If things were revealed by report, we 
should have the merely technical problem of finding the 
right lang~age; but, the poem demonstrates, things are 
rather constituted by our evocation of them, and that 
is a moral task. (It is of course for this same reason 
that th~' foregoing is a most unsatisfactory evocation 
of Eliot's work; its truth, can only lie in a proper 
engagement with the issues and values which motivate it, 
and this calls for a sustained critical immersion.)' 
Similar ideas inspire a poem like Wallace Stevens l IThe-
Man with the Blu~ Guitar', (1953) at first sight a curious 
inversion of Eliotic values, and yet in so many stylistic 
(and"therefore"moral) ways the modern peer of a poem like 
'The Waste Landi. The poem opens concretely, then a 
quasi-allegorical form sets up the discussion : art 
does not simply describe the known, but takes hold of 
what we know and so fashionB it that we come to know 
it differently. 
The man bent over his guitar, 
A shearsman of sorts. The day was green. 
They said, 'You have a blue guitar, 
You do not play things as they are. ' 
The man replied, 'Things as they are 
Are changed upon the blue guitar.' 
And they said then, 'But play, you must, 
A tune beyond us, yet ourselves, 
A tune upon the blue guitar 
Of things exactly as they are. ' 
In another poem elsewhere, 'Changes', Stevens shows how 
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it is in fact we who are changed by art, or rather revealed 
by it: 
The freshness of transformation is 
The freshness of a world. It is our own 
It is ourselves, the freshness of ourselves, 
And that necessity and that presentation 
Are rubbings of a glass in which we peer. 
So morning, for example, 
is not sun, 
It is this posture of the nerves 
Stevens conclusion to 'The Man with the Blue Guitar' 
speaks for itself; it could - in a way - have been taken 
from an Eliot notebook: 
Throwaway the lights, the definitions, 
And say of what you see in the dark 
That"it is this or that it is that 
But do not use the rotted names. 
How should you walk in that space and know 
Nothing of the madness of space, 
Nothing of its jocular procreations? 
Throw the lights away. Nothing must stand 
B~tween you and the shapes you "take 
When the crust of shape has been destroyed. 
You as you are? You are yourself. 
The blue guitar surprises you. 
(Stevens, 1953) 
Changing the 'crust of shape' is effortlessly the 
speaker's condition as much as it is the artist's 
deliberate project. As Butor has said of the novel, 
'formal invention ••• is the sine qua non of a 
greater realism'; speech, similarly, is not a technical 
representation of a prior way of seeing things, but the 
radical innovation of things, and a call for that way 
of seeing. 'Technical' problems are always solved in 
that act of seeing. 
I have argued that language operates between the· 
conservation of sense, and the innovation of meaning. 
We can add to this such equally bonded antinomies as 
knowledge and kr.owing, form and impulse, etc., and 
point to the mutually-sustaining relation~hip between 
institution and innovation. Now, all else being equal, 
the system will work. But school is manifestly an 
unequal place where the pole of communicative, conserv-
ative sense is elevated and the virtual processes of 
knowing depressed. This is not a political statement, 
but one of neutral, empirical simplicity. The drive of 
our education is towards externalising consciousness, 
towards a disembodied knowledge and a rationality 
independent of the child. Children are brought to 
exemplars of knowledge which they must internalise, and 
their own contributions are seldom really required. In 
the science subjects, they are often made to feel that 
their ideas are worthless or at least irrelevant before 
the grand truths of established scientists. In arts 
teaching the situation is generally believed to be 
better; arts teachers asked to identify their aims.will 
norm&lly talk of the development of.individualism and 
self-expression. But the ideal outruns the practice ; 
teachers of English, for example, themselves graduates 
. n 
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within a particular form, still seek and reward perfected 
realisations of that form. They come to praise 'critic 
/ 
talk' - as distinct from the concern implicit in true 
criticism - where a personal and feeling response is 
seen as badly-expressed, or not objectified or gauche. 
And although apparently inviting of the felt response, 
it is in fact often the objectified and sterilised 
version they really require. Witkin (1974) character-
ised the teacher who directs the pupils responses into 
'an objective framework that defuses them'. He found 
no evidence in his limited enquiry that the English 
teacher is 'particularly keen to handle the 'live wire" 
of emotion in his lesson. But if we insist on highly 
stylised language, or if we tactlessly inhibit felt 
responses which are not yet expressed according to the 
models we have come to see as exemplary, we shall 
overlook the value of language which may be on the 
point of teasing out and enhancing unders~anding. 
Allowing and encouraging children to speak obviously 
fosters communication skills; but it further requires 
them to give a personal account of themselves which 
they may not ordinarily be called upon·to do; it 
requires them; that is, to express what they know and 
what they are coming to know, to give form, and not 
merely to echo it. 
The following is perhaps an extreme example of a less 
than judicious imposition of realised form on an 
expressive voice, but examples are easily come by in 
the classroom. Julia, a thirteen year old West Indian 
is telling a second-year Remedial class about an 
experience - her first - in the snow, after the teacher 
has very vividly given an exposition on the theme of 
excitement: 
J": we was sliding er sliding right fast and going 
like anything and so and so fast that .we was 
falling off and went like anything at the bottom 
we just 'laughed and laughed 
T how would you describe your feelings I mean at 
the bottom 
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(silence) 
T : would you say you were exhilarated for example 
(silence) 
mmm (?) 
J : yes 
On the tape-recording of this exchange can be heard how 
Julia's final yes marks the abortion of her enthusiam. 
It has been suggested that teachers directly control 
the sort and quality of knowing. One obvious way in 
which they do this is by having a virtual monopoly on 
the asking of key questions. Children certainly ask 
questions, but these are most often of a clerical 
nature ("Which page .•• ?"; "Where is ••• ?) or about 
vocabulary. Most of the time they are not required 
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to pose searching questions which call for reflection; 
these questions are part of the way in which the teacher 
can direct the enquiry to his idea of its ends. In the 
following transcription, a group quoted in Chapter 5 is 
looking at another Sylvia Plath poem, but this time it is 
introduced by" the teacher. She has a very clear idea of 
wha t she wants to eli ci t from the poem and from the studen ts 
and her questions are directed efficiently towards filling 
in this pre-conceived picture of hers : 
T : why does she call it The Moon and the Yew Tree 
what's what's the significance for her what do 
you know about yew trees what do you know about 
Sylvia Plath and her erm identity with the moon 
PI: there's some yew tree near her house isn't there 
T : that's right I think it's the house in Devori isn't 
it which borders onto the graveyard and ••• well 
what do you know about yew trees d'you know,any-
thing about them . 
P2: associated with death aren't they 
T : yeh a-apparently they're usually planted in 
graveyards and you do yes usually associate thea-
not necessarily with death I think but certainly 
with sorrow what about the idea of the moon what's 
the moon ~n this poem how does she see the moon 
(pause) .-
PI: she says its her mother 
T : its her mother right yeh that's an important 
thing I think to fo~~s on ••• erm right shall 
we start from the beginning 
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In the event this was good teaching. But there is a 
sense in which the actual putting of questions can be as 
important as the finding of answers. Most simply this 
is because putting questions requires seeing and framing 
problems. Merely answering someone else's question may 
amount to mechanical slot-filling, where the necessity 
of those answers is not seen'as a function of an import-
ant question, but rather as a requirement of a;,~,task 
externally-imposed. Asking children to spot the areas 
of difficulty - the areas of their difficulty, moreover -
and to frame their own questions is asking them to ~hare 
in the location of problems. Still with Sylvia Plath and 
the 6th form, the following transcription - quoted in 
Chapter 5 -, shows a group working to interpret r Berck-
Plage l • Left by themselves with a tape-recorder, they 
appear to ask questions commensurate with their needs 
and the pace of the discussion rather than with the 
critical and strategic considerations of a teacher. 
Questions occurring like this are experienced as genuine 
enquiries rather than challenges, and they prompt the 
sharing of ideas rather than the closing down on one 
definitive response. The particular lines they are 
looking at are 
the mackerel gatherers 
Who wall up their backs against him. 
They are handling the black and green lozenges like 
the parts of a body~ 
Vi clcy asks : : 
3/46/V 
3/47/J 
why are t'mackerel gatherers walling up 
their backs against him 
we think that well I think anyway that. 
mackerel gatherers fishermen they just turn 
the i r b a c k s to .t he s e p eo pie the y don't wan t 
to" have nothing to do with them y' know they 
3/48/V 
3/49/8 
3/50/J 
3/51/8 
3/52/J 
3/53/V 
3/54/J 
3/55/8 
3/56/J 
just turn away from them 
n that about lozenges 
well they're t'fish 
they're t'fish 
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They are handling the bl~ck and green lozenges 
like the parts of a body 
and if you notice though lozenges comes into it 
a lot and er throughout poem 
and she describes coffin 
yeh and I think it's some reference to t'drugs 
and pills 
medication 
medication they're on all t'way through 
There are several reasons why such a casual but fruitful 
exchange is unlikely to have taken place with the teacher 
present. Obviously the pupils view the teacher as an 
expert and one whose questions are somewhat artificial 
in that she knows the answers to them; again, there is 
an assumption that there is only one answer. A distinct-
ion is often made between 'closed' questions, which 
require just one specific response, and 'open' questions 
which invite individual reflection and expect a varied 
response. The closed question has the authority of the 
teacher, most often; had a teacher put Vicky's question, 
the response would have been very different. As it is, 
it is the same question which might have the same 'answer', 
but it serves here to prompt a more open consideration . 
.. 
My general argument - that we must make more opportunities 
for pupils to give form - is a pedagogic one based on this 
expressive character of speaking: realised, concrete, 
authoritative form has no meaning unless it is firstly 
de-formed and then re-formed; teacher-sponsored form 
is almost worthless if it does not p'ass through the 
critically-deforming and richly re-creative experience 
of the child. The engagement with the intentional centre 
of the text - ~hich is given with the best of literary 
exploration - must stand as the model of all learning. 
/ 
That same model gives the lie to such exercises as 
formal comprehension which, because they do not call 
for essential involvement with the intentional object 
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of. the study, yield little of value beyond formal 
training. In the _particular case of speaking this model 
calls for special redress against the depressing effect 
of institution on expression,' and for increased oppor-
tunity for individual voices to find their form. 
Two methodological principles suggest themselves. 
The fi~st recommends a willingness to negotiate meaning, 
and again the example of textual exploration serves as 
the model; ideas, like words, have variable meanings 
according to their context and to our perspective. When 
/" we wrestle with the sense of a poem we try its values 
against our own until we have an understanding which 
relates both to the 'objective' ideas of the poem and 
to the 'subjective' truth of our experience. The group 
discussion represents this process made public; meanings 
are arrived at by sharing. 
The second principle is that we should be prepared to 
spend as much time on pupils~ ideas as on those we are 
trying to teach, because their experience is the only 
passage by which this material can be realised. 
These are not novel points, but it is hoped that the 
manner of their argument represents them with their 
crucially existential justification. 
iii. 'hallowing an interval' 
'Black rook in rainy weather' 
On the stiff twig up there 
Hunches a wet black rook -
Arranging and rearranging its feathers in the rain 
I do not expect miracles 
Or an accident 
To set the sight on fire 
In my eye, nor seek 
Any more in the desultory weather some design, 
But let spotted leaves fall as they fall, 
Without ceremony, or portent. 
Although, I admit, I desire, 
Occasionally, some backtalk 
From the mute sky, I can't honestly complain: 
/ A certain minor light may still 
Leap incandescent 
Out of kitchen table or chair 
As if a celestial burning took 
Possession of the most obtuse objects now and then -
Thus hallowing an interval 
Otherwise inconsequent 
By bestowing largesse, honour, 
One might say love. At any rate, I now walk 
Wary (for it could happen 
Even in this dull, ruinous landscape); sceptical 
Yet politic; ignorant 
Of whatever angel may choose to flare 
Suddenly at my elbow. I only know that a rook 
Ordering its black feathers can so shine 
As to seize my sense, haul 
My eyelids up, and grant 
A brief respite from fear 
Of total neutrality. With luck 
. Trekking stubborn through this season 
Of fatigue, I shall 
Patch together a content 
OT sorts. Miracles occur, 
If you care to call those spasmodic 
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Tricks of radiance miracles. The wait's begun again, 
The long wait for the angel, 
For that rar~, random descent. 
('Sylvia Plith, from Ariel, 1965) 
~~--- - ------ - --------~----.---------
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I like this poem chiefly for the way it creates -
from a ragbag of fairly ordinary language. devices -
an effect of radiance as ephemeral as the rook itself. 
In the poem, as in the landscape, the concrete presides; 
the weather is 'desultory', the sky 'mute', the country 
'dull and ruinous', and the poet's feet of clay are 
'Trekking stubborn through (a) season/Of fatigue'; weary 
but ironic conversational tags - II can't honestly com-
plain', 'At any rate', 'If you care to call' - append 
any more brilliant suggestion, and the first intimation 
of relief -
A certain minor light may still 
Leap incandescent 
is dissipated in the bathetic 
Out of kitchen table or chair. 
The mood of resignation is both laconic -
But let spotted leaves fall as they fall 
and faintly insouciant, 
I desire, 
Occasionally, some backtalk 
From the mute sky 
Even the energ~ which delivers the poet from her 'fear/ 
Of total neutrality' has something of the brute character 
of the landscape, for indeed she is so an-aesthetised 
that her sense must be seized, her eyelids hauled; but 
it is a .. 'celestial burning' which makes, 'Suddenly at 
my elbow', an angel of a wet black rook. 
What Plath mostly fears is the dull tract of experience 
between rook and angel, the 'total neutrality' of pass-
ively attending. Indeed, the poem returns to 'The long 
wait', and in that· torpor even the reality of the 
epiphany fades so that she doubts whether such 'miracles' 
are more than 'spasmodic/Tricks of radiance'. The final 
touch of a rather cynical despair is marked by 'random', 
/ 
which limits the sense of 'rare': 
The wait's begun again, 
The long wait for the angel, 
For that rare, random descent. 
There is a shred of hope in the waiting. 
Another such return, but from a far more auspicious 
bird, comes to mind. In the penultimate stanza of 'Ode 
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to a Nightingale', Keats addresses the creature whose song 
is heard 'in faery lands forlorn', and straightway the 
final stanza opens: 
Forlorn the very word is like a bell 
To toll me back from thee to my sole self 
Plath's poem is in many ways the modern analogue of Keats' 
apostrophe, if we accept in each case the brief fusion of 
a 'sole self' with a critically particular moment of 
nature. The texture of Plath's poem suggests that the 
colloquial dross of the general, of general sensibility 
keeps us from dwelling in the object itself; .in Keats' 
poem it is something more like intellection which holds 
. off from things as they are. 'thou among the leaves hast 
never known' the cares of human life on earth 'Where but 
to think is to be full of sorrow'. Keats almost dissolves 
consciousness altogether: 
Away ! Away ! for I will fly to thee, 
Not charioted by Bacchus and his pards 
But on the viewless wings of poesy, 
Though the d~ll brain perplexes and retards: 
But he rejects this possibility of retreat; for although 
the stanza which follows appears to be a celebration of the 
the lovely and the sensuous, its effect is crafted from 
mortal intelligence of names and seasons, of habitat and 
other botanical ge~erality: 
I cannot see what flowers are at my feet, -
Nor what sQ.ft incense hangs upon the boughs, 
But,. in embalmed darkness, guess each sweet 
" Wherewi th" the seasonable month endows 
The grass, the thicket, and the fruit-tree wild; 
White hawthorn, and the pastoral eglantine; 
Fast fading violets covered up in leaves; 
And mid-May's eldest child, 
The coming musk-rose, full of dewy wine, 
The murmurous haunt of flies on summer eves. 
Even the imagination, Keats seems to be saying, is com-
pounded in structures. And, we remember, he is only 
'half in love' with. Death, the other half bound to 
intelligence. 
If, as I suppose, Plath feels she must 'Patch together 
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a content/Of sorts' from colloq'uial experience, Keats' is 
the radically optimistic demonstration of how the 
'viewless wings of poesy' may carry us to the heart of the. 
sensuous particular. Of course, he cannot remain in 
such a 
melodious plot 
Of beechen green, and shadows numberless 
for to do so would require him, to the Nightingale's 
requiem, 'become a sod'. He returns, enriched no doubt, 
to the isolation of his 'sole self'; but the final 
purport of Plath's poem is measured by her own. despairing 
death. 
The poems are chosen here because they demonstrate the 
c?-pa.city-nf art to illuminate the particulars of exper-
ience, and so to reveal not an abstract but a very 
particular and sensual world. These poems create an 
experience, in Eliot's phrase, 'in and out of time'; 
they are attempts to recall some particularly intense 
moment by fixing it in the structure of verse. Most 
importantly, the poems are living records of the poet's 
gli~psing, in one moment, the character of something in 
the phenomenal world and the nature of his self caught 
in its fascination. It is not simply that some thing 
is revealed, but that I so constitute the thing that I 
become aware qf how my presence is itself constituted in 
the focus of that thing. This is the experience of the 
artist, but the experience of the audience is precisely 
1&9 
contiguous: the poem means something to me to the extent 
that it gives shape to myexp eri ence, revealing in the 
same moment some new potential to my experience and 
some new life to the text. 
These examples are of course artistic distillations of 
the heightened awareness of the particularity of things. 
The next example is no less an artefact, but it helps 
illuminate the event, or more precisely the dynamics 
of the moment of enhanced consciousness. It reveals 
to us, I believe, the bearing of such a moment on 
thought generally, and therefore on the whole character 
of expression; thus I shall eventually suggest the 
contiguity of such moments with the genesis of speech. 
The final book of To The Lighthouse (Woolf, 1964) is' 
called 'The Lighthouse', and it resolves two of the 
novel's purposes simultaneously. Mr Ramsay pays an 
overdue obeisance to the spirit of a dead wife as he 
sets foot on the little island where the lighthouse 
stands - a project which opened the drama many years 
previously. And, as he sets foot, Lily Briscoe puts 
the finishing touch to her painting - also conceived 
years before - and the novel ends. In these acts Mr 
Ramsay dissipates (or expiates) a career of bleak and 
dogged rationalism, 
For if thought is like the keyboard of a piano, 
divided into so many notes, or like the alphabet 
is ranged in twenty-six letters all in order, then 
his splendid mind had no sort of difficulty in 
running over those letters one by one, firmly and 
accurately. 
(p. 40) 
whilst the slight Lily, who 
faded ••• became more inconspicuous than ever in 
her little grey dress with her little puckered 
face and her little Chinese eyes 
(p.120) 
closes the book in a t~iumphof decisive clarity and 
vision. For RamsayJs life is deemed 
the refuge of a man afraid to own his own feelings,' 
(p. 53) 
whilst Lily proves - what Mrs Ramsay discerns -
a thread of something; a flare of som~thing; some-
thing of her own ••• 
(p.120) 
and it is her achievement which gilds that of the novel. 
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The structure of the work anticipates this end. In the 
first book, 'The Window', life is held together by the 
presence of Mrs Ramsay, large with the power of her love. 
In an in terregnum, 'Time Pass es', thi s coherence dies 
with her, and the house - deserted in time of war -
is managed by the heavy hand of a dUll-witted house-
keeper posted ironically against the charges of decay; 
Only 'the Lighthouse beam entered the rooms for a 
moment, sent its sudden stare over bed and wall in 
the darkness of winter, looked with equanimity at 
the thistle and the swallow, the rat and the straw. 
Nothing now withstood them; nothing said no to them. 
Let the wind blow; let the poppy seed itself and the 
carnation mate with the cabbage ••• 
(p.157) 
When those who have survived the war reassemble in 'The 
Lighthouse', Mr Ramsay's spirit of rigour and austerity 
has perished with his wife, two of his children, and with 
the long rows of books, black as ravens once, 
now white stained, breeding pale mushrooms and 
secreting furtive spiders. 
(p.159) 
What remains to him is more a spirit of dessication. The 
balance of sympathy presumes against him, and though he 
takes up the project to visit the lighthouse, it is more 
a perverse achievement than the gift to his children 
which was intended. 
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Lily, too, takes up the project which had occupied her 
in her minor role during the first part of the book. 
But now Woolf's design becomes clearer, .and the pre-
occupations of the whole sc~eme - the perspectival, 
insubstantial character of reality, the hopeless 
partiality of representation, the need to comprehend -
these are not resolved but substantially cast as Lily 
resolves her canvas. The act is not grand like Bernard's 
affirmation at the end of The Waves; it is more mature 
and submissive and oddly realistic than this, for in 
her act Lily gives shape to a moment in experience, 
fully aware that it is no insurance against chaos. 
Lily's act creates the moment it describes; it does 
not articulate some experience which existed before it, 
but thematises the very moment, and like that moment 
cannot endure. Woolf's point is made by the simple, 
quick line with which Lily completes her picture; 
meaning happens here, and now, in an impulse which 
makes of the variety of possibility an intentional 
object. 
From the start, Lily's problem has been that of all 
artists, of crafting an exalted new from- a base 
familiar, 'Things as they are but changed'. Like 
Plath in the 'Rook' poem, she wants 
to be on a level with ordinary experience, to feel 
simply that's a chair, that's a table, and yet at 
the same time, ItJs a. miracle, it's an ecstasy. 
(p.229) 
But her error in Book 1 is to see her problem as a 
technical one, as it were of translation; she 'is as 
bound to a formal notion of painting as Mr Ramsay is 
held-'lifelessly in the logical structures of his thought: 
It was a question, she remembered, how to connect 
this mass on the right hand with that on the left. 
She might do ~t by bringing the line of the branch 
across so; or break the vacancy in the foreground 
?y an o?jec~ ••• 
(p.62) 
When she attempts the composition again in the third 
book, she is vaguely aware-that something more than 
her formal arrangement is wrong; 
The disproportion there seemed to upset some harmony 
in her own mind. She felt an obscure distress. It 
was confirmed when she turned to her picture. She 
. had been wasting her morning. For whatever reason 
she could not achieve that razor edge of balance 
between two opposite forces; Mr Ramsay and the pic-
ture; which was necessary. There was something 
perhaps wrong with the design? Was it, she wondered 
that the line of the wall wanted breaking, was it 
that the mass of the trees was too heavy? 
(p.219) 
Here she pauses, 
She smiled ironically; for had she not thought, when 
she began, that she had solved her problem? 
(ib.) 
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She comes to some inexplicit realisation that where 
technique occurs as the moment of translation of a ready-
made vision, what emerges has merely the life of technique. 
Her work is flawed because she excludes from her competent 
management of neutral spaces the very particular intent-
ional objects which mere attention to technique general-
ises. 
What was the problem then? She must try to get hold 
of some thing that evaded her. It evaded her when 
she thought of Mrs Ramsay; it evaded her now when she 
thought of her picture. Phrases came. Visions came. 
Beautiful phrases. Beautiful pictures. But what she 
wished to get hold of was that very jar on the nerves, 
the thing itself before it has been made anything. 
(ib.) 
So ~hen Lily completes her picture, it is a moment of 
direct engagement with her objects. The resolutiori of 
the picture is no longer simply an 'artistic' task, but 
the outcome of commitment to objects. which arrives with 
the intuition of the whole. intentional world which Lily' 
-inhabits. The moment of articulation is the moment of 
meaning for Lily~ this is implicit in her recognition 
that··her pai~ting will not endure. But, then, neither 
did the ideas of Ramsay, nor the schemes of Mrs Ramsay; 
what Lily achieves over these is a single moment of 
reflexive clarity, herself revealed in the meaning of· 
things: 
Quickly, as if she were recalled by something over 
there, she turned to her canvas. There it was -
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her picture. Yes, with all its green and blues, its 
lines running up and across, its attempt at something. 
It would be hung in the attics, she thought; it would 
be destroyed. But what did that matter? she asked 
herself, taking up her brush again. She looked at 
the steps; they were empty; she looked at her canvas; 
it was blurred. With a sudden intensity, as if she 
saw it clear for a second, she drew a line there, in 
the centre. It was done; it was finished. Yes, she 
thought, laying down her brush in extreme fatigue, I 
have had my vision. 
(p.237) 
In the first section of this chapter I emphasised the 
principle that art is concerned to give a symbolic form 
to the sensi.ble world; in the second section, this was 
extended to show how art seeks to re-make our perceptions 
of that world~ Both these qualities of art-making are 
instanced in the pass~ge we have been considering. What 
I wish to add to them is a third observation, namely that 
Moments of art reveal us to ourselves quite as much 
as they reveal things to us. 
By a 'm~ment of art' I certainly mean the moment of the 
artist's vision, and the moment of the viewer's or the 
reader's intuition of that. But such acts are the 
explicated form of a way of attending which is fundamental 
to consciousness, and which the practise of art maximises. 
The moment of art, then, is that unusual occasion of 
understanding when, in seeing to the heart of something, 
self-consciousness is somehow enlarged. Thus the idea 
that .. the artis~ must give form to the sensible world is 
extended so that we see how his coming to know this world 
by a particular name or shape or gesture must also be a 
coming to know himself in that act. Artists have 
frequently reported this experience of joint epiphany, 
but it is familiar to anyone who .finds himself looking 
for just the right word, or for some other formal 
expression. It is not that he seeks, in fully reflex-
ive consciousness for the superficial dressing of a 
predicating thought: the absence of that expression 
betokens the absence of an intentional object dis-
covered only on condition of self-discovery, which is 
to say, only when thought becomes continuous with its 
objects. Merleau-Ponty has written: 
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The whole life of consciousness is characterised by 
the tendency to posit objects, since it is conscious-
ness, that is to say self-knowledge only in so far as 
it takes hold of itself and draws itself together in 
an identifiable object. 
( 1962, p. 71) 
For the world is no more 'out there' than it is 'in 
here', and is not to be opposed to the "I". When we 
speak, when we use this "I", it is the presence of the 
'here and now', and its realisation in syntax which 
precisely marks the movement of this being-for-oneself 
into a being-for-others. 
This is true for all speech, though we can differentiate 
qualitatively between acts of speech in quite the same 
way that we elevate consciously-achieved art-products 
over the manner of aethetic attending which characterises 
.. 
all acts of consciousness. Much of daily speech is an 
effortless ( and apparently thoughtless) sort of'main-
tenance work which seems to exist just to keep things 
going rather than to innovate thought; the extreme form 
of this is clich~, sedimentations of thought which are 
substitutions for ~hinking. By contrast, those acts a~e 
thoughtful which, by the above account, are continuous 
with·their objects. 
Such acts are hard to describe empirically, because they 
lie somewhere between the Greek conception of rhetoric -
as the operation of truth on the soul - and phenomena 
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like hesitation and repetition which suggest some 
energy and earnestness. In discourse we do not attend 
to words as such, but to what they point to, and if, as 
sometimes happens, this very direction itself is what is 
struggled for, then undoubtedly we are seeing someone 
create himself in the creation of his objects. Speech 
which locates those objects for us - however inelegantly -
is speech which in a real sense brings to life a subject. 
Again, an example from art illustrates this. At the end 
of Roots (Wesker, 1964), Beatie becomes, as the author 
says in the stage-direction, 'articulate at last -' • 
This fluency is clearly not a stylistic elegance, but is 
a whole~essand clarity of being which excites the 
language as Beatie experiences for the first time the 
reality, the presence of previously static ideas. This 
is what is revealed to her, and what her words therefore 
point to for us. 
Confronted by her family, Beatie at first tries to 
justify the revolutionary ideas she claims to share with 
her absent lover (And you know what Ronnie say sometimes?). 
But Ronnie has written to end the relationship, and it is 
only as Beatie explores the ideas for her family that she 
discovers them for herself: 
Beatie: Do you think we really count? You don' wanna 
take any notice of what them ole papers say about the 
workers bein' all important these days - that's all 
squit! 'Cos we aren't. Do you think when the really 
talented people in the country get to work they get to 
work for us? Hell if they do! Do you think they 
don't know we 'ont make the effort? The writers don't 
write thinkin' we can understand, nor the~peinters 
don't paint expecting us to be interested - that they 
don't, nor don't the composers give out music thinking 
w~ can appreciate it. 'Blust', they say, 'the masses 
is too stupid for us to come down to them. Blust,' 
they say, 'if they don't make no effort why should w~ 
bother?' So you know who come along? The slop 
singers and t,he pop writers and the film makers and 
women's magazines and the Sunday papers and the picture 
strip love-stories - that's who come along, and you 
don't have to make no effort for them, it come 
easy. 'We know where the money lie, ' they say, 
'hell we do! The workers've got it so 'let's give 
them what they want. If they want slop songs and 
film idols we'll give 'em that then. If they want 
words of one syllable, we'll give 'em that then. If 
they want the third-rate, blust! We'll give 'em 
that then. Anything's good enough for them 'cos they 
don't ask for no more!' The whole stinkin' commer-
cial world insults us and we don't care a damn. Well, 
Ronnie's'right - it's our own bloody fault. We want 
the third-rate - we got it ! We got it ! We ••• 
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(Suddenly Beatie stops as if listening to herself. 
,She pauses, turns with an ecstatic smile on her face -) 
D ' you he art hat ? D' you he a r it? Did you 1 i s·t en to 
me ? J'm talking. Jenny, Frankie, Mother - I'm not 
quoting no more. 
Mrs Bryant (getting up to sit at table) : Dh hell, I hed 
enough of her - let her talk a while she'll soon get 
fed up. 
(The others join her at the table and proceed to eat 
and murmur.) 
Beatie : Listen to me someone. (As though a vision were 
revealed to her) God in heaven, Ronnie! It does work, 
it's happening to me, I can feel it's happened, I'm 
beginning, on my own two feet - I'm beginning ••• 
(The murmur of the family sitting down to eat grows 
as Beaties!s last cry is heard. Whatever she will do 
'they will cbnt~nue to live as before. As Beatie stands 
alone, articulate at last -) 
THE CURTAIN FALLS 
Of course this is a theatrical exaggeration. Much nearer 
home, the example of Kevin's discovery of the text (Ch.5) 
goes some way to illustrating the point that speaking has 
. -
this heuri~tic value. Another example is a later moment 
in one of the group discussions of 'Berck-Plage' c~ted in 
Chapter 5; Vicky suddenly interrupts 
I .- jus twa n n a say so met h i n g I I don't k now i fan y bod y , s 
noticed probably eveybody has noticed and it's just _ 
that I'm thick but I think I've noticed particularly 
that each section gets deeper and deeper ~nto't sort 
of- death scene, it goes deeper and deeper starts off 
as a scene setter it goes deeper and deeper towards 
hospital it .does oh it does 
/ 
It is not necessary to duplicate such examples; their 
shape is familiar to all ieachers, and.·the point, too, 
has become a familiar one: more speaking can mean 
greater thought, if the circumstances require the sort 
of speech which is thoughtful. But although Barnes 
(1976) in particuiar has done much to qommend talk as 
a vital tool of teaching and learning, the full meaning 
of such events seems either to be misunderstood or 
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else taken for granted. Once again, the expressive 
character of language conflicts with the conservative, 
insti tution~l nature of Knowledge, and of the secondary 
school. Tn primary schools it is axiomatic that 
children must talk to develop their thinking, their 
'social skills', their general language abilities; even, 
it might be admitted, their p.ersona1i ties.' But the 
language of the secondary school is a different matter; 
it rapidly becomes an instrument, and its existential 
or exploratory character is suppressed. Britton has 
written 
Education consists in coming to live in the intell-
ectual products of other people and so becoming 
persons who experience life in the general terms of 
tha t cuI ture. 
(1979 ) 
If this is so then education runs contrary to the drive 
of language; all the evidence of our analysis shows that, 
on the contrary, life (and its abstraction, culture) is 
constructed in the highly-.particu1ar, object-sensible 
and originating acts of individual experience. But for 
schools to promote such a view might well be - as Chekhov 
remarked of the community which sponsors the'artist -
like a farmer breeding rats in his granary. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to elaborate ideas put 
forward earlier in the thesis - that the world of 
experience is minimised, sometimes spurned, both in 
the formal study of language and in the practice of 
English teaching. In objecting to this neglect, my 
basic point is simple: that speaking and art-making 
share a quality which is imperfectly described, indeed 
is distorted by focus on either the words (works of art) 
or the speaker (the art-maker). Such separation, such 
reduction pre-cludes any real appreciation of meaning; 
the event of the creation of meaning cannot be analysed, 
pulled apart or measured. Instead I have explored the 
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/ relationship between speaking and art-making by outlining 
three principles which underlie the integrity of the 
event of.meaning. 
These truths are implicit in the best of classroom 
practice, but for this subtlety are easily and often 
supplanted by. more realisable, more assessable concerns 
with evident product. They are implicit, and more 
explicit, in primary school method, where it is gener-
ally true that education addresses a more whole, less 
functional concept of the child. The task, then, is to 
make them explicit in a way which is practically useful 
but which does not simply make of them yet more intrum-
ents. "Too much attention is paid to the mechanics of 
how and what we should teach, as though the prime 
question of why were answered by these inventories. 
We should state categorically that questions ·of method, 
of curriculum, which do not seek, in some measure; to 
ans~er philosophical problems are simply not important. 
Of course this is to take a particular view of philo-
sophy as concer~nd with wholeness of being as with the 
nature of things, with epistemology as with ethics, with 
biology no less than with psychology. Questions of 
method which do not arise from radical reflection 
and from radical astonishment are unlikely to promote 
actions of any value. What is it to be human? What 
is it to think? What is it to grasp a meaning? Who 
could possibly start to understand what is going on in 
a classroom, and, what's more, presume to say what 
should go on, without in some he~itant voice trying 
such questions against his own experience? Put like 
this, questions of method must in all senses involve 
statements of belief, commitments to a particular 
belief in what coming to know really means. 
It should finally be emphasised that such a way of 
seeing knowledge , and sound, is more likely to 
promote an attitude to the curriculum than a curric-
ular scheme. So conclusions from this work are not 
immediately practical; they amount rather to affirming 
and urging a particul~r way of looking at language, 
and it is this which suggests particular ways of 
using it. It is the intervolvement of language with 
knowing and w~th Being in an existential epistemology 
which the thesis as a whole points up, and it is this 
belief which thus has implications for the classroom. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
A framework for language research in education 
i. The original bestowal of meaning 
the task for which the philosopher is 
responsible is to understand how scientific 
understanding takes place within the comp-
rehension of my existence in the world. 
(Ricoeur,1978) 
Returning to the problem which ope~ed the thesis -
How can language be an object for enquiry?- this final 
chapter offers a reflection on the character of phen-
omenological research, and makes a tentative suggestion 
for the framing of research into language. 
The experience of meaning and its historical or 
cuI tural senses are not con tinuous. It is the la tter 
with which science has largely occupied itself; 
phenomenology, on the other hand, is concerned to 
illuminate the experience, and in so doing has found 
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it necessary to dispute the creation of the very things 
(objects) which science takes for granted. If real 
things cannot be simply assumed, then what measures or 
intruments can be said to remain useful? Consciousness 
is, of course, the starting - point; bjl;t then, conscious-
ness is nothing without objects, since self and objects 
are coristituted in the same moment. Those moments of 
constitution are finally the ground of phenomenology, 
then, and the phenomenological method could be described 
as a systematic attempt to recapitulate the events of 
meaning. This means that a phenomenology c~n be defined 
by {ts revelation not only of parti~ular objects - a man 
or honesty, or speaking - but of how those objects are 
so consti tuted." By defini tion, such a description of 
objects would reveal the engagement of its author; This 
~~ .. 
characterisation needs expansion. 
Consciousness provides objects 
Phenomenology is complicated by its self-consciousness; 
the general project to describe the history of exper-
ience is achieved only by working through the functions 
of consciousness, so we must think in order to write a 
phenomenology of thought, use language to talk about 
speech, and so on. This could be described as the 
first inhibition of phenomenology as a science. The 
second is the difficulty it has in justifying the claim 
to speak of a commonality of experience. Because no 
quantifying schemes can be applied to the transcend-
ental terms it has in place of independent instruments, 
measures of such as validity and reliability, for 
exaMple, are not appropriate. 
A phenomenology succeeds by being a virtue before these 
detractions. There are no instruments, no measures 
prior to the very function of consciousness, and all 
instruments and all measures depend for their very 
existence on the way they serve this function. 
Consciousness seeks objects, indeed is only known by 
the moment and way of its finding them. So if a 
consciousness or a phenomenology points out its objects 
to us, it is our recognition of those objects which 
recommends it, not the instruments of their discovery. 
We are not in the first instance led to affirm a view 
by some elegance of 'validation' but by"its manifest -
and manifestly taken for granted - ability to speak 
to our experience because it shares our objects. The 
'controls' of a phenomenology are only those of 
consciousness, and are no more sophisticated; 'checks' 
are similarly constituted; does a particular account, 
Bolton asks, (echoing Hume) 
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contain any ~etaphor which reveals a reality deeper 
than common sense? No.- Does it excite you to a 
~bral invol~ement in the affairs with which it deals ? 
No. Commit it then to the flames, for it is 
nothing but information-that will soon be super-
ceded by more information. 
(Bolton, 1981) 
This is not to make a Luddite assault on instruments, 
but to remember that they are the products ( and not 
the objects) of consciousness, and that consciousness 
first provided the circumstance of their ability to 
characterise reality. The 'crisis' of science which 
Husserl (1970) speaks of occurs when the foundational 
acts which abstract the object from pre-scientific 
experience are occluded, and Nature is identified with 
its already constituted and quantifiable objects. 
Again, this is not a peevish criticism of science 
which would do away with its products willy~nilly; the 
point is that scientific observations are born in part-
icular events, and may not necessarily be transferable. 
In his discussion of Galilean mathematics, Husserl says 
Actually the process whe~b~ material mathematics is 
put into formal-logical form •• is perfectly legit-
imate, indeed necessary .. But all this can and must 
be a method which is understood and practised in a 
fully conscious way. It can be this, however, only. 
if care is taken to avoid dangerous sh~fts of meaning 
by keeping in mind the original bestowal of meaning 
(Sinnebung) upon the method, through which it has 
the sense of achieving knowledge about the world. 
(1970, p.47) 
The particular and the general 
It is the sense of a particular time which is missing 
from the scientific account as much as the print of 
the originator; what is scientifically true holds in-
differently across contexts of situation. But events 
are unique by definition, and although identical in 
their phenomenal setting, their participants or their 
aims, it remains that consciousness is indispensably 
variable in its presence at the event, and no two 
events can share constitution. This is finally to say 
that events are defined as correlates of human intent-
ions, and that their character is imperfectly revealed 
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by any process of history-making. In particular we 
should argue that a way of characterising an event 
should be suggested by the peculiarities of the event 
itself, and lose its justification as the event itself 
recedes in timec-
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What, then, of those features of events which show them-
selves so consistently across contexts that we feel we 
can extrapolate them as constant or transcendent elements 
and hence meet them with standard methods? Again, the 
force of Husserl's comment is not that we cannot have 
such features, but that we should remember how the power 
of such terms was achieved, and understand the nature of 
their purchase on the world. After Kant, we can say 
that a way of seeing becomes transcendent when it appears 
to organise discourse around a given domain of experience. 
But such ways of seeing are cultural products which may 
come to enjoy a cuI tural life out of sight of their human 
origination, hallowed by use rather than ·vision. The 
possibility of a distinction between use and value here 
is arguable •. The evidence of the 'relativists),:: .. (Kuhn,' 
1970, etc) that we are educated into ways of seeing 
which condition our values is at least practically 
acceptable. It is similarly effectively true of science 
that it misunderstands the nature of its products. No 
scientist would want to claim that he deals wi~h a naked 
reality, but this does not excuse science as a virtual 
community from operating as if what it worked on were 
real. Science begins, Oakeshott tells us, 'only when 
the world of 'things' opened to us by our sense and 
perceptions has been forgotten or set on one side'.(1933) 
The .scientific way of seeing is identical with what it 
sees in its search· for stability: 
The method and the matter of scientific knowledge 
are not two parties •• they are inseparable aspects 
of a single whole •• And the notion of the categories 
of scientific knowledge or the instruments of scient-
ific measurement interposing themselves between the 
scientist and his object is a notion utterly foreign 
to the character of scientific experience. 
Without the categories .and the method, there is 
no matter; without the instruments of measurement, 
nothing to measure. 
And Oakeshott concludes that 
'Nature' is the product not the datum of scientific 
thought. 
( 1 9 33, p • 1 91 ) 
The datum becomes, then, not the consequence of a way 
of seeing even, but that act itself, and as such must 
be intentionally opposed to the thing in itself. In 
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this opposition we discover the nature·of the particular. 
For science attempts to conceive of the world 'under the 
category of quantity' (op.cit.), and its datum has the 
required stability only by virtue of the categorial set 
of which it is an indifferent member. There can, by 
this definition, be no such scientific experience as 
that of the particular. Again, Whitehead (1948) 
describes the aim of science to 'seek objects with the 
most permanent definite simplicity of character', 
Lived consciousness; on the other hand, dwells only in 
the particular, the general being what Oakeshott calls 
an arrest of experience. The category of quantity is 
nowhere of the essence of the thing which, because it 
always patently exceeds all the noetic acts which 
characterise it, remains to be experienced in its 
individual and materially distinct self. 
The category of quantity can be said to reveal a kind 
of essence, but only of the kind which is indifferently 
shared by members of a set which is. defined by the 
discipline of the enquiry. But if the 'essential 
essence' - as Heidegger calls it - is not characterised 
by a numerical account, it is equally true that words 
are ,·not· up to ·accomplishing its intui ted aesthetic 
presence, either. In any event, the relation between 
words and numbers is not one of mutual exclusion, 
and the opposition of the" quantitative and the qual-
itative is expedient rather than real. If it is true 
that scientific instruments create matter, it is 
equally true of words that they reveal or accomplish 
something intentionally, but in co-operation with the 
real world. In emphasising the expressive character 
of words we are tacitly denying any sense of an 
instrumental or technological function. Any priority 
claimed for words is on the strength of their aesthetic 
foundation as actual responses to the physical world. 
Their inability to 'fix' reality is the condition of 
their being in the fluid field of embodied conscious-
ness. Numbers are no less'intentional, but their 
objects arB noemata, and they qualify the cultural 
products which words create rather than share the same 
world from which words arise; numbers do not have real 
referents. But the result of this distinction should 
not be to· elevate words - and.the qualitative - over 
numbers - and the quantitative - for most practice 
proceeds unself-consciously without any such explicit 
methodological commitment. But it points to a way of 
validating enquiry which does not itself require 
validation. This is by asking whether and how an 
enquiry is object-directed. 
"To the things themselves !" 
Objects are defined as those real things which, by' 
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virtue of their independence of consciousness, requi~e 
this. consciousness to identify them~ Acts and artefacts 
of identification (noeses and noemata) belong to conscious-
ness as correlates of the object which, on pain of ceasing 
to exist must perpetually exceed the descriptions which 
are .. themselves., properties of consciousness. By this 
definition objects are unchanging, flux being a condition 
of consciousness and not of things. So an object-directed 
enquiry is not one which changes the object, but which 
somehow articulates the change of engagement of its 
author with his objects. Any report which 'changes' 
objects is a legerdemain which disguises the event of 
the enquirer's findings; all discovery, we could say 
(adapting Merleau-Ponty) is self-discovery, 'failing 
which it could have no objects' (1962, p.19l). So 
research is not object-directed if, failing to declare 
the interests of consciousness, it assumes that its 
characterisations are real. For if they are, then the 
object is indifferently at the mercy of such character-
isations to be whatever fashion or expediency require 
it to be. That being so, there is no longer any moral 
requirement of enquiry to describe the real as it is. 
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For morality itself is described by the manner in which 
consciousness entertains objects. This is not a special 
understanding of the word, but precisely what is implied, 
if not made explicit, in all its uses. MacMurray makes 
this point clearly: right and wrong have to do with 
seeing the object as it is in itself, and not as I would 
have it· 'for me' (1935). This is no less true in the 
affective than in the material sphere of experience, 
,and MacMurray distinguishes love of the other as he really 
is from 'love' for him as I need him to be. In any event 
morality is concerned with taking responsibility for one's 
attitude to an object, be it a person or a situation or 
a thing, and with therefore separating its attributes 
from one's (intentional) own. This is not schizoid 
finally because the will has precisely the project'of 
ever approximating characterisations with their objects. 
Morality enables us to distinguish in human terms 
between different manners of being-towards objects. 
When MacMurray observes that 'Reason is primarily an 
affair of the emotions' (op.ci~) he does not 
mean that morality is finally arbitrary, or 'merely 
personal'; r~ther chastity ('emotional honesty') 
derives from openness to the reality of objects 
sensibly held, and not merely intellectually 
abstracted, and sedimented. 
The problem of evaluation 
We are led from this consideration to ask about an 
enquiry, not "Is it quali tative or quanti tative ?" . , 
but nrs it moral?" There remains a problem of 
evaluation. For even if an enquiry is 'open to its 
objects', if it declares the values and unique method 
of its author how do we know that, and what yardstick 
can we possibly find which will qualitatively determine 
its morality? And anyway, if it deals in such a 
particular way with the particular, what can we compare 
it with and what relevance could it have for general. 
experience? Is this not likely to be the very worst 
of 'subjectivity • ? 
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By opposing subjectivity with objectivity we distinguish 
persons from objects in. such a way that their rel~tion 
cannot be described without recourse to extremes of 
mentalist or behaviourist philosophy. If, on the other 
hand, we understand the terms as continuously-related 
ways of having objects, then we take the vital step of 
involving persons with objects by necessity. Subjectiv-
ity is defined, then, not by the particular which it 
dwells in by virtue of its own uniqueness, but by the 
concern it shows to give that particular a g~neral, 
recognition. Such recognition completes the act, and 
the .~articular becomes an object constituted by sharing. 
This process is not susceptible to validation. Because 
it has not explained subject-object relations for its 
sch~mes, the ~research attitude' - to which validation 
as a technique belongs - naively assumes this relation 
and is to be found acting in the firm reality of noemata. 
Of course, this a tti tude is right when it speaks of 
demanding validation in te~ms of the object and not of 
the enquirer; it is right in supposing that the object 
is firm and, even if constituted, that it pre-exists 
characterisation. But the real meaning of its 'object-
i vi ty ,. is reveal ed when, in i ts provi sion 0 f the valid-
ation it requires, it fails to distinguish between the 
object ·proper and the characterisations given by what 
are yet·more noemata. Again, validation needs endless 
shoring up with ever-regressing devices because it is 
not object-directed. 
We have said that a phenomenology can be known by its 
revelation of the author's engagement with his objects. 
But how precisely do we know that? This is still the 
question. And what is it which we recognise and affirm 
or dispute ? 
If we return to the genesis of the phe mmenology, we 
observe that there is a researcher and there is a 
situation of objects which he must constitute. Now 
at this point there occurs a critical moment of char-
acterisation which determines these objects for the 
researcher and for his audience. This is the moment 
normally referred to as methodological~ and which as 
such is the correlate of the later process of·valid-
ation; indeed, it is all that validation can reveal: 
is the·'method what it set out to be, what its author 
says it is? For validation is based, as we shall 
see, on a limited model of truth which either takes 
for granted,. or else ignores, the earlier process 
of verification which guarantees its coherence. 
Validation depends on further regressed devices in 
quite the way t~at truth of statement and truth of 
things·- conceptual and pragMatic truths - depend on 
things being already what/as they are. We are only 
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able to proceed to their statement or demonstration 
because of some earlier moment of our knowing them. 
Things as they are must, on pain of ceasing to exist, 
be already partially revealed. This is what Heidegger 
means by a-letheia : 
Not only must that in conformity with which a cog-
nition orders itself be already in some way uncon-
cealed. The entire realm in which this 'conformity 
to something' goes on must already.occur as a whole 
in the unconcealed ••• With all our correct repres-
entations we would get nowhere, we could not even 
pre-suppose that there is already manifest something 
to which we can conform ourselves, unless the un-
concealedness of beings had already exposed us to, 
placed us in, that lighted realm in which every 
being stands for us and from which it withdraws. 
( 1 9 71 b, p. 52) 
Verification stands in relation to validation as does 
understanding to explanation. Validation, then, is 
a gloss on verification; or, in Husserlian terms, 
it is the provision of other noemata, which abundance 
may yet avoid the thing itself. Attention to valid-
ation is in effect an attention to method at the 
expense of attending to the object which the method 
should reveal.· 
Now, returning to the moment of characterisation, we 
can see that if the enquirer stands in relation to 
his objects in the light of what Hofstadter (1965) 
has called 'truth of spirit', then our response to 
his work - to his objects, that is - is a moment of 
verification, defined now as a-letheia, or uri-hidden-
ness. The instructive case is that of art. 'Truth 
of spirit' is the truth that a thing is in order that 
it can be that thing, and is declared by the work of 
art's own intentionalistic structure. The correlative 
'structure of aesthetic appreciation reveals this, for 
it is our openness to the art-object which allows its 
accomplishment in our experience, not our projection 
of it as it ought .to be. But, as was shown in the 
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analysis of Chapter 4, and developed in Chapter 6, 
aesthetic attending is n6t a special or marginal case 
peculiar to artists or audiences, but one which can 
be "systematically developed by them because it is 
the very foundation of intelligence. This is to ~ay 
no more than that we attend primarily to objects in 
this way as a condition of our being in the world. 
But in daily experience, truth of spirit is so un-
consciously a mode in which we proceed that it is 
occluded by a concern with the more patent and 
accountable forms of truth given with intellectual or 
material schemes. This is still more the case with 
the research attitude which, predicated on scientific 
principles is methodologically opposed to art in its 
concern with explicitation. Verification cannot be 
am~hod in this way, failing which it becomes an 
instrument very much like validation. For although 
directed at objects, verification is reflexive in 
that it asks whether those objects are entertained in 
a fashion which is true to their nature, and it can 
only try this-conclusion against its own experience 
of those objects. Verification so illuminates the 
moment of characterisation - the 'original bestowal 
of meaning' - that it returns the observer to the 
objects S9 constituted. 
Thus the criterial questions which attend verification 
are : 
Is the enquiry object-directed? 
Does it seek to know those objects better·? 
What does it use to do this? 
Does it reveal the value which prompts and maintains 
it ? 
And, chiefly, 
How can I know the answers to these questions ? 
Research is firstly the search for a form within which 
the answers to all these questions will be coherent. 
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But what medium c~n bear such a moral charge? 
What follows is a sketch_suggesting the ways in which 
educational research might better respect the 
expressive character of language. 
ii. A model for language research in education 
Hermeneutics concerns the conditions necessary to 
interpretation, and is based on-the assuption that 
understanding is linguistic, since it holds the real 
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to be linguistically constituted, and our involvement 
reflexive. In 'The New Hermeneutic', Murray (1978) 
develops Heidegger1s concept of the Ihermeneutic circle' •. 
There is always firstly an interpreter, for lonly in the 
context of the existing interpreter can the being of the 
work matter or make sense' (p.107). The social bonds 
which interpreter and text share in their common language 
are described by the life-relation of the interpreter. 
The pre-understanding of the interpreter describes· how 
the reader's foreknowledge is brought to anticipation of 
the text. This meets the essence of that which is inter-
preted and is 'the particular ~ind of reality which is 
experienced in the act of interpretation', constitutive 
of the text. But 
literary interpretation not only questions the work; 
the work also questions the one who understands. The 
circularity of the interpretative process lies in 
the movement of questioning and being questioned. 
(p.107-8) 
So,_ finally, the truth of what is interpreted is a 
dialogue with self. 'Each factor', says Murray ~merges 
through making explicit what is involved in the preceding 
one ••• I, and the circle is joined when the truth of the 
work qualifies the experience of the interpreter. 
Historically speaking, the science of hermeneutics 
belongsto the world of literary texts, and originally 
to biblical study. But it is clear that as a descript-
ion of engagement with objects, the hermeneutic circle 
may describe the more general process of experience, 
as well as the more specific one of phenomenological 
research. Metaphorically, then, we could see any 
situation of objects as a text for interpretation by 
the researcher; his report will be hermeneutic if it 
tries to explicate his circular involvement with his 
objects. Our response to his work is similarly circ-
ular. So if verification can be said to describe the 
intuition of the object, we can see that it is properly 
a hermeneutic moment. 
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How does such a view of research differ from what is 
characteristic of the research attitude? In mini-
mising the involvement of consciousness in the making 
of knowledge, science in one. move suspends the operat-
ion of the hermeneutic circle, ignores the linguistic 
constitution of reality and so immures itself from its 
objects. and from morality. This creates the antinomy 
of explanation and interpretation which Dilthey (1976) 
established as exclusive. But Ricoeur (1978) shows 
that they are in fact continuous moments of the same 
process of understanding, explanation being a refine-
ment for the sake of communicability. Scientific facts 
are not moments in a different circle, but events which 
have been sanitised by a research technology so that 
the 'original bestowal of meaning' is no lo~ger visible. 
Walker (1980) suggests that the literary tradition of 
re~earch report which distills wisdom retrospectively 
belies the 'prospective' and oral process of actual 
discovery. He draws on the testimony of Medawar (1969) 
himself a biologist, who says that the scientific paper 
'g+osses and "edits all you can actually need to know 
to replicate the process of discovery'. Not only is 
this process not the methodologically clean one it is 
popularly supposed to be", but it uses linguistic 
rather than mathematical. structures. Medawar tells 
of biologists in a particular experiment who ask 
repeatedly of their data "Does it tell a story?" 
Narrative man 
Freudian psychoanalysis is an exemplary hermeneutic 
whose aim is to discover with the patient the 'text' 
of his life, and so to teach him the language of his 
experience. It is the view of Kermode (1975) that 
Freud's research into dreams was so aimed at 'formul-
ating.principles applicable to the larger class that 
contains all narrative discourse'. This 'larger class' 
is surely described by the narrative form which the 
intentional structure of consciousness provides around 
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itself. According to Sartre, man is always telling f~~ 
stories; it is narrative which gives coherence over 
time to the field which the intentional arc (of 
Merleau-Ponty) inhabits. Narrative is not, then, 
exclusively a property of fiction, but because con-
sciousness shares this structure with it, fiction may 
have'a similarly privileged access to the real. Butor 
(1970) recognises this relationship, and claims for the 
novel in particular a profoundly heuristic function; 
the n9vel, he says, is itself a search for form, and 
study of this form 
allows us to rediscover beyond this fixed narrative 
everything it camouflages or passes over in silence: 
that fundamental narrative in which our whole 'life 
is steeped • 
.. (1970) 
We have said that all research is search for form; if 
the novel is similarly charged with describing reality, 
itis worth exploring what we can learn from its method. 
,/ 
Scholes and Kellogg (1966) have described two main 
and antithetical modes of narrative; the empirical, 
which has fa primary allegiance to the real', is 
realised by the historical account, true to fact, or 
else by the mimetic, which is true to experience; the 
other mode, the fictional, has 'its allegiance to the 
ideal', and its forms are romantic, 'which cultivates 
beauty and aims to delight', and th.e allegorical, which 
'cultivates goodness and aims to instruct.' It is 
immediately clear that the novel can have any of these 
forms, and has done so in keeping with developments in 
human knowledge. The realistic novel had an objective 
correlate which words hence pointed to; but developments 
in psychology, particularly, have led writers to a 
'fictional' rather than 'empirical' mode ~hose referent 
is 'in' consciousness if it can be said to be anywhere 
at all. Lodge writes 
The mimetic impulse towards the characterisation of 
the inner life dissolves inevitably into mythic 
and expr.essioni sti c patterns upon reaching the 
citadel bf the psyche. 
(1978, p.87) 
Murdoch (1978) similarly reports one of the dominan~ 
twentieth century forms of the novel as 'crystalline', 
a small quasi-allegorical object portraying the 
human condition and not containing characters in 
the nineteenth century sense 
(1978) 
Reference, if it is allowed, is thus turned in on the 
lexical surface of the text, and the reader's attention 
is dominated not by referents or plot, say, but by 
some internally-rhythmic system of the composition. 
In the extreme Barthean account (1975), characters 
become collections of semes - sucb as honesty, wit, 
etc - which attach to names. Where writers once wrote 
to address a single, realistic, perceptual world, they 
now increasingly give up this 'reality' in the attempt 
to. find the mythical, symbolic, archetypical structures 
behind individual experience. 
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But, paradoxically, these allegorical and fragmenting 
forms are attempts at a ·better, truer empirical form. 
These developments are not simply literary responses 
to a field opened up by psychology and linguistics and 
anthropology; they are, as Malraux says of style, 'a 
call for and not a consequerice of a way of seeing.' 
What· they innovate is reality itself. The novel is a 
search for the form which can carry the weight of its 
ever-unfolding insight, and the novelist's obligation 
is to make himself a stylistic and experiential 
ci tizen of a world that does not fully exist for 
him until he has done this; he has to invent the 
possibility of a book in a world he sees as not 
yet fully named. 
(Bradbury,1978) 
But it is Butor (1970) more than anyone who insists on 
the moral and heuristic character of the novel, and 
through whose work we can begin to see its contiguity 
with research generally. In the following passage he 
might well be talking of the research-worker: 
The novelist who refuses to accept this task (of 
'unmasking~ exploration, and adaptation'), never 
discarding old habits, never demanding any partic-
ular effort of his reader, never obliging him to 
confront himself, to question attitudes long since 
taken for granted ••• becomes the accomplice of 
that profound uneasiness, that darkness, in which 
we are groping our way. He stiffens the reflexes 
of our consciousness even more, making any awaken-
ing more difficult; he contributes to· its suffocat-
ion, so that even if his intentions are generous, 
his work is in the last analysis a poison. 
(1970 ) 
And one could similarly substitute 'researcb' for 'the 
novel' in his conclusion: 
Formal invention in the novel, far from being 
opposed to realism as short-sighted critics often 
assume, is the sine qua non of a greater realism. 
(ib.) 
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A call for a way of seeing 
What persuades us that we have returned to talk of 
research is the sense of responsibility towards his 
matter which the researcher should share with the 
novelist, and the criterion of truth-to-things with 
which we appreciate a work. In the case of the novel 
as with the moral research, the 'original bestowal of 
meaning' arises from the ground of reality, and gen-
erates an intentional appraisal of those objects which 
liberates consciousness from its previous, less partic-
ular way of holding them. Conversely, the worst of 
research is just like the form of those novels which 
give us an image of reality in flagrant contradiction 
to the reality which gave them birth and which they 
are concer~ed to pass over in silence. They are im-
postures which it is the duty of criticism to expose; 
for such works, for all their charm and merits, pre-
serve and deepen the darkness, imprison conscious-
n e s sin its co n t ra di c ti 0 n s , in its bl i n dn e s s , w hi c h 
risks leading it into the most fatal disorders. 
(Butor, 1970) 
,But, pitched against the status quo of the novel - or 
of standardised research methods - the writer has the 
task of delivering his work from its 'original bestowal 
of meaning', whilst the objects of this bestowal remain 
our only test of it~ rightness. Lodge (1978) describes 
the dynamic of this essentially rhetorical problem: 
In. the novel personal experience must be explored 
and transmuted until it acquires an authenticity. 
andpersuas1veness independent of its actual origin; 
while the fictiv~imagination through which this 
exploration and "trahsmutation is achieve,d is itself 
subject to an empirical standard of accuracy and 
plaus i bili ty. 
" (p.108) 
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The text becomes a witness of that dynamic for it 'lives' 
for the reader between the finite statements it presents 
,.. , ~ 
lexically, and the infinite experience of the reader, 
which verifies them. But if texts are ever open to new 
integrations, it is mistaken to suppose that they are 
merely 'like a picnic, to which the author brings the 
words and the reader the meaning' (Frye,1957.) 
The correlate of the author's responsibility is just 
that of the reader, and if the novelist creates his 
characters - as Thackeray said - by 'consulting' them, 
then the reader must do the same. We no longer identify 
the meaning of a text with its mens autoris but, as B.S. 
Johnson (1978) points out, an author takes care with 
words because he has a precise job for them to do, which 
fails or is frustrated if they rather license for the 
reader something other than what the text - as the 
author's agent - requires and provides. But there 
remains an area of negotiation because the text is 
self-consciously distinct from 'the thing', . and 
because appreciation must be coherent within personal 
experience. It is for reasons like this that Butor 
calls the novel 'the phenomenological realm par 
excellence, the best possible place to study how 
reality appears to us, or might appear ••• '. And it 
is because there is such an intentional space between 
ent~opy and redundancy - a breach in intersubjectivity -
that~hermeneutics establishes itself as the science of 
involvement with a text. 
The novel stands as all of a form, a metaphor and a 
model of research. As a form, its wholly linguistic 
character suggests its moral commitment to the reader's 
experience, without which its life is limited; as a 
metaphor for research it chiefly emphasises. the urge 
to present veracious narrative; as a model it combines 
th~se'virtues to show how the def~nition of reality is 
essentially a linguistic and therefore co-operative 
activity, directed at objects which it can never 
exhaust. But"'i t is mainly as a form that it is valuable 
b~cause giv~n with its form is the obligation to search 
for form, failing which it can have nothing to say. 
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There is also, in the system of internal dependencies 
which constitutes the novel, part of its own hermeneutic, 
as it were. For this formal invention is the transparent 
display of the terms of its claims to characterise 
reality; the hermeneutic circle is closed if these terms 
satisfy the demands of the reader that his experience be 
intentionally coherent. If he cannot verify the text, 
it remains intentionally true that the text has failed. 
But since research makes a more explicit claim to char-
acterise reality, it needs to surpass the novel in the 
articulation of its method. Where the novel carries the 
terms of its formal invention as a virtual function of 
the text, research ,should be explicit about what it is 
doing and why. A hermeneutic approach to research 
demands that the 'original bestowal of meaning' be 
evident. The notion of the hermeneutic circle further 
requires that data be negotiable with the personal and 
wider cultural and disciplinary ~alues of the interpreter; 
by revealing how objects have been characterised as data -
that is, how an event became a text - the hermeneutic 
research provides us wi·th the particular clues necessary 
to its evaluation in experience. 
From our exploration of subjectivity, we understand 
that truly phenomenological research must have an at 
least implicit recognition of the intentional relations 
of subject and object, and is not, therefore, merely 
'personal'; the analogy of research with the novel 
points to the necessity of perpetual innovation to 
provide techniques special to the object of. enquiry; 
by finally placing the whole within the frame of 
hermeneutics, we can now say that. the moral enquiry 
describes its engagement with its objects, and justifies 
its claim to be talking about real objects by- revealing 
its own orientation. What might such a piece of research 
actually look like ? 
Conclusion : reaffirmat20n 
What has been described - or prescribed - is of course 
hardly new, and there are. now several examples of 
educational research which embody some if not all of 
these principles. One of' the earliest was an enquiry 
carried out by Inglis (1969), who investigated the 
English curriculum in the Fourth year of thirteen 
schools in a (then) quite innovatory style. I quote 
at length from an inspired introduction to the work: 
Such research has no utilitarian justification; it 
cannot provide incontrovertible.data for prediction. 
It justifies itself more as a map on which many in-
dividuals may find their place. Like a novel, it 
gives readers (or participants in the dialogue) a 
chance to recognise themselves, and to do this it 
needs to realise that 'subtle interrelatedness' 
(in D.H.Lawrence's phrase) which marks creative 
fiction. It needs, therefore, to attempt a real-
isation of a total context, an intellectual and 
moral milieu, and any such attempt will only make 
sense as there is present in the writing without 
self-importance or self-consciousness the person-
ality of the writer himself. In such a context 
in his own society, reflection upon the work and 
the relationships within the work is a natural 
and right thing to record; it is an essential 
part of truthfulness about the work ••. 
I, the writer of this book, am a part of the subtle 
interrelatedness which I write about. Often I can-
not prove what I am saying. It is a matter of inter-
pretation. I believe it, however, and I intend this 
kind of effort to reveal a certain significance about 
the social realities of education which are otherwise 
neglected. I hope to suggest the wild and peculiar 
regions of superstition, ideal fantasy and pr~judice 
which move in the minds of children, however simple 
and straightforward commonsense needs must think of 
them as being. I want further to define the nature 
.. the imagina ti ve sta tus and the' function as yet large-
ly potential of the teacher in school and society, 
and in particular the English teacher. For the 
teacher, as we all half-know, is the source of a 
people's energy, of its powers of subversion and the 
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roots of its continuity. Yet we do not train 
him to feel this truth and very few teachers act 
on it. He is unsure of what he does know and how 
he can act - every union action, examination, or 
use of a cane witnesses this uncertainty. He does 
not know in what dialectic he is caught up, nor. 
how to discover it. He does not know what the 
lives of the children among whom he stands are 
worth 
(Inglis, 1969, p.15 & 16) 
The reader must of course judge for himself the tenor 
of Inglis' work, and how successful he was in his 
attempt; that his aims are still more relevant and 
unfulfilled in the general practice of English teaching 
is rot an indication of failure. But what chiefly 
/ interests me in this passage (and in the research as a 
whole) is the mark of its commitment and even outrage; 
there is clear, human point to it. Laid out before us 
is the whole story of an engagement, as far as that is 
possible, in its practical and ideological honesty. 
None of this ~akes it 'phenomenological' or 'hermen-
eutic' by· necessity, and of course-it does not matter 
whether it is known in this way, although it is inter-
esting that Holbrook he.s .recently come to see his 
English for the Rejected (1964) as essentially a work 
1 
of phenomenology. He does so, I believe, because of 
the work's declared human values and its· efforts to 
discover what is true in them. Such work as this, and 
Inglis', is not distinguished from other research by 
features like the syntactical presence of t?e author -
the "I" which it shares with case-study methods, for 
example - but because it is both practical and engaged, 
.. . 
the research its~lf subordinating 'empirical' obser-
220 
vation, however benign, to passionate concern to improve 
practice fromnwithin practice. For what use is research 
which, like Wittgenstein's philosophising, 'leaves 
things as they are' ? 
1 - ina personal communication with the author. 
Perhaps I have merely given a description of the best 
of all educational res~~rch, a description which would 
fit many pieces of research never remotely conceived 
as ·phenomenological. The truth is that in making 
explicit the processes of meaning and truth, phenomen-
ology deliberately maximises not only what is common 
to the best of enquiry, but what is in fact essential 
to all operations of consciousness, and hence to all 
research. Phenomenology 'merely' provides the oppor-
tunity for research-to be honest about rather than 
take for granted the human conditions in which a work 
arises and comes to have meaning. 
The benefits of such enquiry are not 'academic', but 
in the very best senses practical. It is a function 
of this thesis that contribution to knowledge is not 
a direct possibility. But the researcher - and most 
particularly the teacher-researcher - makes a different· 
contribution: the result of radical reflection is 
inevitably improved practice, since heuristic thinking 
and thoughtful practice go hand in hand. This does not 
mean that research projects should become confessional, 
'growth', therapeutic or other self-directed schemes, 
and this is not the necessary outcome of a programme 
of reflection; reflection on experience is only good 
if it seeks out the real objects which unify that 
experience, and which make the experience recognisable 
to others. 
So the final recommendation is ingenuously·simple. 
Perhaps more than at any other time, English Studies 
now needs, through the mediation Qf every single one 
of its teachers,' to turn back on itself with radical 
questions: Why do I do this, or that? What ultimately 
for? How sh'ould I do it better? v[hat is the value 
which is its measure? But to do this they do not 
221 
need the sedimented schemes and models of language 
which educational research has assumed; they need 
on each occasion to create them anew so the stories 
they tell will be of their own 'original bestowal of 
meaning'. We should expect no less of anyone who 
presumes to work in a truly expressive discipline. 
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Appendix A Summary scheme of the argument of Chapters 4 and 5 
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- -----
Thesis for methodology 
In exam1-n1-ng language in terms of its 
symbols ~e may lose sight of the fact 
that these symbols represent an event 
in experience 
Words may have lexical, senses but pers-
onal interpretation gives them 
significance 
In speech ~e re-create meanings in a 
personal style 
Mostly, dialogue is neither pre-
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Meaning - even to the speaker - comes 
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Appendix B Some further notes on the enquiry reported in Chapter 5. 
i. The school and the students 
The usual class teacher, Yve Shrewsbury, gave me these notes 
some months after I had finished working with this group:-
"Jaqger School: Community School in name only. Built in 
1954. S.P.S. In the middle of a large council estate 
on the edge of the city. ·Predominantly white working- class. 
The students: Upper 6th: I only taught them for a year. 
They were passed on to me with very poor recommendations, 
badly-motivated, lazy but mostly disruptive. They turned 
out to be some of these things, but mostly very lively and 
very nice. 
Murray: A drain-pipe in a grey mac. Very odd boy. 
Hardly ever did any work •. Rarely turned up' with books etc., 
only ever wanted to discuss sex, mostly mine. 
Tony: A wonderful boy! outgoing. Verbally very good; 
real problems with written work. Lazy! 
Paul: A clever boy who knew it. On his own was very nice. 
In class he constantly put down the others who were strugg-
ling and could cause a lot of aggro within the group. 
Kevin: Salt of the earth! Not really up to English 'A' 
level. A pl~dder but worked very hard. Really did try 
his best. Constantly got at by Paul, who always tried to put 
him down. 
Martin: 'Again a lovely boy. Hard working but found Plath 
difficult. Suffered from Paul's acid personality. 
Shane: Quiet, unassuming. 
I really liked him. 
A clever boy who worked hard. 
Luke: Very shy; a real worker but had lots of problems with 
English lit. Not really up to 'A' level. 
Julie: Loud, confident, lazy tons of personality. She 
always thought she would get by on her own brilliance; ·un-
fortunately she didn't have it. (P.S. Did you know she's 
singing in a nightclub in Tenerife?! True!). 
Gillian: Probably the mousiest, quietest girl I've ever met. 
Rarely did any work, and did not speak in lessons for the whole 
year. 
Sally: A very bright han~-working gir.l with a quiet confidence 
"in her own abilities, she was probably the most respected girl 
by the rest of the group who on the whole didn't like each other 
very much. 
Dawn: Very bright, quiet, hard-working; she probably had 
the greatest insight into Plath's poetry. 
Vicky: A lovely girl, a bit of a plodder, had great diffic-
ulties with Plath; her main problem was that she took every-
thing literally and always wanted to talk about Ted Hughes and 
Plath and what their relationship was like." 
I should record that in my opinion Yve was an exemplary teacher, who 
gave a great deal to each of the students. I, too, learned much 
from my time spent at the school. Chiefly, although the ideas in 
Chapter 5 are my own, their final shape owes much to Yve's collabor-
ation and criticism; there remain, of course, areas of interpret-
ative disagreement between us. 
ii. The exercise 
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The class had not previously worked in this way. On this part-
icular day, they met as a whole and spent some ten minutes considering 
the poem in pairs; Paul had previously been asked to prepare a 
short introduction to the poem which he presented, before the groups 
went off to separate rooms; they were given the following questions, 
largely to ensure that there would be some discussion: 
What characterises each section of the poem? 
What do you think are the most important images? 
What links the sections? 
Compare this poem with 'Getting there', or 'Death and Co', 
or any others that we've done. 
iii. The text 
The groups obviously dealt with the whole of Berck-Plage, although 
Chapter 5 is based on their interpretation of,the first stanza only. 
This is reproduced here; the remainder of this very long poem can be 
found in Ariel, (Plath, 1965). 
Berck-Plage by Sylvia Plath 
(I) 
This is the sea, then, this great abeyance. 
How the sun's poultice draws on my inflammation •. 
Electrifyingly-colored sherbets, scooped from the freeze 
'By pale girls, travel the air in scorched hands. 
Why is it so quiet, what are they hiding? 
I have two legs, and I move smilingly. 
A sandy damper kills the vibrations; 
It stretches' for miles, the shrunk voices 
Waving and crutchless, half their old size. 
The lines of the ~ye, scalded by these bald surfaces, 
Boomerang like anchored elastics, hurting the owner, 
Is it any wonder he puts on dark glasses? 
Is it any wonder he affects a black cassock? 
Here he comes now, among the mackerel gatherers 
Who wall up their backs against him. 
They are handling the black and green lozenges like 
the parts of a body. 
The sea, that crystallised these, 
Creeps away, many-snaked, with a long hiss of distress. 
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iv. 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
The transcriptions 
Murray, Paul, Tony : 
M 
P 
T 
P 
T 
P 
T 
M 
P 
M 
T 
P 
right, Berck-Plage by Sylvia Plath 
OK, erm the poem 
set out in seven parts 
seven sections and beginning with a first very personal, view 
of a, French holiday resort for erm (?) people, it progresses 
through the seven sections to 
burial scene 
a burial scene 
seems to follow progression of a person who's died in this 
place and who's been took out 
I think a lot of people at Berck-Plage were, thingies, war, 
war injuries 
they might have been yeh 
they were actually I think, it (?) 
first 
it begins with a description of the actual scene at Berck-
Plage the seaside resort, and as the poem progresses, er 
other ideas are introduced so, on top of the sort of main 
theme 
(noise) 
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and these extra themes carryon until the actual scene changes 
'n 
13 T it seems that she puts ideas on to 't actual description but 
. n then, ideas get more and description gets less, and event-
ually its all ideas and actual description just, fades away 
14 P yes er I see what you mean, yes good point 
15 M yes, yarse 
16 P we have some erm sort of pointers here, like erm What chara-
characterises each section of the poem? well if we take 
section 1 first of all, it is, it is the sort, of description 
of the, the actual, seaside resort This is the sea, then, this 
great abeyance and this is the sun's poultice draws on How the 
sun's poultice draws on my inflammation 
17 T yeh I think its supposed I think that, there's a bit of cynicism 
in that first er, How the sun's poultice draws on my inflamm-
ation, supposed to mean, you shouldn't, don't go away wi' t'idea 
that being by the seaside'll make you better, erm sun'll make 
you better and how, how is sun supposed to draw on yer 
inflammations? 
18 P I think there could be something in the fact that, y'know the 
people are by the sea, but y'know, they're cripples 
19 T useless yeh 
20 P its its not going to do anything to them anyway 
21 T its abeyance in'it, its but 
22 M but useless 
23 P there's a sort of contradiction in the actual thing because 
there y'know the sea is sort of the place where all life came 
from in the first (T : yeh) place a sort of life-giving force 
while y'know tl:ese people sort of, life-defying if. you like, 
cos their lives (?) 
24 TIM: yeh 
25 P . getting to be old infirm y'know their no chance of carrying on 
life at all 
26 M in the normal sense 
/ 
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27 P 
28 T 
in the normal sense of the word yes, good point 
second point just seems to be describe, most its, I don't 
know the description of one. 
***** 
2 : Kevin, Shane, Martin, Luke : 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
K : I'll start reading what notes I've got then shall I, take 
it section by section •.• first one sort of, sets the scene 
it its obviously er showing yer that its its a place that 
she's actually been to this Berck-Plage, and er, ther're a 
lot of images in the first one sort of de denoting emptiness, 
illness, there's priests included er fishers, er the idea of 
the sea as a creative centre, er, is also included in that, 
n its one of t'most over-powering 
S a creative centre a creative centre where d'you get that from 
M a creative centre can I ask you where you get that from 
though 
K yeh, erm well it comes from the er different things, the er, 
••• oh where is it ••• it does follow through then this This 
is the sea, then, this great abeyance, erm, you get the idea 
from it that it is a sort of creating, force, its its power-
ful, its great and its vastness,they talk about, er 
S yeh, now its emphasising the emptiness isn't it 
K yeh, but 
S cos it isn't creating anything 
K well I don't know 
L as though its useless worthless for them, there because 
M What's abeyance mean now 
S vastness 
K oh is it I -thought (?) confused 
L yeh emptiness 
S its justa vast empty sea and they're all crippled aren't they 
so its really worthless to them 
M this is-a positive image the Electrifying-coloured sherbets 
what's that 
16 S 
17 M 
18 L 
19 M 
that's emphasising holiday atmospheres 
I thought it could be er t'foam on t'sea 
no 
sherbets, yeh they all fizz up don't they like white what's up 
20 K 
21 S 
22 L 
23 K 
24 S 
25 M 
26 K 
wi' yer 
there is holiday-type atmosphere isn't it erm then description 
of the sea y'know like its vastness it sort of describes a 
certain lack of human contact, that'd foll that'd follow through 
with these people they sort of they're away from everybody else, 
they're sort of away from society aren't they a separate er 
community on their own erm ••• then, it carries on in in Section 
2 er, black boot that's that's 
no it jumps ahead a bit (?) 
it changes in Section 2 doesn't it· 
yeh 
that that Section 2 
yeh tone of it tone of it changes 
if you go back to Section 1 then that black cassock association, 
it refer~ to death, doesn't it ... that's that's a sort of 
negative thought er and then you get mackerel gatherers she 
27 S 
28 K 
29 S 
30 M 
she seems to be alternating in ea ea within each sort of 
section with positive and negative thoughts and also er just 
ideas and images and also actual, experiences like probably 
'she's obviously been to this place, she has been to Berck-
Plage, erm and she sees these mackerel gatherers, that sort 
of shows a positive side of life er and then ideas contrast 
er between death and disease and er the sort of the land 
and the sea where these people are, I think they, I defin-
itely think that they, that the sea's sort of seen as a, a 
sort of harbour of life ••• whereas they 
where they're separated 
whereas this place they're separated from it, because there's 
something wrong with them 
yeh I agree with that 
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what's this, explain what significance this black boot has then 
***** 
3 : Julie, Sally, Dawn, Vicky, Gillian: 
1 J 
2 S 
3 J 
4 S 
5 J 
6 S 
7 J 
8 S 
9 S 
10 V 
11 S 
12 J 
13 S 
14 V 
15 J 
16 S 
17 J 
18 V 
19 J 
20 S 
21 J 
22 S 
23 J 
24 V 
25,S 
26 J 
d'you want me to say what we've got 
(noise) 
right we started off and we said 
we just said its what section in general's just a scene-setter, 
its, sort of, saying its, scene-setter for 
y'know its describing 
Berck-Plage 
describing the holiday atmosphere, its also describing 
also bringing in hospital elements and 
bringing in (?) 
(noise) 
yeh the hospital and these convales, these people that are 
convalescing, not very nice y'know 
shown by what 
negative images well er, look Electrifying-colored sherbets, 
scooped from the freeze by pale girls 
that that's er ice-cream 
that's ice-cream and then also, erm, wait a minute where is it, 
Is it any wonder he puts on dark glasses? 
(?) 
no, thats scene-setter for t'holiday 
that's a tourist 
'tourist (?) 
I thought that were t'priest because Is it any wonder he affects 
a black cassock? 
we can't that's the only sentence we don't understand properly 
but also we think it might 
we think it might 
but a lot of its got a double meaning y'know its the idea of 
tourism but also the idea of ' this, this, convalescent 
I mean like that where it says Is it any wonder he puts on dark 
glasses? we're seeing that from t'tourist point of'view, puttin 
on dark glasses and also, from like that old man's point of 
view like .. 
er he's put the dark glasses on 
blocking. out things 
blocking out things 
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27 D (?) negative images 
28 V and that as well, that I have two legs she's makin a point of 
it like nobody else has got two legs 
29 D 
30 J 
31 V 
32 J 
33 S 
34 V 
35 J 
36 S 
37 J 
38 S 
39 J 
40 D 
41 J 
she's like 
yeh its like __ I think there should be emphasis like I have 
two legs and I move smilingly like I've got em but nobody 
else has 
yeh n I can smile because of it 
yeh 
she's free to move around but .the others can't, they're in 
their wheelchairs cripples 
like (?) 
yeh 
its just y'know, sort of a scene-setter 
a scene-se·tter 
bringing the ideas in her mind to the. sort of 
oh oh everything, y'know going there as a tourist 
what's A sandy damper kills the vibrations 
we thought. that that were, y'know when you sit down on't beach, 
y'know I don't know if you feel it when you sit down its like 
a right, damp dumb thud, y'know and it does, when yer lying 
on the beach yer can't 
42 S I just thought it were the sand on the beach 
//43 J yeh that last line. The sea, that crystallised these/Creeps 
away y'know like tide creeping out y'know like it does, many-
snaked, y'know when t'sea goes out it it leaves all them little 
like snaky lines on t'beach, with a long hiss of distress y'know 
44 S its an idea that the sea's sort of distressed with what it sees 
45 J what it sees and a hiss of distress literally as well, because 
it does hiss as it goes out 
46 V why are t'mackerel-gatherers walling·up their backs against him 
47 J we think that well I think anyway that mackerel-gatherers 
fishermen tJ-ley just turn their back.s to these people, they don't 
want to·have nothing to do with them, y'know they just turn 
away from them 
48 V n that about, lozenges 
49 S well they're t'fish 
50 J they're t'fish 
51 S They are handling the black and green lozenges like the parts 
·of a body 
52 J and if you notice though lozenges comes into it a lot and er 
throughout poem 
53 V! and she describes coffin 
54 J : "yeh and I think its some reference to t'drugs and pills 
55 S medication 
56 J medication they're on all t'way through 
57 D cos you ave fish when you're ill don't you 
58 J yeh yeh they do yeh you give fish for protein._ 
